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INTRODUCTION 
To pay attention, this is our endless and proper work.1 
Ask any fidgety five-year-old—paying attention is hard. Our minds like to 
wander, to meander, to frolic, to detour, to flit from here to there and back 
again as they please. To focus on just one thing feels like work, particularly if 
that one thing happens to be work (or school, or anything else that we are not 
doing purely for the pleasure of it). The only way we can escape the effort and 
the tedium of paying attention is by finding a means of distraction. Thankfully, 
these days we have sources of endless distraction, known collectively as infor-
mation and communication technologies (“ICTs”), and individually as comput-
                                                        
1  MARY OLIVER, Yes! No!, in OWLS AND OTHER FANTASIES: POEMS AND ESSAYS 27, 27 
(2003). 
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ers, televisions, the Internet, cell phones, smartphones, tablets, email, 
voicemail, mp3 and DVD players,2 and pretty much any device with a name 
beginning with a lowercase “i.”3 We live a life immersed in ICTs—we rely on 
them at work and in school, at home and on vacation, when we are alone and 
when we are with others.4 Even when we sleep, they are never far from our 
reach.5 Sweet distraction is just a click away. It is a wonderful thing for our 
restless brains—or is it?  
Not everyone is convinced that our love affair with ICTs is an entirely 
happy story. There is reason to believe that ICT exposure is significantly erod-
ing our ability to pay focused attention, even when we want and try to do so. 
This effect of ICT exposure may be a special concern for today’s young peo-
ple—a group whom I refer to as the Digital Generation6—because they have 
never known life without ICTs, so they have always been exposed to them. It is 
also especially worrisome for members of the legal profession,7 who are in-
creasingly embracing ICTs8 and whose work requires that they possess strong 
powers of attention.9 Adding one plus one together, if we are particularly con-
cerned about the effects of ICT exposure on members of the Digital Genera-
tion, and we are also particularly concerned about the effects of ICT exposure 
on the legal profession, then we must be even more concerned about the effects 
of ICT exposure on members of the Digital Generation who grow up to be legal 
professionals. But deciding that we should be worried is only half of the equa-
tion. The other half is determining what—if anything—we should do about it.  
                                                        
2  See Michael P. O’Driscoll et al., Work-Related Technological Change and Psychological 
Well-Being, in TECHNOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WELL-BEING 106, 106 (Yair Amichai-
Hamburger ed., 2009). Because new types of ICTs are constantly being developed, an effort 
to catalog all existing ICTs would be futile. Accordingly, this Article should be understood 
to refer to ICTs in the broadest, most inclusive sense, including both the devices we use 
(e.g., tablets, smartphones) and the websites and programs we run on those devices (e.g., 
email, social media websites). 
3  This refers, of course, to the myriad devices made by Apple Inc., including the iPhone, 
iPad, iPod, and iMac. See generally APPLE STORE, http://store.apple.com/us (last visited Feb. 
8, 2015). 
4  Access to ICTs varies greatly worldwide and across different socioeconomic groups. See 
infra note 168 and accompanying text. The broad generalizations this Article makes about 
“our lives” and “the legal profession” are intended to reflect the average experience of adults 
in the United States and the U.S. legal profession, with the caveat that these generalizations 
are likely not applicable to adults in every country worldwide or even to adults in every so-
cioeconomic group within the United States. 
5  See infra note 183. 
6  See infra text accompanying notes 166–69. 
7  I use the term “legal profession” for convenience to refer both to law school and the prac-
tice of law, and “legal professionals” to refer collectively to lawyers and law students, 
though the terms could certainly also encompass law professors, mediators, arbitrators, and 
other legal industry professionals and the work that they do. 
8  See infra text accompanying notes 384–93, 436, 445, 461–63. 
9  See infra text accompanying notes 164–65. 
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This Article considers both halves of the equation in turn. Part I explores 
the science of attention and Part II explains why attention is important. Part III 
introduces the Digital Generation and their relationship with digital technology. 
Parts IV and V examine the relationship between ICT exposure and attention 
and review several suggestions that others have made about how legal profes-
sionals should respond to the challenges ICTs pose to focused attention. Part VI 
takes the conversation in a new direction: It predicts the ways in which the le-
gal profession, rather than the legal professionals, will necessarily have to adapt 
to technology in the future. Finally, the conclusion offers thoughts about how 
the legal profession should view its relationship with technology going for-
ward. 
I. WHAT IS ATTENTION? 
Prominent nineteenth-century psychologist Williams James famously 
wrote, “[e]very one knows what attention is.”10 The challenge lies in providing 
a precise definition. This is difficult because attention “is not a single concept, 
but an umbrella term for a variety of psychological phenomena.”11 It is a prop-
erty of multiple, different perceptual and cognitive operations that are in exten-
sive communication with each other.12 Accordingly, the study of attention is a 
broad field that spans most of perception and cognition research.13 Attention 
has ultimately become “a catch-all term for how the brain controls its own in-
formation processing.”14 While recognizing that attention means many things to 
many people, this Article adopts a narrower, more functional definition. As 
used herein, attention refers generally to “the ability to attend to desired or nec-
essary stimuli and to exclude unwanted or unnecessary stimuli.”15 This Part de-
scribes the anatomical bases of attention, the ways in which we control our at-
tention, the concept of working memory, and the reality of multitasking. 
A. The Attentional Networks 
One way of conceptualizing the source of attention is anatomically, by 
viewing attention as an organ system composed of at least three constituent 
networks.16 Michael I. Posner, a professor emeritus of psychology at the Uni-
                                                        
10  1 WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 403 (Cosimo, Inc. 2007) (1890). 
11  ELIZABETH A. STYLES, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTENTION 1 (2d ed. 2006). 
12  Marvin M. Chun et al., A Taxonomy of External and Internal Attention, ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL., 2011, at 73, 76. 
13  Id. at 74. 
14  Id. 
15  M.H. Sam Jacobson, Paying Attention or Fatally Distracted? Concentration, Memory, 
and Multi-tasking in a Multi-media World, 16 LEGAL WRITING 419, 421 (2010). 
16  See generally MICHAEL I. POSNER, ATTENTION IN A SOCIAL WORLD (2012) (analyzing at-
tention as an organ system through the exploration of its physical bases). Posner’s view of 
attentional networks is highly influential, though not universally accepted. See MAGGIE 
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versity of Oregon and a leading researcher in the field of attention, refers to 
these networks as the alerting, orienting, and executive networks.17 The first 
network, the alerting network, is in charge of the process of achieving and 
maintaining a state of sensitivity to incoming stimuli.18 Alertness is akin to our 
“awareness” or “wakefulness”19 or “vigilance.”20 It is the key to sensitivity to 
our surroundings.21 Alertness comes in two general forms, known as “phasic” 
alertness and “tonic” alertness. Phasic alertness is the rapid change in our alert-
ness triggered in response to a warning signal22—the “get-ready feeling trig-
gered by a teacher’s bark or a starting gun.”23 Phasic alertness likely involves 
mechanisms in both brain hemispheres, but it relies more strongly on the left 
hemisphere.24 Tonic alertness refers to our sense of overall alertness that fluc-
tuates depending upon the time of day, fatigue, boredom, and other influ-
ences.25 It is thought to be produced by mechanisms in the brain’s right hemi-
sphere.26  
The second network, the orienting network, helps us to prioritize what our 
senses take in from the environment by selectively allocating attention to a par-
ticular sense or location.27 In other words, orienting involves picking what in-
formation we absorb from amongst all the information available to our senses.28 
This means that as we pay attention to one stimulus in the environment, the 
other stimuli competing for our attention lose their influence—we stop paying 
attention to them.29 For example, as we focus our attention on the sound of a 
bird chirping, we stop paying attention to the sounds of the wind whistling 
through the trees and the children kicking a soccer ball nearby.  
Functionally, orienting involves aligning our attention with a source of 
sensory signals, either overtly (our eyes move as our attention moves) or cov-
ertly (no eye movements).30 The parietal, frontal, and subcortical areas of the 
                                                                                                                                
JACKSON, DISTRACTED: THE EROSION OF ATTENTION AND THE COMING DARK AGE 246–47 
(2008). 
17  Steven E. Petersen & Michael I. Posner, The Attention System of the Human Brain: 20 
Years After, ANN. REV. NEUROSCIENCE, 2012, at 73, 74. 
18  POSNER, supra note 16, at 19. 
19  JACKSON, supra note 16, at 23, 247. 
20  Petersen & Posner, supra note 17, at 75. 
21  JACKSON, supra note 16, at 247. 
22  POSNER, supra note 16, at 19, 35. 
23  JACKSON, supra note 16, at 248. 
24  POSNER, supra note 16, at 35. 
25  Id. at 20. 
26  Id. at 34. 
27  See Diego Fernandez-Duque & Michael I. Posner, Relating the Mechanisms of Orienting 
and Alerting, 35 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 477, 477 (1997); Petersen & Posner, supra note 17, at 
75. 
28  POSNER, supra note 16, at 19. 
29  Petersen & Posner, supra note 17, at 79. 
30  POSNER, supra note 16, at 20. For instance, using attention to search memory involves a 
covert shift of attention. Id. at 50. 
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brain all participate in the process of orienting.31 One brain region interrupts 
our current focus of attention so that we can shift attention to a new target 
stimulus.32 Another region enables us to shift our attention voluntarily to a new 
target following a cue.33 This second region is part of a broader network that 
coordinates our alignment of attention (whether covert or overt) with a target.34 
The third network, the executive network,35 monitors and resolves conflict 
among thoughts, feelings, and responses occurring simultaneously in different 
brain areas.36 Executive attention may also play a role in a number of cognitive 
tasks underlying intelligence.37 When activity occurs in different brain areas 
and competes for control of our behavior, the executive network permits activi-
ty from one area to be expressed in our consciousness and behavior while it re-
presses expression of competing activity in other brain areas.38 In this way, the 
executive network enables us to behave in a goal-directed manner39 and also to 
behave coherently.40 Broadly speaking, executive attention is necessary to pre-
vent conflicting behavior in any situation that involves unexpected stimuli, 
novel responses, planning, making decisions, detecting errors, or overcoming 
                                                        
31  Id. at 64. The parietal lobe is the area near the crown of the head that is closely connected 
to eye movements and sensory processing. JACKSON, supra note 16, at 240. The frontal lobe, 
toward the front of the brain, is the seat of the brain’s higher-order reasoning and is involved 
in operations commonly associated with intelligence. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST 
AND SLOW 37 (2011); Kari Mercer Dalton, Their Brains on Google: How Digital Technolo-
gies Are Altering the Millennial Generation’s Brain and Impacting Legal Education, 16 
SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 409, 419 (2013). See also infra text accompanying notes 43–50 
for more information about the frontal area of the brain. The subcortical areas are those re-
gions below the cerebral cortex. These areas are home to the hippocampus and the amygdala, 
parts of the limbic system. Denise Feil & Anand Kumar, The Neuropsychiatry of Subcortical 
Ischemic Brain Disease, 1 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY REP. 69, 69 (1999). Subcortical regions 
play an important role in regulation of many behavioral functions, such as affect, mood, im-
pulse control, memory, and motivation. Id. 
32  POSNER, supra note 16, at 62. 
33  Id. 
34  Id. 
35  There are two prominent theories regarding executive control in the current literature, one 
of which proposes that there are actually two anatomically separate executive networks. See 
Petersen & Posner, supra note 17, at 80. Analysis of these competing theories is beyond the 
scope of this Article, so I refer to a unitary executive network for ease of reference. 
36  POSNER, supra note 16, at 10, 19. 
37  Id. at 22. 
38  Id. at 73. The classic way of demonstrating this competing brain activity is the Stroop 
task, which requires subjects to name the color of the ink a word is printed in while ignoring 
the color word name (e.g., the word “blue” appears in red ink and the subject must say “red” 
rather than “blue”). Though the name of the word is automatically activated in skilled read-
ers, executive attention enables the subjects to give the desired response (say “red”) and to 
repress the competing response tendency (the impulse to name the word “blue”). Id. at 21. 
39  Id. at 21. 
40  See infra text accompanying notes 138–40 for a discussion of executive attention’s role in 
coherent behavior. 
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habitual actions because, in all of these situations, multiple brain networks can 
be activated simultaneously.41  
Exactly how the executive network functions and its precise anatomical ba-
ses are not fully understood.42 However, researchers believe that executive at-
tention involves the prefrontal area of the brain.43 The medial (middle) prefron-
tal area is active in the face of conflict between stimuli and responses, and 
might function as a monitor of conflict.44 The lateral (side) prefrontal area ap-
pears to be important in holding task-relevant information in mind temporarily 
while other brain areas retrieve information relevant to the response.45 Almost 
any problem that depends upon the retrieval of stored information relies upon 
these two prefrontal areas.46 Executive attention also seems to involve the ante-
rior cingulate cortex (the “ACC”),47 a small region toward the front of the brain 
that is shaped like a banana.48 The ventral (bottom) half of the ACC is involved 
in regulation of emotion and reward detection.49 The dorsal (top) half is strong-
ly connected to certain frontal and parietal areas involved in cognitive process-
es and plays a role in motor processes and in cognitive functions such as con-
flict resolution and error detection.50  
All three of these attentional networks are crucial, and they work together 
constantly in our everyday lives.51 The alerting and orienting networks help us 
to sense and respond to our environment, while the executive network enables 
us to make sense of the world.52 For instance, imagine Caroline, a baseball fan, 
sitting in the stands, waiting to see Derek Jeter’s53 final home regular season at-
bat. The recorded voice of the late Bob Sheppard54 comes over the public-
address system, announcing, “Now batting for the Yankees, number two, Derek 
Jeter, number two.” The public-address announcement serves as a warning sig-
                                                        
41  POSNER, supra note 16, at 65, 73. 
42  See JACKSON, supra note 16, at 244. 
43  POSNER, supra note 16, at 82–83. 
44  Id. at 83. 
45  Id. 
46  Id. 
47  Petersen & Posner, supra note 17, at 76, 80. 
48  JACKSON, supra note 16, at 232. 
49  POSNER, supra note 16, at 10, 81. 
50  Id. 
51  Id. at 25; JACKSON, supra note 16, at 23. 
52  JACKSON, supra note 16, at 25. 
53  Derek Jeter, the former captain of the New York Yankees baseball team, made his major 
league debut in 1995 after being drafted by the Yankees in 1992. Harvey Araton, Of All His 
Numbers, the One on His Back Matters the Most, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2014, at B11; Rich-
ard Goldstein, Bob Sheppard, Mellifluous Voice of Yankees, Dies at 99, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 12, 
2010, at D8. Jeter retired at the end of the 2014 baseball season. Araton, supra. 
54  Bob Sheppard was the Yankees’ public-address announcer from 1951 until his death in 
2010 at age 99. Goldstein, supra note 53. Out of respect for Yankee history, Jeter asked to be 
introduced by a recording of Sheppard’s voice for all of his home at-bats after Sheppard’s 
death. Id.; see also Tyler Kepner, Yankee Who Lived a Dream Says It’s Near End, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2014, at A1. 
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nal that triggers Caroline’s alerting network, making her watchful for Jeter’s 
plate appearance. Caroline’s eyes overtly orient to Jeter and follow him as Jeter 
walks from the on-deck circle to stand at home plate, poised for the first pitch. 
Caroline’s orienting network works to focus her attention on Jeter and to filter 
out the thousands of camera flashes as fans snap photos of Jeter. Her alerting 
network maintains her vigilance as she waits for the first pitch, and her orient-
ing system overtly aligns her attention with the ball as her eyes watch it leave 
the pitcher’s hand and make contact with Jeter’s bat. When Jeter hits the ball 
high and deep and quite close to where Caroline is sitting, her executive net-
work resolves the conflict between the part of the brain urging her to keep a 
hold of her nearly full, six-dollar cup of beer55 and the part urging her to drop it 
on the ground so she can try to catch the ball—and she goes for the ball, of 
course. 
B. The Types of Attentional Control  
Posner’s attentional networks model explains the anatomical mechanisms 
involved in paying attention, but it does not fully explain how it is determined 
what we pay attention to—for example, how does the orienting system know to 
what it should orient? An early answer to this question was inspired by research 
on spatial orienting by Posner and others in the 1970s and early 1980s, which 
found that subjects responded faster to targets that appeared in locations they 
were attending to as compared to unattended locations.56 Intrigued by these 
studies, University of Michigan psychologist John Jonides conducted research 
that highlighted the distinction between voluntary and automatic orienting of 
attention.57 Jonides hypothesized that certain salient stimuli cause us to shift 
attention reflexively and automatically, but that we also have internal control 
over attention allocation, meaning we can voluntarily shift attention from one 
location to another when motivated to do so.58 This dichotomy between auto-
matic and voluntary attentional control remains the predominant theory of at-
tentional control.59 Jonides’s automatic and voluntary forms of attentional con-
trol are widely referred to as “bottom-up” or “stimulus-driven” or “exogenous” 
                                                        
55  The average cost for a twelve-ounce beer at Yankee Stadium was $6 in 2014. Cork 
Gaines, Here’s What a Beer Will Cost You at Every Major League Baseball Stadium,  
BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 21, 2014, 2:52 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/beer-prices-ma 
jor-league-baseball-stadium-2014-4. Though Jeter did not actually hit a home run in his final 
game at Yankee Stadium, he did hit a characteristic opposite-field single in the bottom of the 
ninth inning that drove in the winning run against the Baltimore Orioles. Araton, supra note 
53. 
56  Edward Awh et al., Top-Down Versus Bottom-Up Attentional Control: A Failed Theoreti-
cal Dichotomy, 16 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 437, 438 (2012). 
57  Id.; POSNER, supra note 16, at xvi–xvii. 
58  John Jonides, Voluntary Versus Automatic Control over the Mind’s Eye’s Movement, in 
ATTENTION AND PERFORMANCE IX 187, 188 (John Long & Alan Baddeley eds., 1981). 
59  Awh et al., supra note 56, at 438. But see id. at 438–40 (describing the dichotomy’s limi-
tations). 
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attentional control, and “top-down” or “goal-directed” or “endogenous” atten-
tional control.60 
When psychologists refer to bottom-up attentional control, they are speak-
ing of the mechanisms by which external events capture our attention involun-
tarily.61 Factors external to us, such as the salience of stimuli (e.g., the bright-
ness of a sudden flash of light), determine to what we attend.62 Bottom-up 
control is largely instinctual and automatic;63 our brains constantly review the 
environment for disturbances and we are pre-programmed to attend to novel or 
sudden changes.64 Fast-paced, reflexive shifts in focus were once crucial to 
human survival because they decreased the chances that a predator would take 
us by surprise or that we would overlook a potential food source.65 Though our 
circumstances may have changed, our brains have not. Modern brains react to 
novel stimuli just as the brains of Cro-Magnon man did forty thousand years 
ago.66 While the information we perceive through our bottom-up processes can 
sometimes be lifesaving (e.g., the child who suddenly chases a ball into the 
road), it is often nonessential and merely distracting (e.g., our cubicle mate’s 
sudden coughing fit).67  
In contrast, top-down attentional control refers to the voluntary attention 
we pay to processing information and regulating our internal mental lives.68 
This control is goal-directed and driven by internal factors (e.g., we voluntarily 
allocate attention toward the goal of finding our friend’s red jacket in a 
crowd).69 Top-down attentional control involves conscious awareness and cog-
nitive effort to focus on the task at hand.70 It draws upon the executive attention 
mechanisms to select between alternatives competing for attention71 and allo-
cates attention to the effortful mental activities that require it, including the ac-
                                                        
60  See Chun et al., supra note 12, at 77; see also R. Lisle Baker & Daniel P. Brown, On En-
gagement: Learning to Pay Attention, 36 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 337, 348–49 (2014); 
Jacobson, supra note 15, at 429; Claudia Roda & Julie Thomas, Attention Aware Systems: 
Theories, Applications, and Research Agenda, 22 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 557, 560 
(2006). 
61  Roda & Thomas, supra note 60, at 560. 
62  Awh et al., supra note 56, at 437. 
63  See Jacobson, supra note 15, at 429; Roda & Thomas, supra note 60, at 560 (noting that 
research on visual attention indicates that bottom-up mechanisms may have different degrees 
of power, such that certain stimuli become almost impossible to ignore, while others are 
more controlled by volition). 
64  See Baker & Brown, supra note 60, at 349; Jacobson, supra note 15, at 429–30. 
65  NICHOLAS CARR, THE SHALLOWS: WHAT THE INTERNET IS DOING TO OUR BRAINS 64 
(2010). 
66  Jacobson, supra note 15, at 430. 
67  See Baker & Brown, supra note 60, at 349; Jacobson, supra note 15, at 429–30 (examples 
mine). 
68  Chun et al., supra note 12, at 77, 82. 
69  Awh et al., supra note 56, at 437; Roda & Thomas, supra note 60, at 560. 
70  Jacobson, supra note 15, at 429. 
71  See Chun et al., supra note 12, at 82. 
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tivities involved in our experience of agency, choice, and concentration.72 Un-
like bottom-up attentional control, top-down control results in conscious, high-
level concentration.73 
The reason it is hard to pay attention without getting distracted is because 
our top-down, goal-oriented attentional processes are in a constant battle with 
our more powerful bottom-up attentional processes.74 While the top-down sys-
tem fights to keep our attentional resources directed toward a particular activi-
ty, the bottom-up system continually determines whether other sensory infor-
mation in the environment deserves our attention at any given moment.75 It 
takes significant cognitive effort for the top-down system to maintain focus 
without interruption or interference from the bottom-up system.76 This ability 
to sustain attention over extended periods of time is the ability to sustain vigi-
lance—to maintain focused alertness.77  
Sustained vigilance is challenging. The brain’s natural state is distracted-
ness,78 so it is not surprising that top-down attentional control often succumbs 
to bottom-up control and results in distraction. “We are born to be interrupt-
driven . . . and we must painstakingly learn and keep striving to retain the ever-
difficult art of focus.”79 But because our success in performing tasks that in-
volve reasoning and other higher-order cognitive operations is determined by 
our ability to control attention and avoid distractions, our natural distractedness 
is problematic.80 
To understand the battle between our top-down and bottom-up mecha-
nisms, consider John, a lawyer, who sits in his office late in the evening and 
works on drafting a contract. John endeavors to remain focused on his drafting, 
but he instinctively looks up from his work when a colleague knocks on his 
door and asks if he wants to place a food order. Though John’s top-down pro-
cesses strive to maintain vigilance and keep him focused on his goal (complet-
ing the contract), his bottom-up processes automatically react to a sudden 
change in his environment (the knock on the door). Unless John’s top-down 
mechanisms can overcome the instinctual pull of his bottom-up mechanisms 
more often than not, he will never finish drafting his contract (but, then again, 
he may get to eat dinner). 
                                                        
72  See KAHNEMAN, supra note 31, at 21. 
73  JACK FULLER, WHAT IS HAPPENING TO NEWS: THE INFORMATION EXPLOSION AND THE 
CRISIS IN JOURNALISM 60 (2010). 
74  JACKSON, supra note 16, at 79. 
75  See Baker & Brown, supra note 60, at 350. 
76  Jacobson, supra note 15, at 429. 
77  Chun et al., supra note 12, at 76; Petersen & Posner, supra note 17, at 75. 
78  CARR, supra note 65, at 63. 
79  JACKSON, supra note 16, at 79. 
80  Jacobson, supra note 15, at 430. 
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C. Working Memory 
Higher-order cognitive processes require more than just attentional control. 
They also rely upon an aspect of memory known as working memory. To ex-
plain working memory, it is first helpful to understand how our brains make 
memories. 
Our brains are made up of brain cells called neurons. When first formed, 
neurons contain just the cell body, which as it matures grows dendrites (like 
branches of a tree) and an axon (like a long wire).81 Memories are created when 
messages are sent across the gaps between the neurons, known as synapses, 
from the axon on one neuron to the dendrites on another.82 Memories are held 
in the connections made by this network of synapses and are established either 
temporarily (for short-term memories) or permanently (for long-term memo-
ries) when the network is strengthened.83 Working memory is crucial for estab-
lishing these long-term memories (and thus for learning anything84). 
Working memory is “a system, or . . . a set of processes, that serves to pro-
cess and maintain temporary information for use in other cognitive tasks.”85 
This definition implies that working memory involves both passive, temporary 
maintenance of information as well as active mental manipulation of that in-
formation.86 Working memory is complex, and researchers do not agree wheth-
er working memory is a distinct structural entity with its own specific process-
es, or whether it combines processes shared by other psychological functions.87 
The former view envisions working memory as a multicomponent system with 
three subsystems: an “articulatory loop” responsible for maintaining and pro-
cessing verbal material, a “visuospatial sketchpad” responsible for maintaining 
and processing visuospatial information, and a “Central Executive” system re-
sponsible for coordination and planning.88 The latter view envisions working 
memory as simply an activated subset of long-term memory that uses the same 
                                                        
81  GARY SMALL & GIGI VORGAN, IBRAIN: SURVIVING THE TECHNOLOGICAL ALTERATION OF 
THE MODERN MIND 7 (2008). 
82  JUDITH HORSTMAN, THE SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN BRAVE NEW BRAIN 39 (2010). 
83  Id. The more times the incoming data are repeated to the brain and the more intense or 
emotional the message is, the stronger and longer lasting the memory will be. Id. at 46; see 
also infra note 196 and accompanying text. 
84  Jacobson, supra note 15, at 423; see also infra text accompanying notes 157–62. 
85  Anik de Ribaupierre, Working Memory and Attentional Processes Across the Lifespan, in 
LIFESPAN DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN MEMORY 59, 59 (Peter Graf & Nobuo Ohta eds., 2002). 
Though the precise definition of working memory varies according to different researchers, 
there is consensus regarding working memory’s function. Id. 
86  Id. Insofar as the constructs of working memory and short-term memory both involve 
temporary maintenance of information, the two notions overlap. However, the active manip-
ulation component of working memory makes working memory broader in scope than short-
term memory. Id.; Cornelius J. König et al., Working Memory, Fluid Intelligence, and Atten-
tion Are Predictors of Multitasking Performance, but Polychronicity and Extraversion Are 
Not, 18 HUM. PERFORMANCE 243, 245 (2005). 
87  de Ribaupierre, supra note 85, at 59. 
88  Id. 
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processes that are also used for other cognitive tasks.89 Under either view, 
working memory is assumed to be responsible for such cognitive operations as 
transforming information that has already been stored in long-term memory, 
building new relations between elements of information, activating certain cog-
nitive representations and procedures, and monitoring ongoing cognitive pro-
cesses.90 Working memory is also related to our conception of consciousness: 
Whatever we are currently conscious of is in our working memory; if some-
thing is not in our working memory, we are not conscious of it.91  
Though working memory is critically important to various cognitive opera-
tions, it is also severely limited in capacity.92 Researchers believe working 
memory can only handle between three and seven bits of information at a time, 
depending on the complexity and type of the information and the degree of 
grouping, or “chunking,” of bits of associated information.93 A significant bot-
tleneck forms as information is passed from working memory into long-term 
memory because of this capacity limitation.94 The limitation is problematic be-
cause bits of information held in working memory vanish quickly unless they 
are rehearsed.95  
Memory and attention are closely linked, as the information that we re-
member seems to be the information that we have attended to.96 Our brains 
weigh our minute-to-minute experiences and pick some experiences to keep for 
reference (which become memories) and others to discard.97 Working memory 
relies upon attention98 in four ways: First, attention is necessary to ensure that 
the right bits of information get absorbed into working memory, while others 
get ignored.99 Second, attention is necessary to hold bits of information in 
working memory so they can be processed and stored in long-term memory.100 
                                                        
89  Id. 
90  König et al., supra note 86, at 245. 
91  CARR, supra note 65, at 123. 
92  Id. at 124. 
93  Jacobson, supra note 15, at 423–24; see also JACKSON, supra note 16, at 90. Chunking 
means grouping separate but associated bits of information into one larger chunk of infor-
mation, such as grouping the nine digits of a Social Security number into three chunks of 
digits. Jacobson, supra note 15, at 424. 
94  CARR, supra note 65, at 124. 
95  Id. Chunking helps prevent information loss because it allows more information to be 
held until it is processed into long-term memory. Jacobson, supra note 15, at 424. Long-term 
memory appears to have limitless capacity, though because information stored there is re-
trieved into working memory, retrieval of information from long-term memory is limited by 
the limits of working memory. Id. at 427. 
96  STYLES, supra note 11, at 8; see also Jacobson, supra note 15, at 422–23 (“Only those 
tasks attended to will be remembered . . . .”). 
97  HORSTMAN, supra note 82, at 40. 
98  The reverse is also true: We need to remember what we are concentrating on, so ability to 
maintain attention also depends upon working memory. CARR, supra note 65, at 125. 
99  Jacobson, supra note 15, at 422–23, 425. 
100  Id. at 425. 
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Third, attention is necessary to encode and store information into long-term 
memory, through repetition or chunking, so it is available for future retrieval.101 
Fourth, attention is necessary to retrieve information from memory.102  
To illustrate this relationship, consider two college roommates, Owen and 
Dominic, sitting in their dorm room one evening. Owen is talking on his cell 
phone with Carissa, his new girlfriend, while Dominic is watching The Godfa-
ther103 on his computer. Owen exercises attention to focus on what Carissa is 
saying and to block out the movie’s dialogue, so that Carissa’s offhand com-
ment that her birthday is coming up soon is absorbed into his working memory 
instead of Don Corleone’s conversation with his consigliere. After Carissa tells 
Owen when her birthday is, attention helps him to hold the date in his working 
memory long enough to write it on a nearby scrap of paper. As Owen repeats 
the date to himself several times, attention assists in encoding and storing it in 
his long-term memory. And next year, when that scrap of paper is long gone, 
Owen will need attention to pull the date from his long-term memory so he can 
remember to buy Carissa’s birthday present. This relationship between memory 
and attention makes working memory’s limitations and their consequences es-
pecially relevant to the impact of ICT exposure on attention, as Part IV ex-
plains.104 
D. Multitasking  
In part because of the interplay between capacity-limited working memory 
and attention, one of attention’s hallmarks is its limited capacity for infor-
mation processing.105 At any given time, we face severe limits in the number of 
choices that we can select, the number of tasks that we can execute, and the 
number of responses that we can generate,106 along with the limits in the num-
ber of items that can be maintained in working memory. As psychologist and 
Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman puts it:  
The often-used phrase “pay attention” is apt: you dispose of a limited budget 
of attention that you can allocate to activities, and if you try to go beyond your 
budget, you will fail. It is the mark of effortful activities that they interfere with 
                                                        
101  Id. at 425 & n.29. Chunking information is easiest when the new information can be as-
sociated with information already existing in long-term memory. Id. at 426. It requires great-
er attention when the new information cannot associate with any existing information be-
cause entirely new memory structures must be built. Id. 
102  Id. at 421, 428 n.43. 
103  THE GODFATHER (Paramount Pictures 1972). This classic film based on a novel by Mario 
Puzo depicts the transfer of control of a New York Mafia family from aging patriarch Vito 
Corleone (played by Marlon Brando) to his youngest son, Michael (played by Al Pacino). 
See generally id. 
104  See infra notes 252–81 and accompanying text. 
105  STYLES, supra note 11, at 1. 
106  Chun et al., supra note 12, at 82. 
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each other, which is why it is difficult or impossible to conduct several at 
once.107  
This implies that when we believe we are multitasking—doing two or more 
things simultaneously, while paying full attention to both—we are most likely 
instead dividing our attention between the different tasks.108 As Posner writes, 
“it is simply not possible for people to carry out multiple tasks that require ex-
ecutive attention at exactly the same time.”109 The explanations for why we 
must divide attention between tasks vary according to different theories,110 but 
researchers generally agree that, rather than doing multiple tasks simultaneous-
ly, we are rapidly shifting our attention back and forth between the different 
tasks.111  
Whether we are merely task switching or truly multitasking, we are doing 
it frequently throughout the day. Forty-six percent of us eat while driving, ac-
cording to a 2011 National Highway Transportation Safety Administration sur-
                                                        
107  KAHNEMAN, supra note 31, at 23. 
108  While this is generally the case, it may be possible to do more than one automatic or 
highly practiced task at a time. Jacobson, supra note 15, at 437. Automatic tasks are ones that 
do not require conscious control, such as breathing or walking. Id. at 421–22. Highly prac-
ticed tasks are ones that initially required attention but became more automatic with practice, 
such as typing on a keyboard. Id. at 422. Also, experiments suggest that the limits on our 
attentional processing come into play when we try to do multiple tasks that require the same 
type of cognitive resources, but that there may not be a limit on our ability to do multiple 
non-competing tasks. STYLES, supra note 11, at 161 (experiments found no limit on a sub-
ject’s ability to perform simultaneously a visual task (matching letters) and an auditory task 
(saying “bip” when the subject heard a tone)). 
109  POSNER, supra note 16, at 139. 
110  Bottleneck theories propose the existence of a central processing bottleneck that limits 
how much processing can be done at one time, the result of which is that the brain must fin-
ish processing the first task before it can start processing the second one. See LARRY D. 
ROSEN, REWIRED 79 (2010) [hereinafter ROSEN, REWIRED]; STYLES, supra note 11, at 15, 
154. Capacity theories suggest that the brain has a limited pool of processing resources, and 
tasks share that limited resource from moment to moment in a graded fashion. See ROSEN, 
REWIRED, supra; STYLES, supra note 11, at 155–56. Crosstalk theories propose that pro-
cessing two tasks may result in an “outcome conflict” between two streams of processing 
that would otherwise be independent of each other, meaning processing one task produces 
outputs or side effects that interfere with processing the second task. See Harold Pashler, 
Dual-Task Interference in Simple Tasks: Data and Theory, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 220, 221, 
240–41 (1994). 
111  E.g., LARRY D. ROSEN, IDISORDER: UNDERSTANDING OUR OBSESSION WITH TECHNOLOGY 
AND OVERCOMING ITS HOLD ON US 106 (2012) [hereinafter ROSEN, IDISORDER] (“[P]eople 
lack the ability to pay full attention to two tasks at a time.”); Jacobson, supra note 15, at 438 
(studies almost universally agree that attention shifts back and forth between the tasks); 
Reynol Junco, In-Class Multitasking and Academic Performance, 28 COMPUTERS HUM. 
BEHAV. 2236, 2236 (2012) (finding that research on multitasking has provided clear evi-
dence that human information processing is insufficient for performing simultaneous tasks); 
see also Dario D. Salvucci et al., Toward a Unified Theory of the Multitasking Continuum: 
From Concurrent Performance to Task Switching, Interruption, and Resumption, in CHI 
2009: DIGITAL LIFE NEW WORLD 1819, 1819–20 (describing a continuum of multitasking, 
from concurrent multitasking (tasks are performed almost simultaneously) to sequential mul-
titasking (a period of minutes to hours is spent on one task before switching to another)). 
768 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:754  
vey.112 While we are at work, we spend an average of just eleven minutes on a 
single project before turning to another, according to one study, and while we 
are engaged in a project, we typically change tasks every three minutes.113 The 
working parents amongst us spend a full quarter of their waking hours engaged 
in multitasking.114 It is not only the adults who multitask; as discussed in Part 
III,115 young people have caught the multitasking bug as well.  
All of our attempts to perform multiple tasks simultaneously come with ef-
ficiency costs, in three primary forms. First, each shift in attention from one 
task to another takes time, known as a “switch cost,” as our brains take time to 
change their goals, remember the rules needed for the new task, and block in-
terference from the prior task.116 Switch costs make shifting between tasks both 
time-consuming—generally taking about 20 percent longer than completing 
tasks sequentially117—as well as inefficient.118 The more complex, cognitively 
similar, or time-pressured the tasks are, the greater the switch costs.119 Second, 
when we get interrupted in the middle of something and switch tasks, there is 
some lag time (known as a “resumption lag”)—sometimes up to several 
minutes—between when we finish the interrupting task and when we go back 
to the original task.120 Third, even if we do not switch tasks after an interrup-
tion, our performance slows down, exacting a “restart cost” when we resume 
                                                        
112  JULIE TISON ET AL., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., NATIONAL PHONE  
SURVEY ON DISTRACTED DRIVING ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS 14 (2011), avail- 
able at http://www.distraction.gov/downloads/pdfs/national-phone-survey-on-distracted-dri-
ving-attitudes-and-behaviors.pdf. Another survey puts this figure at closer to 70 percent. Ja-
mie Locher & Owen Moritz, Eat-&-Drive Sure Recipe for a Crash, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Jul. 
19, 2009, at 14. 
113  JACKSON, supra note 16, at 84–85. 
114  Id. at 74. 
115  See infra text accompanying notes 178–80. 
116  JACKSON, supra note 16, at 79. 
117  Jacobson, supra note 15, at 438. 
118  SMALL & VORGAN, supra note 81, at 68. One study by University of Michigan psycholo-
gists found that switching tasks (e.g., answering an email while trying to write a memo) may 
decrease brain efficiency by up to 50 percent in comparison to completing the tasks sequen-
tially. Id. 
119  Jacobson, supra note 15, at 438 (describing greater switch costs when “the work gets 
more complex, when the work moves from familiar to unfamiliar, when the tasks must be 
done quickly, and when the tasks compete for the same cognitive resource” (footnotes omit-
ted)); Darryl W. Schneider & John R. Anderson, Asymmetric Switch Costs as Sequential Dif-
ficulty Effects, 63 Q.J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1873, 1873 (2010) (noting greater switch 
cost when moving from an easier task to a harder one than vice versa). 
120  Erik M. Altmann & J. Gregory Trafton, Task Interruption: Resumption Lag and the Role 
of Cues, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE 
SCIENCE SOCIETY 43, 43 (Kenneth Forbus et al. eds., 2005); see also ROSEN, IDISORDER, su-
pra note 111, at 109 (citing a study of computer programmers that found that resumption 
lags were frequently more than five minutes); Larry D. Rosen et al., An Empirical Examina-
tion of the Educational Impact of Text Message-Induced Task Switching in the Classroom: 
Educational Implications and Strategies to Enhance Learning, 17 PSICOLOGÍA EDUCATIVA 
163, 166 (2011) (defining resumption lag as the time between completing the interrupting 
task and returning to the primary task). 
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what we were doing before the interruption.121 As with switch costs, restart 
costs may be higher when we are interrupted from a more demanding task.122 
These switch costs, resumption lags, and restart costs combine to make multi-
tasking significantly less efficient than completing tasks sequentially. Various 
factors—such as the comfort of our surroundings, our degree of sleep depriva-
tion, and the complexity and familiarity of the tasks involved—make it more or 
less difficult for us to try to combine tasks, and thus more or less likely that the 
multitasking costs will be significant.123 
To illustrate what our brains experience when we try to multitask, imagine 
Avery, an emergency room doctor in a busy hospital. Avery is stitching up a 
gash on a patient’s forehead when a nurse approaches her with an urgent test 
request that Avery needs to sign. Avery steps away from her patient, removes 
her gloves, signs the request form, and hands it to the nurse. She then washes 
her hands, dons new gloves, turns back to her patient, and resumes stitching up 
the wound. A few minutes later, a second nurse comes to the door. Avery paus-
es her suturing momentarily and glances toward the nurse, who tells Avery that 
her next patient is ready. After thanking the nurse, Avery turns back to her pa-
tient and finishes the sutures. 
The way that the nurses’ interruptions delay Avery’s completion of her 
primary physical task (i.e., sewing stitches) is like the way that trying to multi-
task delays our brains’ completion of their primary cognitive task. The seconds 
it takes Avery to step away from her patient, take off her gloves, and sign the 
form after the first nurse’s request is similar to the switch cost exacted as our 
brains prepare for the new task and block interference from the old one. The 
minute it takes Avery to wash her hands, put on new gloves, and take up her 
needle is similar to the resumption lag between the time it takes for our brains 
to finish the interrupting task and turn back to the original one. The moment it 
takes Avery to acknowledge and thank the second nurse is similar to the restart 
cost that slows our brains’ performance after an interruption. The costs of 
Avery’s physical task switching in this example are minor—a minute here and 
a few seconds there, with no perceptible harm done to her patient. But now im-
agine that Avery is a trauma surgeon operating on a gunshot victim’s heart—in 
this scenario, even brief delays could have grievous consequences.  
In the same way, the switch costs, resumption lags, and restart costs our 
brains experience when we try to combine tasks may be inconsequential. No 
one gets hurt if we chat with a friend while filling out a crossword puzzle, for 
example. But when the task is more complex—such as driving a racecar—a 
                                                        
121  Schneider & Anderson, supra note 119, at 1874. 
122  See Florian Waszak et al., Task-Switching and Long-Term Priming: Role of Episodic 
Stimulus-Task Bindings in Task-Shift Costs, 46 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 361, 380, 400 (2003) 
(finding a substantial restart cost following interruption from a word-reading task, as com-
pared to subsequent trials involving switching between word-reading and picture-naming 
tasks). 
123  See STYLES, supra note 11, at 155; Jacobson, supra note 15, at 438. 
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performance cost of even half a second could make a life-or-death difference. 
And the more times we switch between tasks while trying to multitask, the 
greater the impact of these switch costs, resumption lags, and restart costs is on 
our performance. 
Multitasking imposes other performance costs as well. Multitasking can 
decrease our awareness of stimuli, disrupt our decision making, and impair our 
behavior on one or more of the tasks.124 In addition, recent studies suggest that 
the increased time it takes to accomplish a task while multitasking can lead to 
more errors in completing the task.125 Decreases in accuracy from 20 to 40 per-
cent can result, and the greatest decreases are likely when we try to multitask 
while doing intellectually demanding work.126 Multitasking can also impair our 
memory because it discourages paying full attention to what we need to learn 
and recall later,127 as well as because bits of information are lost from our 
working memory with each task switch.128 Even becoming a more successful 
multitasker might be harmful: Some have argued that improving our ability to 
multitask actually hurts our ability to think deeply and creatively by making us 
more likely to rely on conventional ideas and solutions.129 Compounding these 
performance problems are the psychological tolls multitasking can take on us. 
As previously explained, multitasking involves interrupting one task to perform 
another. Such interruptions tend to produce feelings of stress and anxiety, as 
discussed in Part IV.130 Multitasking may also make work feel more effortful, 
time pressured, and frustrating.131 Though there are some caveats to these find-
ings132 and some ways to minimize multitasking’s various costs,133 it seems that 
                                                        
124  Junco, supra note 111, at 2237. 
125  See Rosen et al., supra note 120, at 166. 
126  Jacobson, supra note 15, at 440. 
127  SMALL & VORGAN, supra note 81, at 137. 
128  Jacobson, supra note 15, at 441. 
129  CARR, supra note 65, at 140. In the words of psychologist David Meyer of the University 
of Michigan, when we multitask, we are “learning to be skillful at a superficial level.” Sha-
ron Begley & Jeneen Interlandi, The Dumbest Generation? Don’t Be Dumb, NEWSWEEK, 
June 2, 2008, at 42, 42 (quoting David Meyer). 
130  See GEORGE MANDLER, MIND AND BODY 239 (1984); SMALL & VORGAN, supra note 81, 
at 32; Rosen et al., supra note 120; see also infra notes 282–308 and accompanying text. 
131  See KAHNEMAN, supra note 31, at 37 (switching between tasks is effortful, especially 
under time pressure); ROSEN, IDISORDER, supra note 111, at 114 (describing a study that 
found workers who were interrupted while performing a task seemed to compensate for the 
interruption by working faster, with more stress, higher levels of frustration, greater feelings 
of time pressure, and more effort). 
132  For example, combining certain tasks that activate different parts of the brain—such as 
performing manual tasks while listening to music—may actually improve performance. 
SMALL & VORGAN, supra note 81, at 68–69 (noting that some surgeons perform stressful 
non-surgical tasks more quickly and accurately when they listen to their preferred music, 
suggesting that music may enhance the efficiency of those who work with their hands). Also, 
some environmental “distractions” may not be as distracting as expected. ROSEN, REWIRED, 
supra note 110, at 84 (describing a study in which college students learning new material 
received the same score on a subsequent test if they studied with a distracting video playing 
in the background as when studying in silence, though performance suffered when they were 
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multitasking is more effortful and counterproductive than it is effortless and ef-
ficient. 
Moreover, we do not become better at combining activities (i.e., multitask-
ing) simply because one of the activities involves an ICT. If anything, ICT-
induced multitasking is more insidious because we may not realize the frequen-
cy or extent to which we are trying to do it. While we might recognize that we 
are having trouble concentrating on the book we are reading while our spouse 
is standing in the room talking to us, we might not feel as though we are equal-
ly distracted134 when we have the same conversation via text message. The act 
of reading a text message feels similar to the act of reading a book, so it is pos-
sible that we do not consciously recognize we are actually trying to do two 
things at once. 
II. WHY DO WE NEED ATTENTION? 
With the foregoing background on what attention is and how it works, this 
Part outlines why attention is so important for our daily functioning, our ability 
to exercise effortful control, and our ability to learn. It then explains why atten-
tion is particularly crucial for legal professionals. 
A. Necessary for Daily Functioning 
Attention is crucial for our basic daily functioning. Our ability to perform 
simple motor movements, such as reaching and grasping, depends upon atten-
tion.135 So does our capacity for higher-order cognitive operations, such as 
                                                                                                                                
required to memorize both the video and the material (i.e., they could ignore background 
noise but were unable to split attention)). Finally, a few studies have suggested that interrup-
tions may not have the same negative performance effects in a real-world setting, with less 
stringent time constraints, as in a laboratory. See Rosen et al., supra note 120, at 166–67 
(noting that the study’s reading comprehension task took longer when it was interrupted, but 
ultimate comprehension was unaffected); see also ROSEN, REWIRED, supra note 110, at 76–
77. 
133  See SMALL & VORGAN, supra note 81, at 138–39 (finding that varying tasks throughout 
the day reduces multitasking stress; slowing pace may increase accuracy and efficiency); 
Jacobson, supra note 15, at 439–40 (switch costs can be reduced by self-cuing and practice 
of tasks to make them more automatic). But see JACKSON, supra note 16, at 79–80 (“ ‘Train-
ing can help overcome some of the inefficiencies by giving you more optimal strategies for 
multitasking,’ . . . ‘but except in rare circumstances, you can train until you’re blue in the 
face and you’d never be as good as if you just focused on one thing at a time. Period.’ ”) 
(quoting David Meyer of the University of Michigan). 
134  Alternatively, we may actually be less distracted by ICT interruptions than by live ones 
because we may be able to determine when it is necessary to ignore technological distrac-
tions and focus in a way that we cannot with live ones. See DON TAPSCOTT, GROWN UP 
DIGITAL: HOW THE NET GENERATION IS CHANGING YOUR WORLD 116 (2009) (arguing that 
the Digital Generation are better at handling pervasive distractions than Baby Boomers are, 
because the Digital Generation know when they have to focus and think deeply and are able 
to block out distractions to help them do so). 
135  STYLES, supra note 11, at 251. 
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planning and remembering things.136 Because our environment provides us 
with far more perceptual information than we can effectively process,137 we re-
ly upon our attentional mechanisms to focus our limited processing capacity 
efficiently on the most important information relevant to our ongoing goals and 
behavior.138 In essence, we need attention to help us focus on the right inputs so 
that we can produce the right outputs.  
The brain is known to be a massively parallel computational device in which 
many varieties of information are concurrently available from different parts of 
the system. In order to maintain coherent behaviour, some of this information 
needs to be combined for response while other subsets need to be “ignored” to 
allow selection for action.139  
This selection ability is essential for us to function coherently—and thus for our 
survival.140  
B. Necessary for Effortful Control  
Also crucial for our coherent functioning is our ability to exercise effortful 
control, which in turn depends upon our executive attention mechanisms. Ef-
fortful control is “the ability to inhibit a dominant response to perform a sub-
dominant response, to detect errors, and to engage in planning.”141 It is the 
source of our ability to focus and shift our attention and to regulate our impuls-
es.142 For example, when our entrée is the first to arrive at the table, it takes ef-
fortful control to wait until everyone has been served before we start to eat. Ef-
fortful control is a major form of self-control (or self-regulation),143 and is 
important for controlling our emotions as well as our cognition.144 Research has 
linked children’s effortful control to their development of empathy and con-
science and to lower levels of maladjustment and psychopathology.145 Devel-
                                                        
136  Id. 
137  Chun et al., supra note 12, at 75. 
138  Id. 
139  STYLES, supra note 11, at 251. 
140  POSNER, supra note 16, at 73; see also STYLES, supra note 11, at 252 (“In order to inter-
act with the environment in a goal-directed manner, we have to be able to select which re-
sponse is appropriate at any given moment. . . . For goals to be achieved other potential ac-
tions have to be inhibited.”). 
141  Mary K. Rothbart & M. Rosario Rueda, The Development of Effortful Control, in 
DEVELOPING INDIVIDUALITY IN THE HUMAN BRAIN 167, 169 (Ulrich Mayr et al. eds., 2005). 
142  POSNER, supra note 16, at 91; Mary K. Rothbart et al., Developing Mechanisms of Tem-
peramental Effortful Control, 71 J. PERSONALITY 1113, 1114 (2003). 
143  Rothbart & Rueda, supra note 141, at 169. The term “self-control” is more frequently 
used in studies of adults, while the term “self-regulation” is more often used in studies of 
children. POSNER, supra note 16, at 73. They both refer to the suppression of brain activity 
that conflicts with our current goals so that we can control our thoughts, behaviors, feelings, 
and reactions to stress, maintain focused attention, and interpret our and others’ mental 
states. Id. at 73, 87; Rothbart & Rueda, supra note 141, at 169. 
144  POSNER, supra note 16, at 91. 
145  Rothbart et al., supra note 142, at 1115. 
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opmental psychologists have identified lack of control as a risk factor for a 
number of undesirable behaviors in adolescents, such as aggressiveness, delin-
quency, substance use, and antisocial behaviors.146  
Researchers believe that effortful control and executive attention are 
linked.147 They both reflect our ability to regulate our emotions, thoughts, and 
behavior.148 It seems that executive attention mechanisms provide the basis for 
effortful control.149 In fact, some developmental psychologists view our devel-
opment of effortful control as a product of our having developed executive at-
tention mechanisms, which happens during our toddler and preschool years.150 
This connection between executive attention and effortful control makes sense 
because our executive attention processes enable us to deploy our attention 
voluntarily.151 If we were unable to direct our attention voluntarily, we would 
similarly be unable to do things associated with effortful control, such as rein in 
our negative emotions, prevent ourselves from overreacting, or overcome our 
habitual responses.152 We need executive attention whenever a situation calls 
for careful control of our actions.153 It follows that, without this attention, we 
would be unable to exercise effortful control. 
C. Necessary for Learning  
Attention and learning are closely connected154—so much so that attention 
is necessary for each step in the learning process.155 First, we need attention to 
absorb from the environment the information relevant to our current goal and to 
ignore all the irrelevant stimuli.156 Studies show that the likelihood of our re-
calling information later (i.e., having learned it) is greatly increased when we 
paid close attention to the information at the time we first encountered it.157 
Second, we need attention to process the stimuli we attended to.158 Not only 
must we attend consciously to the task we are doing while we are processing it, 
but we must also utilize our top-down attentional mechanisms to prevent inter-
ruptions and distractions from taking us off-task.159 Third, we need attention to 
                                                        
146  Id. 
147  POSNER, supra note 16, at 91–92. 
148  Id. at 92; Rothbart & Rueda, supra note 141, at 173. 
149  Rothbart & Rueda, supra note 141, at 184. 
150  Rothbart et al., supra note 142, at 1114–15. 
151  Rothbart & Rueda, supra note 141, at 173. 
152  See id. 
153  Id. at 184. 
154  POSNER, supra note 16, at 152. 
155  Jacobson, supra note 15, at 428. 
156  See id. at 421. 
157  POSNER, supra note 16, at 152. 
158  Jacobson, supra note 15, at 421. Although automatic or highly practiced tasks can be 
processed without attention, processing other tasks requires attention. Id. at 421–22; see su-
pra note 108. 
159  Jacobson, supra note 15, at 422. 
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remember the relevant information—to hold bits of information in working 
memory and then to transfer them to long-term memory.160 It is not entirely 
clear how attention facilitates the process of storing information long-term, but 
it appears that attention is a precondition for its happening.161 Fourth, once in-
formation is stored in our long-term memory, we need attention to retrieve it 
and to bring the learned information into our conscious minds so we can use 
it.162 Because attention is involved in every step of the process, without atten-
tion there could be no learning. 
D. Necessary for Legal Professionals 
Neither could there be lawyering without attention. “The ability to sustain 
attention and focus over time is essential for practical domains . . . as well as 
for daily functioning in work, school, and social settings.”163 The nature of le-
gal work imposes particularly strong demands upon attention. To begin with, 
law school is an intense cognitive endeavor.164 In everything from reading and 
understanding cases, to listening to and processing lectures, to drafting appel-
late briefs and writing seminar papers, law students must exercise their powers 
of attention. And attention is no less necessary when students graduate and be-
come practicing attorneys; the practice of law is, in many ways, the practice of 
learning. Lawyering skills—such as researching precedent cases and statutory 
authority, drafting contracts and court documents, interviewing clients, and 
making coherent arguments—all depend upon higher-order cognitive functions. 
Lawyers need sustained focus (to slog through the thousands of pages of dis-
covery), impulse control (lest the lawyer tell the judge what she really thinks of 
that ruling), a sharp memory (to realize the witness just contradicted his affida-
vit), an eagle eye for errors (to spot the internal inconsistencies in the draft LLC 
agreement), top-notch planning (to anticipate problems the client never consid-
                                                        
160  Id. at 425. Working memory’s role in performing various cognitive operations makes it 
crucial for learning. Id. at 423; see also supra text accompanying notes 85–96. 
161  POSNER, supra note 16, at 152–53. This is the case for explicit learning—the type of 
learning that involves specific, conscious effort to learn something. See id. at 153. For exam-
ple, students who take a class to learn a second language are engaged in explicit learning. 
Explicit learning relies upon the hippocampus, which helps to distribute and integrate infor-
mation that is ultimately stored in the brain long-term. Id. at 152. However, there is evidence 
of so-called implicit learning—a form of learning without conscious awareness that does not 
require the involvement of the hippocampus or specific efforts to store the information being 
learned long-term. Id. at 153. For instance, the way a young child learns to string together 
grammatical sentences in his native language is through implicit learning. 
162  Jacobson, supra note 15, at 421, 425–27. 
163  Chun et al., supra note 12, at 76. 
164  See Jacobson, supra note 15, at 419–20 (noting that law school involves an “intense and 
sustained cognitive effort” in every aspect and requires students to pay attention and concen-
trate). 
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ered), and countless other traits born out of attention. A lawyer who cannot pay 
attention effectively is unlikely to be an effective lawyer.165 
III. THE DIGITAL LIFE OF THE “DIGITAL GENERATION” 
Today there is a new generation of young people who have never known a 
world in which computers, the Internet, and cell phones did not exist. There is 
no consensus on what these youth should be called,166 exactly what birth year 
separates them from earlier generations,167 or even whether it is appropriate to 
refer to them as a generation at all.168 What probably can be agreed upon is that 
what makes this generation unlike any other generation before them is their 
lifelong exposure to ICTs. These young people are the Digital Generation.169  
It is hardly astonishing that digital technology plays a big part in the Digi-
tal Generation’s lives. According to a 2012 survey of technology use by Amer-
ican170 teens, 95 percent of teens are on the Internet.171 Almost three-quarters of 
                                                        
165  Lawyers and law students who are able to focus on their work are likely to be more effi-
cient and may make fewer errors. Baker & Brown, supra note 60, at 340. The converse may 
also be true, as suggested by Baker and Brown’s observation that “a number of Bar disci-
pline cases involving lack of diligence or related ethical issues also involved a claim of miti-
gation because of problems of attention deficit or lack of concentration.” Id. at 340 n.10. 
166  For different examples of how scholars refer to this generation, see, e.g., ROSEN, 
IDISORDER, supra note 111, at 7 (the “Net Generation” and the “iGeneration,” depending 
upon their age); TAPSCOTT, supra note 134, at 16 (noting that the “Net Generation” are also 
known as the “Millennials” and “Generation Y,” while “Generation Next” are also known as 
“Generation Z”); Marc Prensky, Digital Natives, Digital Immigrants Part 1, ON THE 
HORIZON, Sept./Oct. 2001, at 1, 1 (“Digital Natives”). 
167  See, e.g., HORSTMAN, supra note 82, at 56 (those born after 1980 are “digital natives”); 
ROSEN, REWIRED, supra note 110, at 12–13 (the “Net Generation” were born in the 1980s, 
while the “iGeneration” were born in the 1990s and the 2000s); TAPSCOTT, supra note 134, 
at 16 (the “Net Generation” were born between January 1977 and December 1997 while 
“Generation Next” were born between January 1998 and the present). 
168  See JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST 
GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES 14 (2008). Palfrey and Gasser note that access to ICTs 
varies across countries and populations, so it cannot be assumed that everyone born after a 
certain year will have the same exposure to ICTs. Therefore, they argue, it is more useful to 
think of young people with ICT exposure as a population, rather than a generation. Id. 
169  The eldest of the Digital Generation are currently in their early thirties, while the young-
est are just being born. This is, admittedly, a broad span of years. Others have divided this 
group into at least two different generations (see supra notes 166–67), but the dividing lines 
seem rather arbitrary. I consider the entire group to be the Digital Generation. However, for 
the sake of consistency with much of the research cited herein, this Article uses “Digital 
Generation” primarily in reference to today’s “tweens,” teens, and college-age youth—i.e., 
young people roughly ages eleven to twenty-two. 
170  All of the statistics cited in this Part refer to technology use by young people in the Unit-
ed States. As with the generalizations about adults in this Article, generalizations about the 
Digital Generation are not intended—and are unlikely—to represent technology habits of 
young people worldwide, given the variance in access to ICTs in different countries and dif-
ferent populations. Cf. supra note 4. 
171  MARY MADDEN ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., TEENS AND TECHNOLOGY 2013 2, 3 (2013), 
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2013/Teens-and-Tech.aspx. This report, 
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teens at least occasionally use their cell phones, tablets, and other mobile de-
vices to access the Internet.172 Ninety-three percent of teens either own their 
own computer or have access to one at home.173 More than three-quarters of 
teens now own a cell phone, and almost half of these are smartphones.174 The 
Digital Generation struggle to go even fifteen minutes without checking their 
ICTs for new messages,175 which is perhaps not surprising considering they are 
more likely to communicate with other people in their lives via text message 
than by talking to them on the phone or in person.176  
In fact, most of the time that young people are awake and not attending 
school, they are using some form of digital technology. A recent survey on me-
dia use among American youth found that children between eight and eighteen 
years old spend on average more than seven and one-half hours per day doing 
things such as watching TV and movies, playing video games, listening to mu-
sic, using computers, and—for just a small part of this time—reading print me-
                                                                                                                                
part of a series of reports issued by the Pew Research Center in collaboration with Harvard’s 
Berkman Center for Internet & Society, is based on a 2012 nationally representative tele-
phone survey of 802 parents and their 802 teens, ranging in age from twelve to seventeen 
years old, with a plus or minus 4.5 percent margin of error. Id. at 2. 
172  See id. at 4. Seventy-four percent of teens aged twelve to seventeen at least occasionally 
use mobile devices to access the Internet. Id. Older teens, those aged fourteen to seventeen, 
are slightly more likely than twelve- and thirteen-year-olds to access the Internet via mobile 
devices (76 percent versus 71 percent, without distinguishing between genders). Id. 
173  Id. at 5. The survey found that 80 percent of teens own a desktop or laptop, and two-
thirds of the remaining 20 percent can access one at home, for a combined 93 percent of 
teens who own or have access to a computer. Id. On average, white teens are more likely to 
own a computer than black teens are (81 percent vs. 64 percent), older teens are more likely 
to own one than younger teens are (83 percent for fourteen- to seventeen-year-olds vs. 72 
percent for twelve- to thirteen-year-olds), and teens living in suburban areas are more likely 
to own a computer than urban teens are (84 percent vs. 75 percent). Id. 
174  See id. at 6–7. Seventy-eight percent of teens own a cell phone, and 47 percent of those 
have smartphones, for a combined 37 percent of all teens with smartphones. Id. For purposes 
of comparison, 45 percent of adults have a smartphone. Id. at 7. 
175  See ROSEN, IDISORDER, supra note 111, at 7, 13. A study of message checking habits 
among different generations found that 64 percent of “Net Generation” respondents (born in 
the 1980s) check every fifteen minutes or less for text messages, while 42 percent check for 
cell phone calls, and 36 percent check Facebook. Id. at 13. Of those respondents from the 
“iGeneration” (born in the 1990s), 62 percent check texts, 34 percent check calls, and 32 
percent check Facebook every fifteen minutes or less. Id. at 7, 13. In contrast, of the Baby 
Boomers surveyed, 18 percent check texts, 20 percent check calls, and 8 percent check Fa-
cebook with the same frequency. Id. at 13. 
176  See AMANDA LENHART, PEW RESEARCH CTR.’S INTERNET & AMER. LIFE PROJECT, TEENS, 
SMARTPHONES & TEXTING 16–17 (2012), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/2012 
/03/19/teens-smartphones-texting/. This 2011 nationally representative telephone survey of 
799 teens aged twelve to seventeen years old and their parents found (with a plus or minus 
4.8 percent margin of error) that 63 percent of teens communicate with others every day by 
text, compared to 39 percent who talk on a cell phone, 35 percent who socialize face-to-face 
outside of school, 29 percent who exchange messages through social networking sites, 22 
percent who use instant messaging, 19 percent who talk on landlines, and a mere 6 percent 
who exchange emails. Id. at 16–17, 19. 
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dia.177 Almost a third of the time that these youngsters are using digital media, 
they are multitasking, using multiple media at once.178 This combined media 
use adds up to more than ten and one-half hours of media exposure per day,179 
not even counting the time they spend talking on a cell phone, texting, or using 
media for school-related purposes.180  
                                                        
177  VICTORIA J. RIDEOUT ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., GENERATION M2: MEDIA 
IN THE LIVES OF 8- TO 18-YEAR-OLDS 6, 11 (2010), available at http://kff.org/other/event 
/generation-m2-media-in-the-lives-of/. This finding comes from a nationally representative 
survey conducted in 2008 and 2009 of 2,002 third through twelfth grade public, private, and 
parochial school students aged eight to eighteen, including 702 volunteers who completed 
seven-day media use diaries, with a plus or minus 3.9 percent margin of error. Id. at 6. Media 
use refers to the amount of time that young people spend using media in a given day, taking 
into account the proportion of time they are using multiple media at the same time (e.g., if a 
teenager listens to music for the entire hour he spends using a computer, the report accounts 
for one hour of media use). See id. Print media use (time spent reading print versions of 
books, magazines, or newspapers for pleasure) accounted for thirty-eight minutes of the av-
erage seven hours and thirty-eight minutes the survey respondents reported using media in a 
typical day. Id. at 2, 11. See also id. at 6–7 (describing what was or was not included in each 
type of media use). 
178  Id. at 33 (reporting that young people use two or more media concurrently 29 percent of 
the time they are using media). Multitasking varies in frequency depending upon the type of 
medium being used, with 48 percent of young people reporting multitasking “some of the 
time” or “most of the time” while playing video games, as compared to 53 percent while 
reading, 68 percent while watching TV, 66 percent while using a computer, and 73 percent 
while listening to music. Id. (quotation marks omitted). This variance likely has to do with 
the different mental resources required to engage with different media. Rosen attributes the 
greater likelihood of multitasking while listening to music than while playing video games to 
the fact that playing video games requires greater mental resources (vision, hearing, and 
manual skills, along with logic and problem solving), making it more difficult to multitask 
while playing. ROSEN, REWIRED, supra note 110, at 81. 
179  See RIDEOUT ET AL., supra note 177, at 11. This survey found that young people on aver-
age are exposed to a total of ten hours and forty-five minutes of media content per day be-
cause of the frequency with which they use two or more media concurrently. Id. Media ex-
posure refers to the amount of media content young people consume in a day, without taking 
multitasking into account (e.g., if a teenager listens to music for the entire hour she spends 
using a computer, the report accounts for two hours of media use). See id. at 6. The amount 
of media exposure varies substantially by age, ethnicity, and gender, with older youth (fif-
teen- to eighteen-year-olds) exposed to more media on average than younger children (eight- 
to ten-year-olds) (eleven hours and twenty-three minutes vs. seven hours and fifty-one 
minutes), black or Hispanic youth exposed to more than white youth (twelve hours and fifty-
nine minutes and thirteen hours vs. eight hours and thirty-six minutes), and boys exposed to 
more than girls (eleven hours and twelve minutes vs. ten hours and seventeen minutes). Id. at 
11. 
180  See id. at 18. This report excludes the time spent texting or talking on the phone from the 
media use calculation, but includes time spent listening to music, playing games, and watch-
ing videos on a phone. Id. at 6. Moreover, the findings reflect only recreational (non-school-
related) media use. Id. When the excluded media use is included, the total media exposure 
figure is likely to be significantly greater. For example, Rosen’s studies estimate the figure to 
be more than twenty hours per day. ROSEN, REWIRED, supra note 110, at 12. 
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The Digital Generation interact with their ICTs right up until the moment 
they close their eyes.181 Even sleep cannot part them from their ICTs and the 
thousands of messages182 they send and receive every month. Many of them 
wake up in the middle of the night to check their messages and send a text or an 
email, or are awakened by an incoming call or message.183 Clearly, ICTs are a 
big part of the Digital Generation’s lives. Their generation is defined by the 
facts that they have grown up with technology, that they spend a lot of time 
every day using it, and that they tend to use more than one form at a time. 
IV. WHAT DO ICTS HAVE TO DO WITH ATTENTION? 
The great deal of exposure the Digital Generation have to ICTs may be af-
fecting their attention in three significant ways.184 First, ICT exposure may be 
causing neurological changes that in turn change how—and how well—the 
Digital Generation pay attention. Second, ICT exposure may be altering the 
Digital Generation’s attentional control, decreasing their ability to pay atten-
tion. And third, ICT exposure may be redefining what it means to the Digital 
Generation to be “paying attention.” This Part explores all of these potential 
changes in turn.  
                                                        
181  See Press Release, Nat’l Sleep Found., Annual Sleep in America Poll Exploring  
Connections with Communications Technology Use and Sleep (Mar. 7, 2011), avail- 
able at http://sleepfoundation.org/media-center/press-release/annual-sleep-america-poll-ex 
ploring-connections-communications-technology-use-. A poll of 1,508 Americans between 
ages thirteen and sixty-four reports (with a plus or minus 2.5 percent margin of error) that 55 
percent of thirteen- to eighteen-year-olds surf the Internet within the hour before sleep, and 
56 percent send, read, or receive text messages. Id. 
182  See NIELSEN, STATE OF THE MEDIA 2010: U.S. AUDIENCES & DEVICES 3 (2011), avail-
able at http://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/corporate/us/en/newswire/uploads/2011/01/niel 
sen-media-fact-sheet-jan-11.pdf. An analysis of over sixty thousand phone bills from the 
third quarter of 2010 found that the number of text messages sent and received in a month 
was 1,178 for children twelve and under, 1,707 for eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds, and a 
staggering 3,705 for thirteen- to seventeen-year-olds. Id. at 3–4. 
183  See Press Release, Nat’l Sleep Found., supra note 181. In this poll, 18 percent of thir-
teen- to eighteen-year-olds reported being awakened by a phone call, text message, or email 
at least a few nights a week. Id. Additionally, in a 2013 nationally representative survey of 
1,103 parents and caregivers of children age six to seventeen years old, parents reported that 
43 percent (plus or minus 4 percent) of their fifteen- to seventeen-year-olds sent or read text 
messages, emails, or other electronic communications after initially going to sleep. NAT’L 
SLEEP FOUND., 2014 SLEEP IN AMERICA® POLL: SLEEP IN THE MODERN FAMILY: SUMMARY  
OF FINDINGS 5, 36 (2014), available at http://sleepfoundation.org/sites/default/files 
/2014-NSF-Sleep-in-America-poll-summary-of-findings---FINAL-Updated-3-26-14-.pdf. 
Further, a 2011 study of 3,500 people from 1,100 corporations worldwide found that 77 per-
cent of “Net Generation” employees (born in the 1980s) keep their cell phone in their bed-
room and 60 percent keep it within arm’s reach. ROSEN, IDISORDER, supra note 111, at 7, 9. 
Those who keep it within reach are 60 percent more likely than average to awaken and check 
it for new messages. Id. at 9. 
184  This Article’s focus is the impact of ICT exposure on the Digital Generation, and so the 
neurological and attentional changes outlined in this Part are described as if applicable solely 
to the Digital Generation. This choice of language notwithstanding, many of the described 
changes are likely experienced by all ICT users, regardless of their generation. 
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A. ICT Exposure May Be Changing the Digital Generation’s Brains 
Bestselling author of books on technology Nicholas Carr has called the In-
ternet “the single most powerful mind-altering technology that has ever come 
into general use.”185 Indeed, ICT exposure may be physically altering the Digi-
tal Generation’s brains. Such neurological change is possible because the brain 
is not an entirely static organ; it does change over time in the face of different 
influences and experiences. This Section explores the brain’s capacity to 
change and the various types of changes different ICTs may be causing to the 
Digital Generation’s brains. 
1. Neuroplasticity 
Prior to the late twentieth century, it was commonly believed that the brain 
was hardwired and unchanging and that brain cell creation ended at or shortly 
after birth.186 Scientists thought that once the brain developed in a certain way, 
it remained fixed except for a degree of decay with age.187 More recently, sci-
entists have determined that the brain is an inherently changeable—or plastic—
organ.188 This quality is generally referred to as “neuroplasticity.”189 Changes 
in the brain result mainly from the growth of new networks of, and connections 
between, our neurons.190  
Mature human brains create new neurons throughout life, a process known 
as neurogenesis.191 Newly created neurons die within a few weeks unless they 
are activated,192 which happens whenever we perform a new task or experience 
a new sensation.193 If the neurons are near each other, they join together by ex-
changing synaptic neurotransmitters—the chemicals that transmit signals be-
tween neurons across a synapse.194 This communication between neurons is 
what gives us the ability to think, feel, and move.195 If we repeat the experi-
ence, the synaptic links between our neurons strengthen and become more plen-
tiful, which makes our brains perform that task faster and more efficiently.196 
                                                        
185  CARR, supra note 65, at 116. 
186  HORSTMAN, supra note 82, at 8; TAPSCOTT, supra note 134, at 99. 
187  TAPSCOTT, supra note 134, at 99. 
188  Dalton, supra note 31, at 413–14. 
189  HORSTMAN, supra note 82, at 8. 
190  Id. at 11. 
191  Id. at 8. This is not unique to humans; all mammalian brains experience neurogenesis. 
See id. 
192  Id. at 15. The more effortful the experience is, the more likely it is that new neurons will 
survive. Merely repeating skills that have already been learned does not seem to promote 
survival. Id. at 15–17. 
193  CARR, supra note 65, at 27. 
194  Id. 
195  SMALL & VORGAN, supra note 81. 
196  CARR, supra note 65, at 27, 34. In other words, “[c]ells that fire together wire together.” 
Id. at 27 (quotation marks omitted). 
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Neural network pathways can become permanent (so to speak) as we repeat 
tasks or experiences.197 The unused pathways are pruned away,198 giving truth 
to the old maxim: “Use it or lose it.”199  
Our number of existing synapses peaks by the time we are two years old 
and is reduced by about 60 percent by the time we reach adulthood.200 This 
pruning process prevents our brains from creating so many neural connections 
that they cannot operate efficiently.201 As a result of this deterioration, our 
brains devote a greater portion of their neural area to the more frequently used 
connections.202 These brain changes can be desirable, such as when the neural 
connections in blind people devoted to sight are pruned back, while the connec-
tions devoted to the other senses are strengthened.203 They can also be undesir-
able, such as when the neural pathways for a bad habit are strengthened.204 
Given the fact that the Digital Generation’s brains are plastic and change in 
response to new experiences, it seems likely that ICT exposure is changing 
their brains. What is less well understood is exactly how their brains are chang-
ing: “Research has been showing for decades that how we use mind and body 
changes our brain and brain activity. Hours spent with today’s digital technolo-
gy and on the Internet are bound to result in a shift in neural processing. So far, 
though, no one knows exactly how.”205 Difficulty finding nonusers of digital 
technologies makes it challenging to conduct studies that compare the brains of 
users and nonusers.206 But because interaction with ICTs is stimulating and of-
ten repeating, it seems very likely that ICT exposure is strengthening the neural 
connections related to the use of ICTs207 and altering the Digital Generation’s 
brain function in some way.208 
                                                        
197  SMALL & VORGAN, supra note 81, at 5. 
198  CARR, supra note 65, at 34. 
199  Illustrating this concept, children who speak another language at home before entering 
school may lose the capacity to speak that language without retraining once they have redi-
rected all of their language skills to learning English in school. TAPSCOTT, supra note 134, at 
100–01. 
200  SMALL & VORGAN, supra note 81, at 7. 
201  Id. 
202  Dalton, supra note 31, at 416. 
203  Id. 
204  CARR, supra note 65, at 34 (“[N]othing says the new state has to be a desirable one. Bad 
habits can be ingrained in our neurons as easily as good ones.”). 
205  HORSTMAN, supra note 82, at 57. 
206  Id. at 60. 
207  Dalton, supra note 31, at 417–18. 
208  SMALL & VORGAN, supra note 81, at 1–2 (“Daily exposure to high technology—
computers, smart phones, video games, search engines like Google and Yahoo—stimulates 
brain cell alteration and neurotransmitter release, gradually strengthening new neural path-
ways in our brains while weakening old ones. . . . Although we are unaware of these changes 
in our neural circuitry or brain wiring, these alterations can become permanent with repeti-
tion.”). 
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2. Video Games 
One digital technology that has received significant attention in this regard 
is video games. Research indicates that playing video games can improve the 
player’s mental dexterity, pattern recognition, hand-eye coordination, infor-
mation processing skills, and perhaps even attention span.209 Video game play 
seems to improve peripheral vision and shorten reaction time to visual stimu-
li.210 Moderate video game play may even lead to more systematic thinking and 
enhanced executive skills.211 These improvements may particularly benefit pro-
fessionals such as architects, engineers, and surgeons.212  
Yet not all of the studies of video game play suggest that it leads to posi-
tive developments. There are indications that video game play stimulates brain 
areas that control lower-order brain functions—such as movement and vision—
but neglects the frontal lobe.213 Studies by researchers at Tokyo’s Nihon Uni-
versity found that the more time adolescents spent playing video games, the 
less time they used key areas of the brain associated with executive functions. 
Players who typically played between two and seven hours per day sometimes 
developed a condition in which their frontal lobes essentially shut off, even 
when they were not playing.214 Although moderate game play may have some 
cognitive benefits, excessive play may actually stunt the Digital Generation’s 
frontal lobe development and lead to a decrease in their working memory.215 
3. Internet Use 
Adding to the effects video game play may be having on the Digital Gen-
eration’s brains, evidence suggests that Internet use may also be producing neu-
rological changes. Internet searching and browsing appear to strengthen lower-
order cognitive skills—such as hand-eye coordination, reflexes, and processing 
of visual cues—similarly to video games.216 This may be because the Internet 
makes users repeatedly evaluate headlines, snippets of text, hyperlinks, and im-
ages, making them better at distinguishing quickly between bits of competing 
information, analyzing the information’s features, and determining whether it is 
                                                        
209  HORSTMAN, supra note 82, at 30. There is a caveat to this research, in that video game 
play may cause greater activity in males’ brains than in females’. Id. Presumably, then, 
males may reap more of these benefits than females. 
210  Id. at 58; TAPSCOTT, supra note 134, at 98. 
211  SMALL & VORGAN, supra note 81, at 39. Along the same lines, a study of laparoscopic 
surgeons at Beth Israel Medical Center in New York City found that those who played three 
or more hours of video games per week made approximately 40 percent fewer errors during 
surgical procedures as compared to non-gaming surgeons. Id. at 38–39. 
212  TAPSCOTT, supra note 134, at 98. 
213  Dalton, supra note 31, at 419. 
214  SMALL & VORGAN, supra note 81, at 36. 
215  See Dalton, supra note 31, at 419. 
216  CARR, supra note 65, at 139. 
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relevant to their current goals.217 Using the Internet may also expand working 
memory capacity218 and may generally increase users’ mental activity.219 
Moreover, these changes may be rapid. A small study of newcomers to 
computer technology and their computer-savvy peers by UCLA professor of 
psychiatry Dr. Gary Small used fMRI scans to map the volunteers’ brain activi-
ty while they searched for information using Google. In the initial test, the 
computer-savvy group showed significant activity when searching in the dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex, a brain region involved in decision making and com-
plex reasoning,220 while the newcomers had minimal or no activation there. But 
after only five days’ practice searching Google for just one hour per day, the 
newcomers’ brain activity during the searching task was virtually identical to 
that of the computer-savvy group.221 The fact that the brain apparently can re-
wire itself so fast is both astounding and somewhat unsettling.222 That said, it 
remains to be seen what—if any—effect on cognitive performance these neural 
changes from Internet use may bring about.223  
4. Multitasking 
A frequent question in the context of neuroplasticity and the Digital Gener-
ation is whether their constant multitasking with ICTs224 is changing their 
brains in a way that makes them better at multitasking than their elders. It has 
been argued that the Digital Generation are learning “to juggle multiple activi-
ties, use time efficiently and use existing technologies in creative ways” be-
cause of their proclivity for multitasking, and that with extensive practice in 
multitasking, their brains may adapt to be proficient both at multitasking and at 
                                                        
217  Id. 
218  Id. 
219  HORSTMAN, supra note 82, at 30. 
220  Id. at 60. There was no difference in the two groups’ brain activity in the initial test dur-
ing the control task of reading pages of a book. SMALL & VORGAN, supra note 81, at 16. 
221  SMALL & VORGAN, supra note 81, at 15–16. 
222  It also raises the question of how quickly this rewiring might be reversed, a subject that 
Posner grapples with: 
[W]hen it comes to discussions of negative influence [from ICTs], they [those who say brain 
plasticity makes ICT use a cause for concern] often consider the brain to be hard-wired and sug-
gest that we are raising a generation that is changed for all time. However, if the brain is plastic, 
it is as likely that any change induced by the use of media could be changed back by a vacation 
in the woods with a long intense novel. 
POSNER, supra note 16, at 139. Yet Posner believes it is unlikely that such brain changes will 
be undone, given our current social environment. “[I]t seems clear that the desire to carry out 
many tasks at the same time [using ICTs] will remain a constant feature of human life.” Id. 
223  See HORSTMAN, supra note 82, at 60–61 (describing a 2009 Dutch study of the cognitive 
performance of people aged sixty-four to seventy-five that found no differences in standard 
tests of cognitive functions between a group of computer nonusers and a group given a year 
of computer training). 
224  See supra notes 178–80 and accompanying text. 
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tasks requiring extended concentration.225 It has also been suggested that the 
Digital Generation may have greater cognitive resources for multitasking than 
their elders do and may be able to handle a larger amount of information at one 
time.226  
A recent study of multitasking across three generations calls these asser-
tions into question. The research team found that the Net Generation (those 
born after 1978) were more likely to multitask than were Baby Boomers or 
Generation X, but also that there were strong similarities in the nature of the 
three generations’ multitasking.227 For instance, all of the age groups agreed on 
what types of activities were good candidates for multitasking (e.g., eating and 
listening to music) and what were not (e.g., reading and playing video 
games).228 This suggests that the Digital Generation may not be able to com-
bine challenging activities more successfully than their elders can. Moreover, 
the generations agreed about which activities were relatively hard to combine 
and which were relatively easy.229 Although the Digital Generation rated multi-
tasking to be easier on the whole than the other generations did, the researchers 
found no evidence that the Digital Generation’s multitasking differed qualita-
tively; their self-report of multitasking ease might be attributable to the Digital 
Generation’s having “younger” brains, or it might simply have been a matter of 
perception and not necessarily indicative of greater skill.230 Given the current 
understanding of the brain’s limitations with respect to multitasking,231 it may 
be the case that the Digital Generation’s propensity for multitasking more re-
flects differences in generational preferences than in capabilities. Even if the 
Digital Generation are adapting to be more proficient multitaskers, the question 
                                                        
225  ULLA G. FOEHR, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDIA MULTITASKING AMONG 
AMERICAN YOUTH: PREVALENCE, PREDICTORS AND PAIRINGS 5, 24 (2006), available at 
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED527858.pdf. 
226  L. Mark Carrier, Nancy A. Cheever, Larry D. Rosen, Sandra Benitez & Jennifer Chang, 
Multitasking Across Generations: Multitasking Choices and Difficulty Ratings in Three 
Generations of Americans, 25 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 483, 488 (2009). 
227  Id. at 487. These findings are based on a survey of 1,319 people in Los Angeles, Califor-
nia, including 312 Baby Boomers (born between 1946 and 1964), 182 “Gen Xers” (born be-
tween 1965 and 1978), and 825 “Net Geners.” Id. at 484. 
228  Id. at 483, 487–88. 
229  Id. at 488. 
230  See id. (quotation marks omitted) (“Essentially, although the younger generations found 
task combinations easier to combine, this ease could possibly be attributed to their young 
ages and not to their generation. . . . [I]t is possible that the responses reflect the respondents’ 
perceptions of their own multitasking experiences, rather than their real multitasking behav-
iors.”). 
231  See id. at 489 (describing their findings as “consistent with the idea that all generations 
share mental limitations affecting which tasks can be combined with other tasks” and noting 
that “some basic human limitations in multitasking ability appear to be shared by all genera-
tions”). 
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remains whether greater multitasking ability necessarily means greater overall 
cognitive functioning.232  
5. Future Implications 
The same question is being asked generally about neurological changes 
from ICT exposure. If the Digital Generation’s brains are changing because of 
their ICT use, what are the implications? One camp views ICT exposure as 
having largely negative implications for the Digital Generation. ICTs have been 
blamed for creating a generation with a short attention span,233 a craving for in-
stant gratification,234 impaired social skills,235 increased narcissism,236 and a re-
duced ability to empathize.237 At the other end of the spectrum, the Digital 
Generation have been credited with enhanced ability to process, categorize, and 
absorb information quickly,238 superior capacity for some forms of attention,239 
and increased intelligence.240 They have been called both “The Dumbest Gen-
eration”241 and “the smartest generation ever.”242 What conclusions can we 
draw from this? Probably the most we can say with any degree of confidence is 
that ICT exposure is likely changing the Digital Generation’s brains, though we 
cannot be sure whether this is a positive or negative development, or even 
whether it will be a long-lasting one. Their brains may reflect undesirable 
tradeoffs in cognitive functioning,243 or they may be better adapted to function 
                                                        
232  As Jordan Grafman, the head of the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and 
Stroke’s cognitive neuroscience section, frames it: 
“If you’re multitasking a lot as a kid, the likelihood is that your brain will develop around your 
adaptive behavior.” . . . “Would it change the brain to optimize multitasking? The answer might 
be yes.” . . . “Does optimizing for multitasking result in better functioning—that is, creativity, 
inventiveness, productiveness? The answer is, in more cases than not, no.” 
TAPSCOTT, supra note 134, at 108 (quoting Jordan Grafman). 
233  SMALL & VORGAN, supra note 81, at 32. 
234  Id. at 24. 
235  Id. at 2, 21, 116. 
236  ROSEN, IDISORDER, supra note 111, at 18–19. 
237  Id. at 126; SMALL & VORGAN, supra note 81, at 30, 32. 
238  SMALL & VORGAN, supra note 81, at 21; TAPSCOTT, supra note 134, at 30. 
239  SMALL & VORGAN, supra note 81, at 20–21. 
240  TAPSCOTT, supra note 134, at 30. 
241  MARK BAUERLEIN, THE DUMBEST GENERATION: HOW THE DIGITAL AGE STUPEFIES 
YOUNG AMERICANS AND JEOPARDIZES OUR FUTURE [OR, DON’T TRUST ANYONE UNDER 30] 
26 (2008) (citing PHILIP ROTH, THE HUMAN STAIN (2000) as the source of the appellation, 
“The Dumbest Generation”) (describing the Digital Generation as “a portrait of vigorous, 
indiscriminate ignorance”). 
242  TAPSCOTT, supra note 134, at 30. 
243  As Patricia Greenfield, a psychologist who teaches at UCLA, writes: 
Every medium has its strengths and weaknesses; every medium develops some cognitive skills 
at the expense of others. Although the visual capabilities of television, video games, and the In-
ternet may develop impressive visual intelligence, the cost seems to be deep processing: mindful 
knowledge acquisition, inductive analysis, critical thinking, imagination, and reflection. 
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in today’s ICT-saturated society, or they may simply be different—neither bet-
ter nor worse than those that have come before them.244 
B. ICT Exposure May Be Leading to a Loss of Attentional Control 
Though the long-term neurological effects of ICT exposure on the Digital 
Generation is still a matter for debate, research suggests that this exposure is 
currently contributing to the erosion of their attentional control. In professor 
and research psychologist Dr. Larry Rosen’s blunt terms, “using our technolog-
ical devices . . . may be permanently ruining our focused attention.”245 Loss of 
attentional control is worrisome because of how crucial focused attention is to 
the ability to function coherently246 and to engage in higher-order cognitive op-
erations.247 Three significant factors linking ICT exposure to this erosion are 
(1) stimulus-driven distractions, (2) cognitive overload, and (3) stress and anxi-
ety. 
1. Stimulus-Driven Distractions 
ICTs are distracting—purposefully so. The Digital Generation program 
their devices to interrupt them and let them know when something potentially 
of interest is happening—to ding or ring or flash or buzz or pop up (or some-
times all of these) when a new call or message comes in, or when it is time for 
an appointment, or when a friend has just posted new pictures on Facebook. 
These message indicators undermine the Digital Generation’s top-down atten-
tional control mechanisms because they are designed to trigger their bottom-up 
processes. The flashes and dings and pop-up messages are novel or sudden 
changes in the Digital Generation’s environment—the very things that their 
bottom-up attentional control systems are primed to be alert to. When the Digi-
tal Generation are engaged in a task and their ICTs produce an auditory or vis-
ual notification, the battle between their top-down and bottom-up control sys-
tems ensues. This is not to say that the bottom-up systems always win,248 but 
they frequently do.  
                                                                                                                                
Patricia M. Greenfield, Technology and Informal Education: What Is Taught, What Is 
Learned, SCIENCE, Jan. 2, 2009, at 69, 71 (2009) (endnote omitted). 
244  See Andrew E. Taslitz, Information Overload, Multi-Tasking, and the Socially Net-
worked Jury: Why Prosecutors Should Approach the Media Gingerly, 37 J. LEGAL PROF. 89, 
113 (2012) (“[T]he new net-brain is neither better nor worse than its predecessors . . . .”). 
245  ROSEN, IDISORDER, supra note 111, at 106. 
246  See supra text accompanying notes 135–40. 
247  See supra text accompanying notes 141–62. 
248  The likelihood that their bottom-up systems will prevail varies based on the types of in-
terruptions and the nature of the people confronted with the disruptions. See Jacobson, supra 
note 15, at 448–50. Auditory distractions and distractions that are frequent or complex are 
more likely to be interruptive. Id. at 448–49. That said, certain noises or types of music 
might distract some people more than others. Id. at 449–50. For instance, a Manhattanite 
may not even notice the sounds of sirens and delivery trucks outside her window while she is 
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As a result, the Digital Generation shift focus from their original task to the 
interrupting stimulus as they consult their devices to determine the reason for 
the notification. Inevitably, this interrupts their ongoing cognitive activity249 
and impairs their memory and information processing.250 The more complex 
the interrupted mental activity is, the more impairment the distraction causes.251 
One might argue that the gravity of this situation is overblown, that hearing an 
innocuous little text message ding is hardly comparable to being surprised by a 
fire alarm, that the extent to which ICTs engage the Digital Generation’s bot-
tom-up attentional control processes is simply “not a big deal.” And while it is 
surely true that there are different degrees of distractors, it is also true that any-
thing that engages the Digital Generation’s bottom-up mechanisms imposes an 
extra burden on their top-down mechanisms and makes it harder for them to 
exercise top-down attentional control. 
2. Cognitive Overload 
The second way that ICTs diminish the Digital Generation’s attentional 
control is by contributing to their cognitive overload. The information entering 
our working memory at any given time is called cognitive load.252 Cognitive 
overload occurs when our brains are “receiving too much information”253 and 
our working memory is unable to handle the amount of information being taken 
in254—in other words, when the amount of processing required for a task ex-
ceeds our cognitive capacity available for processing.255 When our working 
memory is overloaded, there is no room left in it to retain information about 
what we are trying to concentrate on, so we are more likely to become distract-
ed and lose focus.256 Our working memory becomes unable to transfer new in-
formation into our long-term memory or to make connections between the new 
information and what is already in our long-term memory.257 It also becomes 
more difficult for us to determine what is relevant and to filter out irrelevant 
information.258 We become restless and our attention span is reduced.259 Our 
                                                                                                                                
studying, whereas her mother visiting from suburban Florida might be jolted from her book 
by every such noise. 
249  Maurizio Corbetta & Gordon L. Shulman, Control of Goal-Directed and Stimulus-
Driven Attention in the Brain, 3 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 201, 208 (2002). 
250  Jacobson, supra note 15, at 432–33. 
251  CARR, supra note 65, at 132. 
252  Id. at 125 (quotation marks omitted). 
253  PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 168, at 190 (quotation marks omitted). 
254  CARR, supra note 65, at 125. 
255  Richard E. Mayer & Roxana Moreno, Nine Ways to Reduce Cognitive Load in Multime-
dia Learning, 38 EDUC. PSYCHOLOGIST 43, 45 (2003). 
256  CARR, supra note 65, at 125. 
257  Id. 
258  Id. 
259  PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 168, at 190. 
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reading skills and ability to learn suffer.260 In addition to its impact on our at-
tentional control, cognitive overload can also have primary and secondary 
physical effects, including increased heart rate and blood cholesterol, mi-
graines, decreased appetite, insomnia, and suppressed immune function.261  
ICTs—particularly those involving the Internet—increase the possibility of 
this overload,262 and the Digital Generation’s heavy usage of ICTs and the In-
ternet greatly improves the chances that they will experience it. ICT usage con-
tributes to cognitive overload primarily because it involves “extraneous prob-
lem-solving” and “divided attention.”263 A task that involves extraneous 
problem-solving is one that is both mentally demanding and superfluous to the 
primary cognitive task, such as trying to complete a crossword puzzle while 
reading a book.264 One significant way in which ICTs add extraneous problem-
solving tasks to what the Digital Generation are doing is by making frequent 
use of hypertext—text containing hyperlinks—on a screen.265 Hypertext per-
mits ICT users to move rapidly from information on the screen to other, related 
information located elsewhere. In the 1980s, many educators believed that hy-
pertext would significantly enhance learning and strengthen students’ critical 
thinking skills by allowing them to explore multiple viewpoints easily and to 
make intellectual connections between otherwise unrelated texts.266 But the 
process of evaluating hyperlinks and navigating through them is itself a mental 
problem-solving task, one that is extraneous to the act of reading.267 Figuring 
out which links are worth clicking on and which should be ignored increases 
the users’ cognitive load and decreases their ability to understand and retain 
what they are reading.268 Several studies show that even experienced computer 
users are distracted when they try to read documents that are online or that con-
tain hypertext.269 Though experimental results are not uniform, the preponder-
ance of research evidence suggests that people understand more, remember 
more, and learn more when they read linear text rather than hypertext.270 Rather 
                                                        
260  CARR, supra note 65, at 125; PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 168, at 190. 
261  PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 168, at 190.  
262  Id. 
263  CARR, supra note 65, at 125 (internal quotation omitted). 
264  See id. at 126. 
265  See id. 
266  Id. 
267  Id. 
268  Id. 
269  ROSEN, IDISORDER, supra note 111, at 106. Interestingly, research also demonstrates that 
if ICT users know they will be able to access information on the Internet or on their comput-
er later, they will not remember the information as well as if they are told it will not be avail-
able in the future. Id. at 202. 
270  See CARR, supra note 65, at 127–29 (summarizing experiments suggesting hypertext in-
terferes with learning). Part of this may be due to the manner in which readers of online ma-
terial read. A 2006 eye tracking study by the Nielsen Norman Group recorded how 232 users 
looked at thousands of web pages and found the dominant reading pattern resembled the let-
ter “F”: Readers read horizontally all the way across the first few lines, then their eyes 
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than enhance learning, combining a primary reading task with extraneous ICT 
usage can impede learning. In this way, the Digital Generation’s tendency to 
read on screens instead of in print271 may be contributing to their cognitive 
overload. 
ICTs also contribute to the Digital Generation’s cognitive overload by di-
viding their attention. ICTs put them in a state of “continuous partial attention,” 
in which they are “continually staying busy—keeping tabs on everything while 
never truly focusing on anything.”272 In this way, ICTs “seize[] [their] attention 
only to scatter it.”273 ICTs divide the Digital Generation’s attention not only by 
distracting them with message indicators, but also by delivering information 
through “hypermedia”—the Internet’s combination of hypertext and multime-
dia.274 Many educators initially thought that hypermedia would deepen com-
prehension and strengthen learning because it presents information in multiple 
forms (audio, video, text, etc.).275 Instead, hypermedia seems to divide attention 
in a way that strains cognitive abilities, decreases learning, and weakens under-
standing.276  
To understand how hypermedia divides attention and contributes to cogni-
tive overload, consider Rodney, a teenage aspiring chef. Rodney props up his 
tablet on the kitchen counter and pulls up a recipe for traditional lasagne Bolo-
gnese on an online recipe site, intending to follow the recipe on his tablet like 
he would a recipe from a printed cookbook. The first sentence of the recipe’s 
preamble tells Rodney that this is a traditional Italian recipe from Bologna. The 
word “Bologna” is hypertext—he taps the hyperlink and finds himself reading 
a web encyclopedia page about the city of Bologna. He turns back to the recipe 
                                                                                                                                
dropped down the page and read about halfway across a few lines, and then finally  
scanned down the page’s left side in a vertical movement. Jakob Nielsen, F-Shaped  
Pattern for Reading Web Content, NIELSEN NORMAN GROUP (Apr. 17, 2006), 
http://www.nngroup.com/articles/f-shaped-pattern-reading-web-content/. 
271  See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
272  SMALL & VORGAN, supra note 81, at 18. Carr agrees: “The Net’s cacophony of stimuli 
short-circuits both conscious and unconscious thought, preventing our minds from thinking 
either deeply or creatively. Our brains turn into simple signal-processing units, quickly shep-
herding information into consciousness and then back out again.” CARR, supra note 65, at 
119. 
273  CARR, supra note 65, at 118. Carr argues that the Internet “returns us to our native state 
of bottom-up distractedness, while presenting us with far more distractions than our ances-
tors ever had to contend with.” Id. 
274  Id. at 129 (quotation marks omitted). Hypermedia is also referred to as “rich media.” Id. 
(quotation marks omitted). 
275  Id. 
276  Id. Presenting information in more than one form does not always reduce understanding. 
It is possible for carefully designed presentations to combine audio and visual instructions or 
explanations in a way that actually enhances learning. Id. at 131. This process of presenting 
information in different processing channels is known as “off-loading.” Mayer & Moreno, 
supra note 255, at 46. But because the Internet was not built to optimize learning, it is rare to 
find information presented in these optimal circumstances. See CARR, supra note 65, at 131. 
Instead, it presents information in a “concentration-fragmenting mishmash.” Id. 
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page and reads the next sentence of the preamble, which says lasagne Bolo-
gnese combines alternating layers of pasta, long-cooked ragú Bolognese, Par-
migiano Reggiano, and besciamella. Rodney clicks on besciamella and learns 
from the newly opened web encyclopedia page that it is a white sauce made 
with a roux of butter and flour cooked in milk, known more commonly by its 
French name, béchamel. Now he turns back to the recipe page, where a video 
featuring a famous television chef preparing lasagne Bolognese has automati-
cally started playing. Rodney shifts his attention back and forth from the stove 
to the text of the recipe while cooking, all the while half-listening to the TV 
chef talk about the ideal ratio of ragú to besciamella, and occasionally glancing 
at the video to see the chef demonstrate how to tell whether the roux has 
achieved proper thickness and what the finished lasagne should look like. 
Would it be any surprise if Rodney missed a step in the recipe or left out an in-
gredient or two in the face of the processing demands from the flood of infor-
mation spewing forth from the tablet? 
Both message indicators277 and hypermedia278 also divide the Digital Gen-
eration’s attention by interrupting what they are doing, thereby encouraging 
them to multitask. Each time the Digital Generation shift attention to check a 
message (or, in Rodney’s case, to watch the video accompanying the recipe he 
is making), their brains are forced to reorient themselves.279 This process adds 
substantially to their cognitive load and further taxes their limited mental re-
sources,280 potentially leading to cognitive overload. Like all forms of multi-
tasking, this comes with costs—including for the Digital Generation’s atten-
tional control.281 
3. Stress and Anxiety 
The third way that ICTs diminish the Digital Generation’s attentional con-
trol is by contributing to their stress282 and anxiety, which have adverse effects 
                                                        
277  See supra text accompanying notes 248–51. 
278  See CARR, supra note 65, at 131. 
279  Id. at 133. 
280  Id. 
281  See id. 
282  Stress is rarely defined in scientific literature; the term tends to be used in vague and in-
consistent ways. Margaret E. Kemeny, The Psychobiology of Stress, 12 CURRENT 
DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 124, 124 (2003). It is used both in the sense of circumstances that 
threaten our physical or psychological wellbeing (i.e., stressors) and in the sense of our nega-
tive psychological response to such circumstances (i.e., distress). Id. While stress is often 
discussed in negative terms, it enables us to cope in circumstances that call for vigilance, 
action, or heightened arousal, and is therefore both useful and adaptive. Kenneth J. Thiel & 
Michael N. Dretsch, The Basics of the Stress Response: A Historical Context and Introduc-
tion, in THE HANDBOOK OF STRESS: NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS ON THE BRAIN 3, 4 
(Cheryl D. Conrad ed., 2011). The body’s response to stress serves a protective function be-
cause it is designed to restore balance. Id. Though the experience of excessive stress over 
time can have negative health and behavioral consequences, an utter lack of stress would 
leave us unable to respond adequately to internal and external demands. Id. 
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on their attention and their capacity to control it.283 ICT exposure is connected 
with stress and anxiety in three primary ways. First, ICTs’ visual and auditory 
message indicators are stressful because they are interruptive. Second, the state 
of continuous partial attention that ICTs put the Digital Generation in is a form 
of inherently stressful hyper-alertness. Third, ICTs create a stressful and anxie-
ty-inducing culture in which instantaneous communication is both possible and 
expected.  
Before exploring the role ICT exposure plays in contributing to the Digital 
Generation’s stress and anxiety, it is helpful first to understand what happens to 
us when we encounter stress. Short-term stress is associated with high levels of 
autonomic arousal.284 The autonomic nervous system (the “ANS”) controls our 
bodies’ visceral functions, such as the beating of our hearts, the smooth mus-
cles of our digestive organs, and the activation of certain glands.285 ANS arous-
al sends the signal throughout our bodies that “[s]omething is going on, some-
thing needs to be done.”286 A subsystem of the ANS, the sympathetic nervous 
system (the “SNS”), then mobilizes the functions that help our bodies react to 
threats and danger, producing what is known as the flight-or-fight response.287  
The flight-or-fight response is an innate, involuntary physiological re-
sponse that we and other animals display in the face of acute or chronic stress-
ful situations.288 It heightens our alertness and prepares us to react quickly by 
increasing the blood supply to our muscles and brain, increasing our heart rate, 
decreasing our digestive activity, widening our pupils, increasing our metabo-
lism, and raising our blood sugar content.289 These responses are aimed at 
achieving physiological equilibrium, or homeostasis, meaning that they attempt 
to restore our bodies’ internal environment to “normal” levels in response to 
external events.290  
                                                        
283  See Jacobson, supra note 15, at 442–44. 
284  MANDLER, supra note 130, at 249–50. 
285  Id. at 134. 
286  Id. at 137 (quotation marks omitted). 
287  Id. at 134. 
288  HERBERT BENSON WITH MIRIAM Z. KLIPPER, THE RELAXATION RESPONSE 54 (updated & 
expanded ed. 2000). While this is generally the case, our bodies’ physiological response to 
stress may vary depending upon factors such as the type and duration of the stressor. See 
Thiel & Dretsch, supra note 282, at 5. Also, both sexes experience similar hormonal reac-
tions to stress, but it has been suggested that human females may have developed a stress 
reaction better suited to protecting their offspring than the flight-or-fight response is, known 
as the “tend-and-befriend” response. See Shelley E. Taylor et al., Biobehavioral Responses 
to Stress in Females: Tend-and-Befriend, Not Fight-or-Flight, 107 PSYCHOL. REV. 411, 412–
13, 421–22 (2000) (describing the tend-and-befriend response). 
289  MANDLER, supra note 130, at 134–35. 
290  MANDLER, supra note 130, at 118, 139 (quotation marks omitted); Thiel & Dretsch, su-
pra note 282, at 7. Mandler suggests that we both adjust our internal environments in re-
sponse to external events, and that we also adjust the external environment so that our inter-
nal environments are restored to their normal resting points. MANDLER, supra note 130, at 
139. 
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ANS arousal also sends signals to our attentional networks that they need 
to take in more information, either about the cause of the arousal or about our 
present condition and the present state of our environment.291 In this way, any 
events that trigger ANS activity also trigger attentional activity.292 However, 
intense arousal diminishes the amount of information from the environment or 
from memory that we can use effectively because this intense arousal floods 
our attentional mechanisms.293 The number of stimuli that can share our con-
scious attention becomes more limited as the arousal increases.294 Our atten-
tional resources are allocated to detecting and processing the stressor, while in-
formation nonessential to that task is blocked out.295 If ANS arousal continues 
for the long term, it can lead to numerous undesirable consequences, such as 
decreases in our cognitive efficiency, negative effects on our heart and visceral 
functions, and suppression of our immune system.296 
Interruptions appear to cause autonomic arousal297 and are an important 
type of stressor.298 Research shows that frequent interruptions make us tense 
and anxious.299 When we are interrupted and ANS activity is triggered, our 
cognitive resources are diverted from whatever we are doing and are redirected 
to seeking out information about the interruption.300 It requires conscious effort 
for us to try to cope with the interruption, and this effort demands our atten-
tional resources.301 If the interruption produces a high level of autonomic ac-
tivity, our attention narrows and our capacity for pursuing cognitive activities 
and thought processes unrelated to the interruption is reduced.302 Our other 
cognitive functions suffer.303 This redirection of cognitive resources can be 
beneficial if the interruption is very important and our current task less so, but 
                                                        
291  MANDLER, supra note 130, at 118. This information-seeking behavior may help us to 
identify and evaluate threats. Id. at 141; Thiel & Dretsch, supra note 282, at 8. 
292  MANDLER, supra note 130, at 139. 
293  Id. at 141. 
294  Id. at 254. 
295  Thiel & Dretsch, supra note 282, at 14; Phillip R. Zoladz et al., Neurobiological Basis of 
the Complex Effects of Stress on Memory and Synaptic Plasticity, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
STRESS, supra note 282, at 157, 158. 
296  MANDLER, supra note 130, at 264. 
297  Id. at 171. This makes sense from an evolutionary perspective because if the interruption 
is something dangerous, engagement of the flight-or-fight functions and an increase in in-
formation-seeking behavior could have survival value. Id. at 172. 
298  Id. at 252–53; see also BENSON WITH KLIPPER, supra note 288, at 86 (circumstances that 
involve “uncertainty in the immediate environment” are stressful); S.J. Lupien et al., The 
Effects of Stress and Stress Hormones on Human Cognition: Implications for the Field of 
Brain and Cognition, 65 BRAIN & COGNITION 209, 210 (2007) (a situation will induce a 
stress response if it is “novel, and/or unpredictable, and/or the individual [has] the feeling 
that he/she does not have control over the situation” (emphasis omitted)). 
299  CARR, supra note 65, at 132. 
300  MANDLER, supra note 130, at 251–53. 
301  Id. at 253. 
302  See id. at 251, 254–55. 
303  Id. at 251. 
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more problematic if the interruption is trivial and it diverts our cognitive re-
sources from a more important task.304  
To illustrate, imagine co-workers carpooling to work. As they are chatting, 
a truck swerves into their car’s lane. The driver stops talking mid-sentence and 
devotes her cognitive resources to avoiding the truck. In this case, the primary 
task (holding a conversation) is less important than the interrupting stressor (the 
swerving truck), and the diversion of attentional resources is beneficial. Now 
imagine it is snowing and the driver is focused intently on steering the car 
through the snow. One of the backseat passengers suddenly sneezes loudly, 
scaring the driver, who then swerves into the neighboring lane. In that case, the 
primary task (navigating the slippery roads) is more important than the inter-
rupting stressor (the loud sneeze), and the diversion of attention to the sneeze is 
harmful. 
With this background, it is easy to see how ICTs contribute to the Digital 
Generation’s stress and anxiety by producing auditory and visual alerts that 
trigger autonomic arousal and the related stress responses. ICTs produce these 
alerts (i.e., interruptions) at an alarming rate—at least twelve alerts per hour, 
according to one estimate.305 In reaction to the stress of these alerts, the Digital 
Generation’s brains go into “survival mode” and begin to panic.306 As their bot-
tom-up attentional control processes start to overwhelm their top-down pro-
cesses and their stress and anxiety build, their attention is diverted and redi-
rected to the interruptions.307 When the brain enters this panicked state, “the 
frontal lobes lose their sophistication, intelligence dims, and the brain is unable 
to think clearly.”308 The Digital Generation lose cognitive efficiency and effec-
tiveness as they lose their attentional control. 
For instance, imagine Marilyn, a Digital Generation intern sitting at her 
desk in front of her computer, reading a company memo on the screen. A pop-
up window appears on the screen, notifying her of a new email from her super-
visor. Marilyn’s pulse quickens and her breath grows slightly more rapid as she 
experiences autonomic arousal. Her attention turns toward the pop-up and she 
momentarily forgets about the memo and the paragraph she just read as she 
wonders, Why is a window popping up? Who is emailing me? It’s my supervi-
sor—am I in trouble? Once she clicks on the pop-up, reads the email, and de-
termines it is non-threatening (just providing the location for the upcoming 
“welcome interns” party), Marilyn’s autonomic arousal decreases; her heart 
rate and breathing slow. She regains attentional control and can refocus on the 
memo. Now imagine how this arousal and response could intensify if instead of 
one email disrupting her, Marilyn received multiple emails from different ac-
                                                        
304  See id. at 256. 
305  See CARR, supra note 65, at 132 (estimating that the Internet interrupts an average person 
with at least twelve alerts per hour, and possibly many more). 
306  See Jacobson, supra note 15, at 433. 
307  Id. at 442–43. 
308  Id. at 433. 
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counts at the same time that her fellow intern called her office line and her boy-
friend sent a flurry of text messages about their weekend plans with his parents. 
Intense arousal—and the accompanying stress responses—would surely ensue. 
Loss of attentional control and cognitive impairments would be the price. 
Another way that ICT exposure contributes to the Digital Generation’s 
stress and anxiety is by putting them in the state of continuous partial atten-
tion,309 which is a state of inherently stressful hyper-alertness. In this condition 
of constantly divided attention, the Digital Generation are on alert for new in-
formation and new contact at all times.310 They have no time for thoughtful de-
cision making or deep reflection.311 As they become used to being constantly 
on alert, the heightened state of stress begins to feel normal, even desirable.312 
This condition can be acculturating and potentially even addictive.313 But be-
cause their brains were not meant to maintain this heightened monitoring state 
for extended time periods, trying to do so can cause a type of stress that Small 
labels “techno-brain burnout.”314 In the face of this stress, the Digital Genera-
tion’s brains signal their adrenal glands to secrete the hormones cortisol and 
adrenaline, which in the short term boost their energy levels and memory, but 
in the long term can impair their cognition, lead to depression, and alter their 
neural circuitry in the brain regions responsible for controlling mood and 
thought.315 Feelings of fatigue, irritability, and distraction may ensue.316 When 
the Digital Generation’s brains remain in this state of divided attention and hy-
per-alertness for too long, they “gradually lose[] [their] capacity to attend fully 
and thoroughly to anything.”317 
Finally, ICT exposure contributes to the Digital Generation’s stress and 
anxiety by creating a culture in which instantaneous communication and con-
                                                        
309  See supra text accompanying note 272. 
310  SMALL & VORGAN, supra note 81, at 18. 
311  Id. 
312  Id. 
313  PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 168, at 187 (discussing Internet addiction as an extreme 
form of overload); ROSEN, IDISORDER, supra note 111, at 62–71 (discussing risk factors for 
and characteristics of Internet addiction and addictive behaviors associated with ICT use); 
Jacobson, supra note 15, at 433–34 (stating that overstimulation “is certainly acculturating” 
and “may even be addictive”); see SMALL & VORGAN, supra note 81, at 48–62 (describing 
technology addiction, including neurochemical and other causes, and proposed diagnostic 
criteria). Though many authors refer to Internet “addiction,” the most recent version of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) published by the American 
Psychiatric Association does not include Internet usage as a disorder. DSM-5 lists “Internet 
Gaming Disorder” as a condition warranting more research, though “the criteria for this con-
dition are limited to Internet gaming and do not include general use of the Internet, online 
gambling, or social media.” Internet Gaming Disorder, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (May 2013), 
http://www.dsm5.org/Documents/Internet%20Gaming%20Disorder%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf. 
314  SMALL & VORGAN, supra note 81, at 19. 
315  Id.  
316  Id. 
317  Edward M. Hallowell, Overloaded Circuits: Why Smart People Underperform, HARV. 
BUS. REV., Jan. 2005, at 3. 
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stant connectivity are possible—and expected. In the days before the telephone, 
people might write their friends a letter and not expect a reply for days or even 
weeks. Today, ICTs make it possible to communicate with people at a distance 
as rapidly as with those in the same room. While this is wonderful progress 
from a communications standpoint, this technological capability is also prob-
lematic insofar as it has led to societal expectations of instant responses.318 
Modern message senders expect that the recipients will answer immediately 
and may grow anxious, frustrated, or angry in the face of unresponsiveness.319 
In turn, message receivers feel the pressure of these expectations and may feel 
overwhelmed by the demands of keeping up with their digital lives:  
The pressure of living in an instantaneous environment can overwhelm some 
Net Geners. They know others are expecting an immediate response from them, 
and many experience feelings of saturation, craziness, and never having a mo-
ment of peace. Some wish they could disconnect by turning off their cell phones 
and logging off their computer, but they’re reluctant to do this because they fear 
missing an important message and don’t want to feel detached from their social 
environment.320 
As a result, those on both sides of the screen may experience heightened 
arousal, feelings of stress and anxiety, and the associated cognitive and atten-
tional decrements. 
C. ICT Exposure May Be Changing the Definition of “Paying Attention” 
Along with its neurological effects and impact on the Digital Generation’s 
attentional control, ICT exposure is also causing significant societal changes, 
insofar as it is changing the Digital Generation’s definition of what it means to 
be “paying attention.” Elder generations might consider multitasking with a de-
vice in the midst of a face-to-face conversation to be rude, but the Digital Gen-
eration are starting to find it to be de rigeuer.321 Digital distraction is the new 
normal.322 Real-life examples of this are rampant. Movie theaters are aglow 
                                                        
318  Alina Tugend, What to Think About Before You Hit ‘Send’, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2012, at 
B5 (stating that most people expect to get a response to electronic communication “almost 
instantaneously”); Alina Tugend, The Anxiety of the Unanswered E-Mail, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
20, 2013, at B5 [hereinafter Tugend, Unanswered E-Mail] (describing feelings of frustration, 
anger, and discomfort with unanswered messages). 
319  See Tugend, Unanswered E-Mail, supra note 318. 
320  TAPSCOTT, supra note 134, at 94. 
321  In the study by Rosen’s team cited supra note 226, members of the “Net Generation” 
(born after 1978) “were more likely than . . . other generations to multitask while talking 
face-to-face with other people,” particularly by listening to music, “despite the apparent 
rudeness of the act.” ROSEN, REWIRED, supra note 110, at 81; see Carrier et al., supra note 
226, at 484, 485–87 (defining study participants with birth years after 1978 as “Net Geners” 
or the “Net Generation” and discussing study results). 
322  To the extent that behavioral norms are shaped by observing peers’ behaviors, the Digital 
Generation are learning about the acceptability of ICT use from observing their peers. For 
instance, as one law professor notes, using laptops in class for non-class purposes is conta-
gious. If students see a room full of their peers surfing the Internet during class, they learn 
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with the light of smartphone screens as teens text throughout the film. Bars and 
restaurants are abuzz with pictures being taken (and uploaded to Facebook and 
Instagram) as Digital Generation diners share their dining experience with ab-
sent friends. Earbuds and screens block family conversations during car rides as 
children listen to music and send messages to friends throughout the trip. For 
members of the older generations, this can be maddening.323 Why are the Digi-
tal Generation living their lives through a screen? Why aren’t they paying at-
tention to what is going on around them? But members of the Digital Genera-
tion know that they are paying attention—they are simply operating under a 
different definition of what that means. For them, divided attention is both ex-
pected and acceptable. 
Perhaps one of the primary drivers of this changing definition is that the 
Digital Generation find digital technology unremarkable—simply part of the 
landscape, no more otherworldly than an airplane and no more magical than a 
microwave.324 They are not amazed when they see a two-year-old playing An-
gry Birds325 on her dad’s tablet. They do not see why they should not surf the 
Internet on their iPads while they watch TV. And they do not expect that their 
friends will ignore their incoming text messages while they are talking to them. 
The Digital Generation are acculturated to digital technology, and as a result of 
this acculturation, the concept of paying attention means something different to 
them. 
V. WHAT SHOULD LEGAL PROFESSIONALS DO ABOUT IT? 
Scholars and researchers in many different fields have noted the attentional 
challenges that ICT users face and have proposed a number of possible tactics 
for coping with these challenges. This Part examines three tactics that have 
                                                                                                                                
that it is acceptable to surf the Internet during class. Jeff Sovern, Law Student Laptop Use 
During Class for Non-Class Purposes: Temptation v. Incentives, 51 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 
483, 488 (2013). The converse is also true: If students see that most of their peers are fo-
cused on the class material, they may conclude that it is unacceptable to let their attention 
wander to non-class topics. Id. 
323  It can also be acculturating. Looking around those movie theaters, bars, and restaurants, 
it is clear that elder generations are taking lessons from the Digital Generation about the ac-
ceptability of using ICTs in public. 
324  Tapscott puts it well: 
Technology has been completely transparent to the Net Gen. . . .  
Net Gen kids growing up looked at computers in the same way boomers look at TV. Boom-
ers don’t marvel at the technology or wonder how television transfers video and audio through 
thin air, we simply watch the screen. TV is a fact of life. So it has been with Net Geners and 
computers. And as technology relentlessly advances each month, young people just breathe it in, 
like improvements in the atmosphere. 
TAPSCOTT, supra note 134, at 19. 
325  Angry Birds is a video game franchise created by Finnish video game developer  
Rovio Entertainment, with games available to play on the iPhone, iPad, Android, Windows  
Phone, and Kindle, among other platforms. See generally ANGRY BIRDS, 
http://www.angrybirds.com/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2015). 
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been suggested for improving attention in legal professionals, namely (1) shut-
ting off the ICTs entirely, (2) taking “technology breaks,” and (3) learning to 
meditate. After describing each suggestion, this Part analyzes its strengths and 
weaknesses, both for current legal professionals and for the Digital Generation 
lawyers and law students of the future.  
A. Shut Off ICTs and Avoid Multitasking 
The most basic of these suggestions is simply to turn off the ICTs or oth-
erwise arrange their settings so as to minimize their ability to distract—i.e., si-
lence ringers, set the email program not to send a visible or audible notification 
each time a message comes in, and generally put ICTs out of view so they are 
not a visible distraction.326 This advice’s goal is to prevent multitasking alto-
gether.327 The concept is simple: Legal professionals are incapable of resisting 
the temptation of ICTs’ distractions, so they must eliminate ICTs to give them-
selves a fighting chance to focus. This suggestion provides the foundation for 
retreats such as Camp Grounded, an adults-only summer camp that forbids the 
use of ICTs.328  
The advice to turn off ICTs and avoid multitasking altogether makes intui-
tive sense—if legal professionals are powerless to resist ICTs’ allure when they 
are on, their only hope is to turn them off. And since legal professionals are 
presumably poor multitaskers,329 they should avoid multitasking altogether. 
This suggestion resonates from a brain science perspective as well: Legal pro-
fessionals’ top-down attentional control mechanisms are less likely to lose out 
to their bottom-up mechanisms if they eliminate some of the stimuli that are 
likely to appeal to their bottom-up mechanisms. Much like advice to avoid fat- 
and sugar-laden desserts will probably aid in a quest to shave off a few pounds, 
the suggestion to put aside technology for a few hours or days or weeks at a 
time—if followed—will probably be effective in improving legal professionals’ 
attention by reducing bottom-up distractions and the stress and anxiety associ-
ated with multitasking. 
The trouble with this suggestion, of course, lies largely in that “if.” Like 
passing up a slice of cake at an office birthday party, turning off ICTs and disa-
                                                        
326  See SMALL & VORGAN, supra note 81, at 141 (minimize distractions by keeping ICTs out 
of view and by closing email); Karen Erger, Mono-Mania: The Case Against “Multitask-
ing”, 94 ILL. B.J. 206, 207 (2006) (“Turn off the phone, stop checking email, close your 
door.”); Jacobson, supra note 15, at 452 (eliminate auditory and visual announcements of 
new email and turn off auditory and visual prompts on the phone). 
327  See, e.g., Erger, supra note 326, at 206 (advocating “ ‘monotasking’ rather than multi-
tasking”). 
328  See Leslie Gordon, Technology-Free Zone: Summer Camp Offers Adults a Detox from 
Their Devices, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2013, at 9, 9. Camp Grounded is organized by Digital Detox, 
a group that runs ICT-free meet-ups for those wishing to take a break from technology. Id. 
Camp Grounded targets lawyers and other professionals who are constantly on call, such as 
doctors, accountants, and CEOs. See id. at 10. 
329  See supra text accompanying notes 108–11, 116–28. 
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bling their notifications requires discipline and willpower. And, like dieters try-
ing to eliminate sweets, legal professionals are unlikely to succeed with this 
advice, for four primary reasons. First, they will have to overcome their own 
message-checking habits and the temptation of the ICTs, which anyone who 
has ever received a “phantom vibration”330 knows is no easy task. As Rosen 
puts it: “All of this is fine, but impossible for most people. Face it: We are con-
nected and we have created a cyber world that requires us to be connected.”331 
Second, studies show that it is difficult to do tasks well when we are tempted 
by something.332 This suggests that legal professionals who are trying to resist 
interacting with their ICTs may have trouble completing their work efficiently 
and accurately. Third, attorneys who turn off their message indicators will like-
ly also encounter client-relations issues, as clients have come to expect that 
their lawyers will be nearly instantly available. Clients may view a delay of 
several hours as a sign of overall unresponsiveness, and they may seek out a 
new lawyer who is more attached to his ICTs. And fourth, shutting off ICTs is 
not a panacea that guarantees perfect attention. An absence of message indica-
tors does not ensure a similar absence of daydreaming, trips to the vending ma-
chines, and other forms of self-interruptions.333  
These obstacles will only be exacerbated for Digital Generation lawyers 
and law students. As discussed above, ICTs are ubiquitous in the Digital Gen-
eration’s lives.334 Moreover, multitasking may be more ingrained in them than 
in their elders.335 It stands to reason that breaking the ICT habit will be even 
                                                        
330  See ROSEN, IDISORDER, supra note 111, at 54. In conversations with hospital medical 
staff, researchers at Baystate Medical Center in Massachusetts found that approximately 70 
percent of the staff had experienced phantom vibrations from a pager or cell phone. Id. at 55. 
More frequent phone users were more prone to reporting experiencing phantom rings. Id.; 
see also Gordon, supra note 328, at 10 (“She [a San Francisco-based business lawyer] 
caught herself reaching for her phone for moments of mindless entertainment, felt phantom 
vibrations in her pocket and heard ringtones that weren’t there.”). 
331  ROSEN, IDISORDER, supra note 111, at 207. 
332  See id. at 209. This phenomenon has been demonstrated in a number of different con-
texts. When a group of six- to thirteen-year-olds were told not to eat any of the prominently 
displayed marshmallows, they performed a paper folding task more slowly than if they ate 
the tempting sweets first and then folded the paper. Id. Similar results were found when diet-
ing adults were told to ignore a nearby snack. Id. And when a group of adults were asked to 
complete a counting task before they were allowed to watch a funny video that was getting 
guffaws from another group who were watching it, they made more counting mistakes than 
if they were allowed to watch the video before the task, “as their brains were undoubtedly 
distracted by the thought that they were missing out.” Id. 
333  Similarly, Baker and Brown suggest that there is a difference between simply reducing 
distractions and actually learning to pay attention. See Baker & Brown, supra note 60, at 346 
(commenting that although some sources offer “useful ideas,” such as the “advice to try to 
minimize distractions,” they still provide only “limited guidance on how to learn how to pay 
attention more successfully”). 
334  See supra text accompanying notes 171–83. 
335  See, e.g., Carrier et al., supra note 226, at 486–87. Rosen’s team found significantly 
more multitasking among the “Net Generation” than the older generations, with each genera-
tion multitasking more than the one before it. Id. 
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more challenging for Digital Generation legal professionals. Furthermore, re-
search suggests that the Digital Generation do not view their habitual checking 
of messages as particularly problematic336 and that they believe themselves to 
be proficient multitaskers.337 With this in mind, it seems unlikely that the Digi-
tal Generation would think it worthwhile to divorce themselves from their 
ICTs, even if they were able to. It also seems unlikely that Digital Generation 
clients would be willing to accept their lawyers’ digital hiatus. What may be 
forgivable today in that regard may be a client-relations disaster in the future.  
In addition, turning off the ICTs may do more harm than good for the Digi-
tal Generation; research tells us that the Digital Generation quickly become 
anxious when separated from their communication devices.338 Rather than re-
duce the stress born from multitasking, turning off ICTs may result in true anx-
iety for the Digital Generation.339 Even if Digital Generation lawyers and law 
students can handle shutting off their ICTs, this may not be effective in ending 
their distractions. Thinking about a text message is just as disruptive from their 
brains’ perspective as actually interrupting what they are doing to check it.340 
Thus, while disabling the ICTs may prevent external distractions, it may do lit-
                                                        
336  See Antti Oulasvirta et al., Habits Make Smartphone Use More Pervasive, 16 PERS. & 
UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 105, 112 (2012). In this small study of high school students who 
were asked to keep a diary for two weeks after receiving a new smartphone, the participants 
described their repetitive message checking as “annoying at times” and “distracting from 
regular activities,” though “the majority of the participants did not consider habitual use neg-
atively, even if it was very frequent.” Id. 
337  See Carrier et al., supra note 226, at 487–88. For example, in the study by Rosen’s team, 
87 percent of “Net Generation” adults reported being able to do two or more typical daily 
activities—such as being online, playing video games, listening to music, watching TV, eat-
ing, reading books, and talking face-to-face—concurrently. ROSEN, IDISORDER, supra note 
111, at 106–07. These “Net Generation” adults reported finding 65 percent of the various 
task combinations “very easy.” Id. at 107. In comparison, 67 percent of Baby Boomers re-
ported being able to do more than one task at the same time, and they labeled 23 percent of 
the task combinations “very easy.” Id. 
338  See TAPSCOTT, supra note 134, at 46–47 (noting that teens begin to feel real anxiety and 
a sense of deprivation when they are separated from their phones for more than twenty-four 
hours). 
339  The converse may be true as well—being able to multitask often makes the Digital Gen-
eration feel more productive and less stressed. PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 168, at 205. 
In light of the research regarding ICTs and stress (see supra notes 305–20 and accompanying 
text), it would be interesting to know whether the Digital Generation’s perceived stress lev-
els while multitasking actually coincide with their degree of autonomic arousal while doing 
so. 
340  See ROSEN, IDISORDER, supra note 111, at 209 (“[M]any technological actions are firmly 
ensconced in the brain and are stealing valuable resources needed for actual attention. In 
fact, these ‘internal’ interruptions are just as brain activating as external interruptions, such 
as responding to a phone call or text message.”); see also Rosen et al., supra note 120, at 174 
(finding shift in neural activity from the hippocampus (the brain region associated with 
thought and memory) to the striatum (the brain region associated with habitual learning) dur-
ing task switching may happen as a result of internally driven task switching, such as think-
ing about a message, as well as externally driven task switching, such as responding to a 
message notification). 
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tle to stop internal interruptions in Digital Generation legal professionals who 
wonder what messages they may be missing.341 
B. Take Technology Breaks 
The second frequently made suggestion of how to improve attention in a 
world filled with ICTs is to take “technology breaks”—designated times during 
the day that are reserved for checking messages and otherwise interacting with 
ICTs. The form of this advice varies. A more restrictive version counsels 
checking messages once daily, or perhaps a couple of times throughout the 
day.342 A more expansive version recommends taking one- to two-minute tech-
nology breaks as frequently as every fifteen minutes, with intense periods of 
focus in between each break.343 This Section focuses on the latter formulation 
because the anxiety the Digital Generation experience when separated from 
their ICTs probably makes it a better fit for them. 
The technology break suggestion neatly balances the benefits of minimiz-
ing distractions and the challenges posed by turning off ICTs altogether. For 
current legal professionals, limiting ICT usage to specified break times should 
reduce external distractions similarly to turning off their ICTs altogether. In ad-
dition, technology breaks may help to minimize their internal distractions. 
Knowing that a break is coming makes it easier to focus on the current task for 
the specified amount of time, so their attention should improve during the time 
in between breaks.344 Even Digital Generation lawyers and law students will 
probably be able to focus for fifteen minutes, knowing that a technology break 
awaits them at the end of that time period.345 
                                                        
341  This concern about missing out on what others are doing has a name: FOMO, an abbre-
viation for “fear of missing out,” which was added to the Oxford English Dictionary in 2013. 
See Buzzworthy Words Added to Oxford Dictionaries Online—Squee!, OXFORD 
DICTIONARIES ONLINE (Aug. 28, 2013), http://blog.oxforddictionaries.com/2013/08 
/new-words-august-2013/; Definition of FOMO in English, OXFORD DICTIONARIES ONLINE, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/FOMO (last visited Mar. 7, 2015). Ox-
ford defines FOMO as “[a]nxiety that an exciting or interesting event may currently be hap-
pening elsewhere, often aroused by posts seen on a social media website.” Id. FOMO is not 
merely a Digital Generation affliction. See Kristi Hedges, Do You Have FOMO:  
Fear of Missing Out?, FORBES (Mar. 27, 2014, 2:36 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites 
/work-in-progress/2014/03/27/do-you-have-fomo-fear-of-missing-out/. 
342  E.g., Jacobson, supra note 15, at 451. 
343  Rosen et al., supra note 120, at 174. 
344  See SMALL & VORGAN, supra note 81, at 141. 
345  Research on the Digital Generation’s undergraduate and law school classroom habits 
casts some doubt on this assertion. One study of student attention involving 186 college 
chemistry students reported lapses in student attention during class as early as the first thirty 
seconds of the lecture, with a peak in attention lapses between four and one-half and five and 
one-half minutes into the lecture. Diane M. Bunce et al., How Long Can Students Pay Atten-
tion in Class? A Study of Student Attention Decline Using Clickers, 87 J. CHEMICAL EDUC. 
1438, 1441–42 (2010). Another study, this one of law student laptop use in class, found that 
58 percent of the 387 upper level students observed were distracted (i.e., using laptops for 
non-class purposes) for at least half of the class period. Sovern, supra note 322, at 492. 
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The trouble with the technology break advice is twofold. The first problem 
is that taking frequent technology breaks would require breaking some of the 
legal profession’s current rules. For instance, it is not yet the norm for profes-
sors to permit technology breaks; in fact, many professors—such as myself—
affirmatively ban the use of ICTs during class time. A law student seeking to 
improve her attention in my class by taking technology breaks every fifteen 
minutes would be forced to break the rules laid out in the syllabus. Even more 
problematic, a bar exam taker could find his score nullified and himself being 
disqualified and reported to his state’s character and fitness committee if he 
tried to use his phone to take a technology break during the exam.346 Perhaps 
no test taker would realistically believe this use of technology breaks to be 
permissible, and perhaps it should be assumed that law students would only 
take technology breaks when the rules allow. Both groups certainly could take 
technology breaks without violating current rules by waiting until scheduled 
break times (i.e., in between classes or test sessions). But as with anything else, 
practice makes permanent. If students are trained to take technology breaks 
every fifteen minutes in order to help them concentrate, it is not unreasonable 
to think that they would want to make use of this strategy whenever they need 
aid in concentrating, and that they would have trouble waiting the hour or more 
between sanctioned breaks.  
Lawyers face similar obstacles under current rules. Many courts ban the 
use of ICTs within the courthouse by persons other than court officials, or simi-
larly restrict the use and/or possession of ICTs.347 
An attorney in Maryland state court who wished to improve her attention 
by browsing Pinterest periodically during a trial would be prohibited from do-
ing so by rules requiring that ICTs remain turned off inside the courtroom.348 
                                                                                                                                
Though this study had some methodological limitations (see id. at 487–91), its findings are 
nonetheless troubling from the standpoint of student attention. However, it is important to 
note that neither of these studies involved scheduled technology breaks. Whether scheduling 
technology breaks would have a positive impact upon law student attention is an area for 
future research. 
346  See, e.g., Misconduct Statement, N.Y. ST. BOARD L. EXAMINERS, 
http://www.nybarexam.org/Misconduct/Misconduct.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2015) (penal-
ties for misconduct violations (e.g., using a cell phone in the exam room) include nullifica-
tion of exam results and report to the Committee on Character & Fitness, among others). 
347  For instance, U.S. courthouses in the Eastern District of Virginia ban all electronic de-
vices, other than those used by attorneys for their trial presentations. See, e.g., Alexandria 
Courthouse, U.S. DISTRICT CT. E. DISTRICT VA., http://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/loca 
tions/ale.htm#security (last visited Mar. 7, 2015) (attorneys must receive prior approval from 
the judge to use laptops for courtroom presentations); Local Rules and Standing Orders: 
Clerk’s Office Helpful Hints Richmond Division, U.S. DISTRICT CT. E. DISTRICT VA., 
http://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/localrules/richmondhints.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2015) (elec-
tronic devices not permitted in courthouse). 
348  See MD. R. P. 16-110, available at http://mdcourts.gov/reference/rule16-110.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2015) (stating that all electronic devices shall remain off in the courtroom, 
other than during reasonable and lawful use by attorneys and their agents in connection with 
the proceeding). 
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Violation of these court rules could lead to confiscation of her phone, being 
held in contempt of court, and possible sanctions.349 Again, this attorney could 
wait until the court calls a break, but again, she may have difficulty waiting—
and concentrating in the interim—if she has trained herself to take breaks more 
frequently. While it is likely that more classrooms and courtrooms will permit 
periodic ICT use in the future,350 the current rules present obstacles to frequent 
technology breaks.  
The second problem is that technology breaks are inherently disruptive. On 
the one hand, having periodic scheduled breaks may generally improve a 
class’s or other group’s attention, assuming students or group members use 
ICTs only during the scheduled breaks and not continually throughout the class 
session or group meeting. On the other hand, it will surely take time to bring 
the class or group back to attention after a scheduled technology break. A pro-
fessor teaching a ninety-minute class who provides a two-minute technology 
break every fifteen minutes will lose a minimum of ten minutes of class time, 
and probably more, since it will likely take another two to three minutes in total 
to regain his students’ attention after the breaks.351 This may be worthwhile if 
there is a marked improvement in student focus and improvement during the 
remaining seventy-seven minutes; if, instead, students remain distracted 
throughout the class by their ICTs, this is simply thirteen wasted minutes.  
C. Practice Meditation 
The third prominent suggestion for how legal professionals can combat 
technology’s negative effects on attention is to practice a form of meditation, 
such as mindfulness meditation or concentration meditation. Practitioners of 
mindfulness meditation seek to develop mindfulness, “a deliberate, present-
                                                        
349  Id. 
350  Perhaps predictive of things to come, the Southern District of New York recently re-
versed its prior ban on personal electronic devices in the courtroom. See Court Notice to the 
Bar, U.S. Dist. Court S. Dist. N.Y., SDNY Board of Judges Revises Its Electronic Devices 
Policy (Mar. 19, 2014), available at http://www.nysba.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx? 
id=47593. The SDNY now allows attorneys to obtain prior permission to bring cell phones, 
laptops, tablets, and other comparable devices into the SDNY’s courthouses for personal use, 
subject to certain restrictions. S.D.N.Y. Standing Order M10-468 (Revised) (Feb. 27, 2014), 
available at http://www.nysba.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=47593. Other courts 
are more permissive. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth District permits 
anyone to bring “electronic devices” (smartphones, laptops, etc.) into the courthouse and to 
use such devices in the courtrooms to “take notes, transmit and receive data communica-
tions, and access the Internet,” including media members who are transmitting written ac-
counts of the proceedings. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Electronic Device 
Policy, U.S. COURTS (Jun. 23, 2010), available at http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore 
/uploads/calendar/elec_policy6_23_10.pdf. 
351  Mathematically, this assumes the professor calls a technology break in the last ten 
minutes of class, for a total of five technology breaks. If he chose to forego the fifth break, 
then he would lose a minimum of eight class minutes, plus another two to three minutes to 
regain the students’ attention. 
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moment non-judgmental awareness of whatever passes through the five con-
ventional senses and the mind—to simplify: emotions, thoughts, and body sen-
sations.”352 In other words, mindfulness is a way of paying attention intention-
ally but calmly, without becoming attached to any particular thought or 
sensation.353 The ability to be mindful can be cultivated through formal medita-
tive practices, in which practitioners systematically learn to pay attention to 
their breath, body sensations, thoughts, and emotions, first one at a time, and 
then simultaneously.354 Followers of Buddhist philosophy and psychology de-
veloped and popularized these practices starting nearly 2,500 years ago.355 
Mindfulness can also be cultivated through informal practice, using techniques 
that produce present-moment, non-judgmental awareness in daily life.356 
Though mindful awareness is more a “state” than a “trait,” practitioners can be-
come more adept at sustaining it with sufficient and continued practice.357 
Concentration meditation refers to a distinct set of meditation practices that 
are expressly intended to enhance practitioners’ ability to pay attention by de-
veloping the capacity to concentrate.358 Like mindfulness meditation, concen-
tration meditation is based on practices developed in the eastern contemplative 
traditions, but the two are separate forms of meditative practice.359 The goals of 
concentration meditation are twofold: first, to stay focused continuously and 
completely on a single concentration object without becoming distracted; and 
second, to minimize the distractions of background noises and thoughts to help 
produce a sense of calm.360  
Meditative practices have many proven benefits related to attention. Medi-
tation physically changes the brain in ways that produce enhanced clarity of 
                                                        
352  Leonard L. Riskin, Awareness and the Legal Profession: An Introduction to the Mindful 
Lawyer Symposium, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 634, 635 (2012) [hereinafter Riskin, Mindful Lawyer 
Symposium]. Mindfulness is also called “mindful awareness.” Leonard L. Riskin, Annual 
Saltman Lecture: Further Beyond Reason: Emotions, the Core Concerns, and Mindfulness in 
Negotiation, 10 NEV. L.J. 289, 308 (2010) [hereinafter Riskin, Saltman Lecture]. See gener-
ally id. at 308–15 for a deeper discussion of mindful awareness and mindfulness practices. 
353  Riskin, Saltman Lecture, supra note 352, at 308. 
354  Id. at 314. 
355  Id. at 293; Riskin, Mindful Lawyer Symposium, supra note 352, at 635. 
356  Riskin, Saltman Lecture, supra note 352, at 314–15 (e.g., deciding to be mindful while 
brushing one’s teeth). 
357  Id. at 315 (quotation marks omitted). 
358  Baker & Brown, supra note 60, at 359. 
359  See id. at 360, 362–63. Traditionally, there is a distinction between concentration medita-
tion and awareness meditation, the latter of which is intended to train continuous awareness 
of whatever occurs in consciousness. Id. at 360. At least one type of mindfulness meditation 
may be considered a “hybrid” system that combines pure concentration and pure awareness 
practices by training some degree of concentration on the breath to stabilize concentration 
before training the continuous awareness characteristic of mindfulness. Id. at 362–63. 
Though concentration meditation and mindfulness meditation may overlap in some ways, 
they are treated here as two distinct practices. 
360  Id. at 359–60. For a detailed explanation of concentration meditation practice and train-
ing, see generally id. at 365–72. 
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thought and focus.361 Researchers have found that long-time meditators tend to 
have a thicker prefrontal cortex and right anterior insula (an area of the brain 
related to sensory data processing) than do non-meditators.362 Observable 
changes in the high-frequency brain waves associated with attention and per-
ception can be achieved with as little as two weeks of meditation practice.363 
Meditation can also produce the “relaxation response,” a term coined by Dr. 
Herbert Benson, cardiologist and founder of the Mind/Body Medical Institute 
at Harvard Medical School, to describe “an inducible, physiologic state of quie-
tude” characterized by decreased heart rate, metabolic rate, breathing rate, and 
blood pressure.364 The relaxation response counteracts the autonomic arousal 
evoked in connection with the flight-or-fight response.365 In producing the re-
laxation response and in helping to reduce and relieve stress,366 meditation may 
help lawyers and law students learn more, focus better, and improve their per-
formance.367  
In addition to the general benefits of various forms of meditation, specific 
attentional benefits have been observed as a result of mindfulness and concen-
tration meditation practices. Mindfulness training appears to improve practi-
tioners’ alerting network operations by improving their readied awareness, as 
well as their orienting network functions by improving their ability to concen-
trate on a specific object.368 Similarly, an exercise done with law students by 
Professor R. Lisle Baker of Suffolk University Law School and Dr. Daniel P. 
Brown of the Department of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School suggests 
that concentration meditation training might help to increase meditators’ ability 
to focus their thoughts and to listen attentively without having their minds 
                                                        
361  HORSTMAN, supra note 82, at 31. 
362  Id. 
363  Id. at 34. Though changes can be observed after such limited practice, meditation triggers 
these brain waves to a much greater extent in experienced meditators than in novices. Id.; see 
also SMALL & VORGAN, supra note 81, at 142 (observing significant brain wave changes 
during and after meditation in systematic electroencephalographic brain studies). 
364  BENSON WITH KLIPPER, supra note 288, at 9. 
365  See id. at 99; see also supra notes 287–89 and accompanying text. 
366  See HORSTMAN, supra note 82, at 20. 
367  See Riskin, Mindful Lawyer Symposium, supra note 352, at 639 (explaining that mind-
fulness practices can improve concentration and stress management, resulting in benefits for 
legal professionals and law students in terms of increased learning, more efficient studying, 
and better performance in class, clinics, and law practice settings). 
368  See Amishi P. Jha et al., Mindfulness Training Modifies Subsystems of Attention, 7 
COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE & BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 109, 109–16 (2007). In this study, partici-
pants in an intensive, one-month, residential mindfulness retreat demonstrated improved ori-
enting and alerting performance following mindfulness training as compared to participants 
in a weekly mindfulness-based stress reduction course and a control group. See id. at 111–
16. These types of enhancements in practitioners’ ability to concentrate and in turn enhance 
everything they do. Riskin, Saltman Lecture, supra note 352, at 323. 
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wander, as well as lead to increased feelings of alertness, relaxation, and 
calm.369  
Legal education has begun to embrace the teaching of meditative practices. 
Many law schools offer for-credit or non-credit courses on mindfulness or other 
topics that introduce or integrate mindfulness practices, such as negotiation, 
mediation, professional responsibility, trial practice, and clinics.370 Special pro-
grams on mindfulness can be found at the University of Miami School of 
Law371 and the UC Berkeley School of Law,372 among others. Law students and 
practicing lawyers can attend workshops and continuing legal education pro-
grams involving mindfulness, which have been sponsored by law schools, the 
American Association of Law Schools, the American Bar Association (the 
“ABA”) and other bar associations, law firms, courts, government agencies, 
and other sponsors in the United States and internationally.373 While less broad-
ly taught than mindfulness meditation, concentration meditation has been intro-
duced in at least one law school: Professor Baker and Dr. Brown have part-
nered to train Professor Baker’s students in concentration meditation practices 
for purposes of improving their attentional skills.374  
The availability of courses that teach meditative practices enhances the 
practicality of this advice for improving attention. Moreover, there are informal 
avenues available to legal professionals for learning about mindfulness or con-
centration meditation practices. These include meditation groups for lawyers,375 
books and audio programs available from bookstores and libraries,376 and even 
apps available for smartphones and tablets, many of which are free.377 
                                                        
369  See Baker & Brown, supra note 60, at 372–75. Although Baker and Brown’s work fo-
cused exclusively upon law students, it is reasonable to think that concentration meditation 
could yield similar benefits for other practitioners as well. 
370  Riskin, Mindful Lawyer Symposium, supra note 352, at 637 (for-credit and non-credit 
courses offered at law schools at the University of Miami, the University of Missouri, the 
University of Florida, Northwestern, Georgetown, and Vanderbilt, among others). 
371  See generally MIAMI LAW MINDFULNESS IN LAW PROGRAM, http://www.miami 
mindfulness.org/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2015). 
372  See generally Berkeley Initiative for Mindfulness in Law, BERKELEY LAW U. CAL., 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/mindfulness.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2015). 
373  Riskin, Mindful Lawyer Symposium, supra note 352, at 638 (noting that programs have 
taken place in the U.S., Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Israel, and Greece). 
374  See generally Baker & Brown, supra note 60, at 372–75, 378–82. 
375  Riskin, Mindful Lawyer Symposium, supra note 352, at 638 (functioning groups located 
in Northern California, Denver, New York City, and Portland, Oregon). 
376  A search of the public library catalog in my suburban Ohio town for “concentration med-
itation” yielded titles such as The Beginner’s Guide to Meditation, an audiobook lecture by 
clinical psychologist Dr. Joan Z. Borysenko, designed to teach the listener about three forms 
of meditation, including concentration and mindfulness. Catalog, MARYSVILLE PUB. LIBR., 
http://catalog.clcohio.org/polaris/ (search performed Oct. 17, 2014). 
377  For example, a search for “mindfulness” on the iTunes App Store turns up too many apps 
to count, such as Mindfully Me, a free app for the iPhone that promises to “enhance your 
mindfulness, leading to increased self-awareness, authenticity, and self-care” based on an 
approach designed by a “passionate team” of “psychologists, engineers, and meditation 
teachers.” “Mindfully Me,” iTunes App Store, ITUNES (search performed Jan. 6, 2015). 
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However, the suggestion to improve attention by practicing meditation is 
not a perfect solution, either now or in the foreseeable future. The two primary 
obstacles are access and effort. Though the number of legal education programs 
that incorporate meditation training is laudable, these programs may not be rea-
sonably available to all legal professionals. Cost is one factor. Attending a 
workshop or CLE event may include registration fees as well as travel and ac-
commodation costs that could be prohibitive for attorneys, educators, and stu-
dents on tight budgets.378 Another factor potentially limiting access to medita-
tion training is limited availability in student schedules for elective courses that 
are not tested on the bar exam. Conscious of the importance of bar exam pas-
sage rates for attracting new students, law schools may steer students toward 
doctrinal courses that are tested on the state exams, rather than “nonessential” 
courses that focus on meditation practices.379 In addition, as law schools reduce 
their number of faculty members in an attempt to cut costs in line with declin-
ing enrollment,380 there may be less room in the curriculum to teach non-
mainstream courses. Furthermore, there may be value for legal professionals in 
courses that specifically tie meditation training to law practice, such that the 
availability of meditation books and free apps may not provide the same degree 
of benefit as meditation training in a legal context. But given the ability to in-
corporate meditation training into well-established classes—such as alternative 
dispute resolution and trial practice—as well as the availability of free or low-
cost resources available to lawyers—such as attorney meditation groups—the 
access obstacle does not seriously undermine the suggestion of developing 
meditation skills to improve attention. 
The second obstacle, effort, is perhaps a greater (though not insurmounta-
ble) impediment to the success of implementing this advice. Simply put, reap-
                                                        
378  To illustrate, a law teacher who attended the Workshop on Mindfulness in Legal Educa-
tion hosted by the Berkeley Initiative for Mindfulness in Law on June 6–9, 2013, may have 
spent $450 for the regular registration fee and $129 per night at one of the recommended ho-
tels, plus the cost of the flight to California and of those meals that were not included in the 
Workshop. See Workshop on Mindfulness in Legal Education: Berkeley Initiative for Mind-
fulness in Law, BERKELEY LAW U. CAL., http://www.law.berkeley.edu/14864.htm (last visit-
ed Mar. 7, 2015). The Workshop organizers were clearly cognizant of the cost issue and of-
fered $50 student registrations and a limited number of $250 reduced-cost registrations for 
those for whom cost was an obstacle, but registrants who had to travel to the Workshop may 
still have incurred significant expenses. See id. 
379  Presumably, this practice would be more likely to occur at law schools that tend to have 
lower bar passage rates and more of a regional employment focus than at schools with higher 
passage rates and more of a national focus. Many schools have found room in their curricula 
to teach “nonessential” courses, such as Wine Law (taught at UC Berkeley) and Law, Psy-
chology, and Morality: An Exploration through Film (taught at Harvard Law School). See 
Courses@Boalt, BERKELEY LAW U. CAL., http://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-programs 
/courses/coursePage.php?cID=10697 (last visited Mar. 7, 2015); Harvard Law School 
Course Catalog: 2014–2015 Academic Year, HARVARD L. SCH. (Jan. 6, 2015, 2:04 AM), 
https://helios.law.harvard.edu/CourseCatalogs/hls-course-catalog-2014-2015.pdf. 
380  See Ashby Jones & Jennifer Smith, In Rare Step, Law Schools Shrink Faculty, WALL ST. 
J., Jul. 16, 2013, at B1. 
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ing the benefits of meditation involves an up-front investment of time and ef-
fort to learn how to meditate, and an ongoing investment of time and effort to 
practice. Changing the brain with meditation requires at least twenty minutes of 
regular practice, preferably daily.381 Legal professionals may be initially re-
sistant to the idea of carving out a block of time most days to practice medita-
tion, particularly if they are unaware of meditation’s numerous benefits or do 
not view themselves as suffering from attentional problems.382 Even those law-
yers and law students who genuinely believe in the benefits of meditation and 
actively desire to practice may find their busy schedules too demanding to 
make meditative practice a priority. Presumably, this will be most true of those 
who are relatively new to meditation and have experienced the difficulties of 
learning to practice383 but not the significant benefits of doing so. 
VI. WHAT CHANGES ARE ON THE HORIZON? 
All of the foregoing suggestions for how legal professionals should cope 
with the attentional challenges presented by ICTs have their own strengths and 
weaknesses. But more significantly, all of these suggestions share something in 
common: They focus upon how lawyers and law students need to change to 
overcome the problems the legal profession has, and will continue to have, with 
ICTs. Perhaps this misses the point. In some form or another, ICTs are here to 
stay. Even if we could undo the last century of technological advances and get 
rid of ICTs, we surely would not want to. More importantly, the Digital Gener-
ation would not let us. So perhaps the question is not, How do we change legal 
professionals so that they overcome what technology is doing to them?, but ra-
ther, How is the legal profession going to adapt to the new technological envi-
ronment when the Digital Generation are in charge? This question is not so 
much about what new technologies will be introduced to the profession as it is 
about how legal professionals will interact with technology in the future. Keep-
ing this inquiry in mind, this Part contains a number of predictions about what 
changes might be in store for law schools, client relations, and the courtroom 
when the Digital Generation take over the legal profession.  
                                                        
381  HORSTMAN, supra note 82, at 31. 
382  See supra note 336 and accompanying text. 
383  See Baker & Brown, supra note 60, at 359 n.96, 368. Baker and Brown suggest that con-
centration meditative practices may be especially difficult for legal professionals, for several 
reasons. First, they note that law teachers and students often pride themselves on how busy 
they are, such that when they “find the rare opportunity to be alone with [their] thoughts, 
[they] tend to get fascinated by them rather than staying focused on the concentration object, 
in turn requiring special effort.” Id. at 359 n.96. Second, they refer to a natural pride among 
law students and lawyers in having developed a “capacity for reasoned analysis,” which may 
make it “specifically challenging . . . to turn aside from often intriguing problems or trains of 
thought to focus on something seemingly as relatively uninteresting as one’s breathing.” Id. 
at 368. But, as Baker and Brown demonstrate in their work with law students, these difficul-
ties—though real—may be overcome with sufficient motivation. See id. at 372–75, 378–82. 
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A. Changes in Law School 
Changes to the law school experience will necessarily be part of overarch-
ing changes to the legal profession because of ICTs, either as an impetus for 
broader change to legal practice or as a result thereof. Bearing this in mind, this 
Section predicts four ways in which the Digital Generation and new technology 
will bring about future changes in law schools, including (1) widespread per-
mission for students to use laptops in class, (2) a revised focus for legal writing 
courses, (3) broader incorporation of meditation practice in the law school cur-
riculum, and (4) decreased reliance on the case method as the primary method 
of legal instruction. 
1. Laptops, Laptops Everywhere and Not a Pen in Sight 
In all likelihood, when the Digital Generation dominate the legal profes-
sion, The Great Laptop Debate384 will be resolved in favor of those who allow 
laptops in class, and laptops (along with tablets and smartphones) will be per-
mitted in every law school classroom. Several factors will contribute to this 
resolution. First, law school is more and more becoming a service industry and 
the “clients” are demanding—and will continue to demand—to use their elec-
tronic devices in class. Whether students’ use of ICTs in class ultimately im-
proves or hurts their academic outcomes is a question being studied,385 and not 
one that has been definitively answered either way.386 Without strong evidence 
that allowing laptops in class is affirmatively detrimental to students’ academic 
performance, law schools will likely provide what students are asking for.387  
                                                        
384  The debate whether to permit students to use laptops in class has been raging throughout 
legal academia for several years. See Jana R. McCreary, The Laptop-Free Zone, 43 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 989, 993–1005 (2009) (describing the debate and competing viewpoints). 
385  See generally, e.g., Carrie B. Fried, In-Class Laptop Use and Its Effects on Student 
Learning, 50 COMPUTERS & EDUC. 906 (2008) (discussing the negative correlation between 
in-class laptop use and understanding of course material and overall course performance); 
Reynol Junco & Shelia R. Cotten, No A 4 U: The Relationship Between Multitasking and 
Academic Performance, 59 COMPUTERS & EDUC. 505 (2012) (conducting study to “examine 
how college students multitask with ICTs and to determine the impacts of this multitasking 
on their college grade point average”); Junco, supra note 111 (examining the frequency with 
which students multitask in class and how that correlates with students’ overall semester 
grade point averages). The bulk of the empirical work is being done at the undergraduate 
level, though some law professors have also undertaken more informal studies on laptop use 
in their classes. See generally, e.g., Sovern, supra note 322 (describing a law professor’s 
study conducted by stationing observers in the back of law classes to determine students’ use 
of ICTs for non-class purposes). 
386  See Junco, supra note 111, at 2237 (describing studies that suggest there may be some 
cases in which technology use during class may not be detrimental to academic performance, 
and other studies that found laptop use was negatively related to various learning outcomes). 
387  The recent law school “crisis” stemming from a decline in law school applications and 
declining student enrollment will no doubt contribute to law schools’ willingness to accom-
modate student demands such as this one. See James B. Stewart, A Bold Bid to Combat a 
Crisis in Legal Education, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2014, at B1 (describing a “crisis in legal edu-
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Second, there is a growing sense that in-class ICT use is inevitable because 
it is an ever-increasing part of students’ elementary and secondary education,388 
and because—speaking practically—it is very difficult for professors to prevent 
it. Attempts at shutting off in-class Internet access have proved to be in vain, as 
students remain one step (or several) ahead of their professors.389 Why turn 
professors into the laptop police when students can just as easily surf the Inter-
net on their smartphones under their desks? Rather than continue to lose daily 
battles, professors will likely surrender and end the war.  
Third, there is a growing number of legal educators who are embracing 
electronic course materials in lieu of traditional printed books.390 It would seem 
unfair, perhaps hypocritical, to assign students to access materials electronical-
ly out of class and then to prohibit them from accessing the materials electroni-
cally in class. This would leave students with a choice either to forgo bringing 
their materials to class or to incur significant printing costs (both in monetary 
and in environmental terms) and would surely generate student complaints.  
Fourth, as time passes and older generations of professors retire, more pro-
fessors will be of the Digital Generation themselves. These Digital Generation 
                                                                                                                                
cation” and noting that law school applications nationwide fell to fifty-four thousand in 
2013, down from one hundred thousand in 2004). 
388  The use of ICTs in schooling starts early. The National Center for Education Statistics 
reported that as of 2008 the average U.S. public school had 189 computers, 98 percent of 
which had Internet access, for a ratio of 3.1 students per instructional computer with Internet 
access. THOMAS D. SNYDER & SALLY A. DILLOW, U.S. DEPT. EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION 
STATISTICS 2012, at 187 (2013), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2014/2014015.pdf. 
Throughout grade school education, teachers are incorporating ICTs in the classroom and 
students are encouraged to utilize ICTs in completing their assignments. See, e.g., KRISTEN 
PURCELL ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR.’S INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, HOW TEACHERS  
ARE USING TECHNOLOGY AT HOME AND IN THEIR CLASSROOMS 35 (Feb. 28, 2013),  
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-media/Files/Reports/2013/PIP_Teachers 
andTechnologywithmethodology_PDF.pdf [hereinafter PURCELL ET AL., TEACHERS USING 
TECHNOLOGY]. Ninety-six percent of teachers surveyed and/or their students use computers 
in the classroom or in completing assignments, while 73 percent use a cell phone or 
smartphone, 67 percent use a digital camera, and 55 percent use a digital video recorder. Id. 
This report by the Pew Research Center’s Internet & American Life Project is the second 
installment of a study based on a 2012 survey of 2,462 middle and high school teachers in 
the U.S., Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Id. at 7, 11. See infra notes 395 and 465 
for findings from the first and third installments. Though the teachers surveyed for this re-
port are “leading edge teachers” who may not be typical of all middle and high school teach-
ers across the U.S., see PURCELL ET AL., TEACHERS USING TECHNOLOGY, supra, at 8–9 (quo-
tation marks omitted), their ICT usage indicates a growing trend of ICT use in the classroom. 
Given that students are spending much of their educational lives using ICTs, it is under-
standable why they would want to use them while in law school and why legal educators 
might be concerned about the difficulties inherent in separating them from their devices. 
389  See McCreary, supra note 384, at 997 (noting “the reality that it is impossible to prevent 
Internet access by students” and describing student successes in circumventing attempts to 
prevent access). 
390  See Matthew Bodie, The Future of the Casebook: An Argument for an Open-Source Ap-
proach, 57 J. LEGAL EDUC. 10, 11 (2007) (“[P]rofessors have begun to create and assign 
their own electronic casebooks for student use.”). 
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professors may be more inclined than their predecessors to permit laptops in the 
classroom.391 Adding this professorial inclination to student demands, difficul-
ties preventing in-class ICT use, and the rise of electronic course materials, in-
class ICT use seems a foregone conclusion.  
If legal educators are faced with the knowledge that electronic devices will 
be part of the classroom landscape whether they like it or not, they will likely 
adopt the refrain of “If you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em.” Even those who formerly 
banned laptops will follow their ICT-enthusiast colleagues’ lead in finding 
ways to incorporate ICTs into classroom activities. Laptop note taking, clicker 
questions,392 and real-time Internet research will be just a jumping off point for 
the ways that creative legal educators will try to use electronic devices as a sig-
nificant learning tool, and not merely a distraction.393  
2. Legal Writing, or Just Writing? 
Educators at all levels have been bemoaning in recent years students’ lack 
of writing ability.394 Digital technology, especially the Internet395 and tex-
                                                        
391  This is by no means a foregone conclusion. According to my own definition, I am a 
member of the Digital Generation. And yet, although I went to law school at a time when 
laptops were commonplace, I ban laptops in my classroom. 
392  See Nancy G. Maxwell, From Facebook to Folsom Prison Blues: How Banning Laptops 
in the Classroom Made Me a Better Law School Teacher, RICH. J.L. & TECH., Nov. 2007, at 
1, 10–11, 32–33 (discussing use of “individual handheld wireless transmitters similar to re-
mote controls,” or “clickers,” by law professors). 
393  Given their vast experience with ICTs, the Digital Generation are uniquely positioned to 
identify viable solutions to the challenges posed by permitting laptops and other ICTs in 
class. Legal educators might be well advised to enlist their Digital Generation students in the 
effort to find methods of using ICTs in the classroom that maximize their pedagogical bene-
fits and minimize their detriments. 
394  See AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR.’S INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, 
WRITING, TECHNOLOGY AND TEENS 1 (2008), available at http://www.pewinternet.org 
/files/old-media/Files/Reports/2008/PIP_Writing_Report_FINAL3.pdf.pdf (“Research in K-
12 schools, colleges and universities has prompted concern among advocates, educators and 
policy makers that many young Americans do not possess strong writing skills.”). 
395  The Internet is blamed for encouraging sloppy, cut-and-paste work. See, e.g., KRISTEN 
PURCELL ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR.’S INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, HOW TEENS DO 
RESEARCH IN THE DIGITAL WORLD 27 (2012), available at http://www.pewinternet.org 
/files/old-media/Files/Reports/2012/PIP_TeacherSurveyReportWithMethodology110112.pdf 
[hereinafter PURCELL ET AL., TEENS DO RESEARCH] (discussing the first installment of a Pew 
report on the impact of technology on education). The Internet is also credited with under-
mining students’ ability to determine the credibility of the information they find. See id. at 
26; Taslitz, supra note 244, at 111–12. Studies of elementary school and secondary school 
children and college students have found that young people have difficulty assessing the 
credibility of what they find on the Internet. Taslitz, supra note 244, at 111–12; see PURCELL 
ET AL., TEENS DO RESEARCH, supra, at 26. The more young people use the Internet, the more 
credible they believe the information they find there to be. Taslitz, supra note 244, at 112; 
see PURCELL ET AL., TEENS DO RESEARCH, supra, at 26. 
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ting,396 has taken a fair amount of the blame for this. But law is largely a pro-
fession of writing—ranging from formal writing, such as contracts and plead-
ings, to informal writing, such as emails to colleagues and clients. Proficient 
legal writing requires the ability to interpret, to analyze, to synthesize, and to 
convey ideas clearly and precisely. Law schools cannot afford for their gradu-
ates to be inept writers. 
Even the rise of digital technology is unlikely to change the importance of 
writing to the practice of law. With this in mind, law schools will probably de-
vote greater resources to legal writing courses in the coming years. These 
courses are likely to have an expanded scope, with more emphasis on proper 
electronic communication, such as how to write a formal email to a client 
summarizing a conference call with opposing counsel. Legal writing instructors 
may also need to fill in gaps in their students’ writing education by, for exam-
ple, teaching students who have long since communicated predominantly 
through text messages how to draft a letter.397 
But the greatest change in law school writing courses will probably be one 
of attitude and expectation. Legal writing instructors may expect students to 
have less of a foundation of writing skills than is expected today. They will 
likely come to view teaching basic writing skills as a major part of their job. In 
short, law school writing courses may become less courses on legal writing, 
and more courses on simply writing. 
3. Make Room for Meditation 
As noted above, legal educators are starting to incorporate meditation in-
struction and practice into their courses.398 This trend is likely to continue as 
the Digital Generation take over legal education. The driving forces will be at 
least threefold: One motivating factor will be the growing problem of law stu-
dent and attorney stress and depression and the destructive behaviors that tend 
to go hand-in-hand, such as alcoholism and suicide.399 Because of meditation’s 
                                                        
396  See, e.g., M.A. Drouin, College Students’ Text Messaging, Use of Textese and Literacy 
Skills, 27 J. COMPUTER ASSISTED LEARNING 67, 68 (2011) (noting assertions that language 
used in texting is having a detrimental effect on people’s use of standard English). 
397  This need has already been recognized by the legal professionals who developed Core 
Grammar for Lawyers, “an online, self-directed learning tool designed to help law students, 
pre-law students, paralegal professionals, and practicing attorneys acquire the grammar and 
punctuation skills that are prerequisites to successful legal writing.” See generally CORE 
GRAMMAR FOR LAWYERS, http://www.coregrammarforlawyers.com/ (last visited Mar. 8, 
2015). 
398  See supra text accompanying notes 370–74. 
399  See, e.g., Todd David Peterson & Elizabeth Waters Peterson, Stemming the Tide of Law 
Student Depression: What Law Schools Need to Learn from the Science of Positive Psychol-
ogy, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 357, 358–59 (2009) (observing that law students 
suffer from elevated levels of depression, stress, and anxiety and report significantly higher 
levels of alcohol and drug use than their non-law student peers); Martin E.P. Seligman et al., 
Why Lawyers Are Unhappy, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 33, 37 (2001) (discussing that lawyers are 
at greater risk for depression, heart disease, alcoholism, and illegal drug use than the general 
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known stress-relieving benefits, meditation will likely be incorporated more 
broadly into classes such as legal professionalism and other classes concerned 
with attorney wellbeing. Another motivating factor will be the perceived de-
cline in students’ attentional capacity concomitant with their use of ICTs. Out 
of concern that students are plagued with “popcorn brain,”400 legal educators 
will likely teach meditation practices in an attempt to increase students’ powers 
of focus and concentration—just like some, such as Professor Baker, are al-
ready doing. A final motivating factor will be the perceived ability of medita-
tion to complement and enhance skills within certain disciplines, such as nego-
tiation.401  
That said, predicting that even a majority of law professors will be inclined 
to teach meditation in their classes goes too far. Meditation instruction is not a 
natural fit within every law school course, and not every law professor will 
necessarily recognize its value to legal education. Like dispute resolution,402 
meditation may at first be the province of only a few pioneers before it is ulti-
mately accepted into the regular law school curriculum. But even if its incorpo-
ration into the curriculum is gradual, meditation will likely become part of 
mainstream legal education in the future because of the many potential benefits 
it has for legal professionals. 
4. Cutting Back on the Case Method? 
Today, one widely used method of legal instruction is the so-called “case 
method” developed by Christopher Columbus Langdell, a teaching method that 
involves “student examination of judicial decisions coupled with Socratic style 
                                                                                                                                
population and suffer from major depressive disorder at a 3.6 times higher rate than em-
ployed persons do generally); Rosa Flores & Rose Marie Arce, Why Are Lawyers Kill- 
ing Themselves?, CNN (Jan. 20, 2014, 2:42 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/19/us 
/lawyer-suicides/ (stating that lawyers rank fourth in suicide deaths by profession, according 
to data provided to CNN by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). 
400  See Elizabeth Cohen, Does Life Online Give You ‘Popcorn Brain’?, CNN (Jun. 23, 2011, 
7:03 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/HEALTH/06/23/tech.popcorn.brain.ep/index.html (de-
scribing “a brain so accustomed to the constant stimulation of electronic multitasking that 
[the person is] unfit for life offline, where things pop at a much slower pace”). 
401  See Riskin, Saltman Lecture, supra note 352, at 292–93 (describing how negotiators may 
improve their ability to utilize Roger Fisher and Daniel Shapiro’s core concerns framework 
by improving their awareness skills through mindfulness). 
402  See Frank E.A. Sander, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Law School Curriculum: 
Opportunities and Obstacles, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 229, 230–32 (1984) (describing early ef-
forts to incorporate dispute resolution into the law school curriculum). In 1983, only forty-
three of the ABA-accredited law schools nationwide (25 percent) offered dispute resolution 
courses. ELLEN CONLIN ET AL., A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION, 
DIRECTORY OF LAW SCHOOL DISPUTE RESOLUTION COURSES AND PROGRAMS 2 (Anne Clare 
ed., 1986). By 1986, the number had grown to 111 out of 175 accredited schools (63 per-
cent). Id. By the year 2000, 182 out of 183 accredited law schools (99.5 percent) offered 830 
dispute resolution courses and programs in total. Kimberlee K. Kovach, Foreword to A.B.A. 
SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, DIRECTORY OF LAW SCHOOL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
COURSES AND PROGRAMS (Jack C. Hanna et al. eds., 2000). 
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analysis.”403 Langdell first introduced this teaching method to legal education 
in 1870, when he became dean of Harvard Law School.404 Langdell’s case 
method has been the subject of a great deal of criticism, from scholars,405 edu-
cational reform groups,406 and students407 alike, though it lives on as the prima-
ry method of legal instruction.408 But as the Digital Generation become both the 
students and the professors, this method will probably lose its primacy. 
Existing law professors are already starting to embrace alternative teaching 
methods and instructional tools, many of which involve technology.409 These 
include PowerPoint slides, in-class Internet access,410 videos,411 class podcasts 
and blogs, web-based course management systems and interactive course web 
pages,412 clickers,413 data projectors,414 computerized tutorials and lessons,415 
                                                        
403  Russell L. Weaver, Langdell’s Legacy: Living with the Case Method, 36 VILL. L. REV. 
517, 518 (1991). 
404  Id. at 518, 520. But see id. at 520–21 (noting that there is some disagreement regarding 
whether the method originated with Langdell and whether the idea to use it was his alone). 
405  E.g., Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method, and What to Do About It, 
60 VAND. L. REV. 609, 612 (2007) (arguing that legal educators using the case method “are 
trapped inside a pedagogic fossil, marvelously preserved from a vanished era by the adaman-
tine rock of a licensed monopoly”). 
406  See A.B.A. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND 
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE 
ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 236 (1992) (criticizing the 
method’s too frequent emphasis on “qualities that have little to do with justice, fairness, and 
morality in daily practice”); ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: 
A VISION AND A ROAD MAP 99 (2007), available at http://www.cleaweb.org/Resources 
/Documents/best_practices-full.pdf (noting that the case method is overused in law school 
and it “has significant defects as an instructional tool. Its impact on individual students is 
sporadic, it emphasizes certain steps of the cognitive process while ignoring others, and it 
does not provide a feedback mechanism to address and correct skills deficiencies.”); 
WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., SUMMARY: EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW 6 (2007) (identifying “lack of attention to practice and inadequate con-
cern with professional responsibility” as “unintended consequences” of legal education’s 
reliance upon the case method). 
407  See Weaver, supra note 403, at 518–19 (noting student complaints that the case method 
is inefficient, poorly used, and a tool of intimidation and harassment). 
408  See John Burwell Garvey & Anne F. Zinkin, Making Law Students Client-Ready: A New 
Model in Legal Education, 1 DUKE F.L. & SOC. CHANGE 101, 102 (2009) (“[T]he teaching 
method of studying cases combined with Socratic questioning . . . is still the primary method 
of teaching law in the United States.”). 
409  Paul L. Caron & Rafael Gely, Taking Back the Law School Classroom: Using Technolo-
gy to Foster Active Student Learning, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 551, 551 (2004) (“Law schools . . . 
have witnessed an explosive growth in the use of technology in the classroom. Many law 
teachers now deploy a wide array of technological bells and whistles . . . .”). 
410  Id. at 556. 
411  See Dwight Golann, Using Video to Teach Negotiation and Mediation, DISP. RESOL. 
MAG., Winter 2007, at 8, 8–9 (describing various purposes for which video can be used in 
ADR instruction). 
412  Camille Broussard, Teaching with Technology: Is the Pedagogical Fulcrum Shifting?, 53 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 903, 906–07 (2008–09). The Blackboard Learning System and The 
West Education Network (TWEN) are two of these course management systems. Id. 
413  See Caron & Gely, supra note 409, at 560–61; Maxwell, supra note 392, at 10–11. 
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online simulations,416 and flipped classrooms,417 among others. As the Digital 
Generation become law students, this trend toward technology in the classroom 
and away from reliance on the case method is likely to continue418—not only 
because many legal educators already think the case method is suboptimal and 
are finding these technology-based methods to be effective, but also because 
they have read that the Digital Generation will not tolerate traditional teaching 
methods.419 Seeking to teach in a way that their Digital Generation students can 
learn,420 and guided by statements of best practices for legal education that ad-
vocate the use of technology,421 these educators will probably utilize the case 
method less often as they more frequently incorporate technology into the 
classroom. 
The movement away from the case method as the primary form of law 
school instruction will surely continue as the Digital Generation take over the 
teaching profession. These Digital Generation professors will probably feel 
                                                                                                                                
414  Craig T. Smith, Teaching Synthesis in High-Tech Classrooms: Using Sophisticated Visu-
al Tools Alongside Socratic Dialogue to Help Guide Students Through the Labyrinth, 9 
PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 110, 110–11 (2001). 
415  The Center for Computer-Assisted Legal Instruction (CALI), a non-profit consortium of 
law libraries, law schools, and other related organizations, distributes over nine hundred in-
teractive legal tutorials and lessons for use in law schools. See About CALI, CALI:  
THE CENTER FOR COMPUTER-ASSISTED LEGAL INSTRUCTION, http://www.cali.org/content 
/about-cali (last visited Mar. 9, 2015). 
416  See Ira Steven Nathenson, Best Practices for the Law of the Horse: Teaching Cyberlaw 
and Illuminating Law Through Online Simulations, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 657, 693–707 (2012) (describing use of “Cybersimulations” as an instructional 
method in a cyberlaw course and describing specific examples). 
417  See generally William R. Slomanson, Blended Learning: A Flipped Classroom Experi-
ment, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 93 (2014) (describing one law professor’s experience flipping his 
civil procedure course). The so-called “flipped” classroom is one in which the traditional 
lecture and homework aspects of a class are reversed: Students view short video lectures out-
side of class and class time is used for discussion, exercises, or projects. EDUCAUSE 
LEARNING INITIATIVE, 7 THINGS YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT . . . FLIPPED CLASSROOMS 
(2012), available at http://net.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/ELI7081.pdf. 
418  See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 406, at 117 (“If technology is not the future of legal edu-
cation, it is at least part of the future. Proven and experimental uses of technology will con-
tinue to grow, and some components of legal education will be transformed by it.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
419  See, e.g., HORSTMAN, supra note 82, at 58–59 (noting that digital natives do not learn 
like traditional students from one-way lectures); SMALL & VORGAN, supra note 81, at 25 
(finding that digital natives have shorter attention spans, especially for traditional forms of 
learning); Prensky, supra note 166, at 3 (questioning whether digital natives cannot pay at-
tention in class or simply choose not to because they feel it is not worth their attention). 
420  See Stephen M. Johnson, Teaching for Tomorrow: Utilizing Technology to Implement 
the Reforms of MacCrate, Carnegie, and Best Practices, 92 NEB. L. REV. 46, 54–55 (2013) 
(describing the Digital Generation’s learning styles and noting that “it would seem to be 
beneficial to incorporate technology more fully into law school pedagogy to fit those stu-
dents’ learning styles, rather than requiring students to try to modify their learning styles to 
fit the mold of traditional law school pedagogy”). 
421  See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 406, at 117–19 (describing the use of technology to en-
hance learning as part of best practices for legal education). 
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comfortable with technology-based teaching methods because of the prevalence 
of technology throughout their educational careers. It is foreseeable that Digital 
Generation professors will gravitate toward the instructional methods they ex-
perienced as law students, just as many of their predecessors have replicated 
their own law school experiences by using the case method.422 And since Digi-
tal Generation professors will likely have less reason to view case method in-
struction as part of the law school right of passage,423 they will probably be 
more open-minded about technology-based alternatives.  
This is not to suggest that legal education is an either/or proposition, that 
legal educators will either use the case method or will integrate technology into 
the classroom. Though the case method may well lose its primacy in legal in-
struction in the coming years, it is unlikely to disappear from legal education 
entirely. As a threshold matter, most of the research regarding the Digital Gen-
eration’s learning styles has examined students at the undergraduate level and 
below, rather than law students.424 Thus, the case method’s compatibility with 
Digital Generation law students remains somewhat of an open question. Future 
research might indicate that certain aspects of the case method make it an effec-
tive instructional tool for Digital Generation students, whether in respect to 
their preference for interactive instruction,425 or their attentional resources,426 or 
otherwise. 
                                                        
422  As Professor Rogelio Lasso remarks, “[l]aw school professors receive little or no instruc-
tion on how to teach. The only model for teaching law school was provided by their law pro-
fessors. As a result, most law professors teach in much the same way they were taught . . . .” 
Rogelio Lasso, From the Paper Chase to the Digital Chase: Technology and the Challenge 
of Teaching 21st Century Law Students, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 13 (2002) (footnote 
omitted). 
423  See Peggy Cooper Davis & Elizabeth Ehrenfest Steinglass, A Dialogue About Socratic 
Teaching, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 249, 279 (1997) (suggesting that some profes-
sors value Socratic dialogue as part of law school tradition that students have come to ex-
pect). 
424  See Johnson, supra note 420, at 56. 
425  To the extent that the interaction between the professor and the student engaged in So-
cratic dialogue makes the case method more engaging than pure lecture, the case method 
might be an effective way to teach the Digital Generation. See Stephen R. Alton, Roll Over 
Langdell, Tell Llewellyn the News: A Brief History of American Legal Education, 35 OKLA. 
CITY U. L. REV. 339, 351–52 (2010) (referring to the case method as “intellectually stimulat-
ing”). However, scholars disagree about whether the case method truly promotes active 
learning, or whether it is “primarily a vicarious form of instruction, where the ‘thinking’ that 
goes on between the teacher and the one student involved in the dialog[ue] ‘rubs off on all 
the students in the class.’ ” Caron & Gely, supra note 409, at 555 (quoting Michael Hunter 
Schwartz, Teaching Law by Design: How Learning Theory and Instructional Design Can 
Inform and Reform Law Teaching, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV 347, 351 (2001)). 
426  Some professors believe that calling on students without warning makes them more alert 
in class and causes them to pay better attention to class proceedings. See, e.g., Davis & 
Steinglass, supra note 423, at 278. This makes sense from an attentional resources perspec-
tive: If students sit in class without fear of being called upon, they will likely experience a 
dip in tonic alertness as they grow bored with the lecture. They might choose to ignore the 
lecture and to allocate their top-down attentional resources to something more diverting, 
such as a Sudoku puzzle. But if students know they could face Socratic questioning at any 
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Moreover, despite the criticisms of the case method, many practicing law-
yers—and not only litigators—still learn legal rules by reading cases.427 A case 
method of instruction focused on teaching common law rules may not provide 
all the instruction needed to go from law student to practicing lawyer,428 but a 
legal education that does not instruct law students how to read a case and to 
glean the rules from it is, arguably, an inadequate legal education. The case 
method may not be the best—and is not the only—way to teach students how to 
read a case, but it is a long-established one. And so, while the case method may 
undergo future modifications,429 and will likely have to share the stage with 
technology-based teaching methods more and more in the coming years, it is 
likely to survive and to remain part of legal education.430  
B. Changes in Client Relations  
Just as legal education is certain to adapt to digital technology and the Dig-
ital Generation who love it, practicing lawyers are sure to experience changes 
in their relations with clients in the coming decades. This Section sets forth 
three predictions for how legal practice will adapt to changes prompted by the 
widespread use of ICTs, namely (1) a movement toward alternative billing ar-
rangements, (2) increased attorney-client communication via text messages, 
and (3) shorter, more frequently interrupted meetings. 
                                                                                                                                
time, their tonic alertness levels will instead probably increase during class. Moreover, upon 
hearing the sound of the professor calling their names, they will likely experience a sharp 
increase in phasic alertness. This sound will also engage their bottom-up attentional mecha-
nisms, likely causing them to allocate their top-down attentional resources to the class pro-
ceedings. In this way, use of the case method could produce discernible attentional benefits. 
However, other aspects of the case method experience might undermine the attentional bene-
fits it provides. Some students report that fear of humiliation by the professor makes it hard 
for them to concentrate. See id. This, too, makes sense from an attentional resources perspec-
tive: If being called on in class is stressful for students, then knowing they could be called on 
at any time will probably heighten their ANS arousal. As their attentional resources are allo-
cated to detecting the stressor (i.e., the sound of their names being called), unrelated infor-
mation (i.e., class proceedings) will probably be blocked out, thereby negating the case 
method’s attentional benefits. 
427  In my years of practicing as a transactional lawyer, there were many times that I re-
searched case law in order to be able to answer a question posed by a client or a supervising 
attorney. 
428  See Rubin, supra note 405, at 651–53 (arguing that the first-year curriculum should in-
clude an introduction to regulatory and transactional law in addition to common law). 
429  See id. at 654–55 (proposing a revised first-year law school curriculum, including several 
variations to the case method’s current form). The case method has already undergone sig-
nificant changes from the original form Langdell introduced to legal education. See Alton, 
supra note 425, at 352 (noting that Langdell “would hardly recognize much of what goes on 
in our classrooms”). 
430  See Johnson, supra note 420, at 53 (“Technology will not replace the traditional law 
school classroom . . . .”). 
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1. Bye-bye, Billable Hour 
The economic downturn in the late 2000s caused many in the news media 
and the legal industry to expect that corporate clients would push for alternative 
billing arrangements to reduce their legal costs, and that law firms would 
quickly agree in order to stem the declining demand for legal services.431 These 
speculations in turn sparked a great deal of talk about the billable hour’s im-
pending death.432 Though many law firms have in fact devoted substantial time 
and effort to creating alternatives to the billable hour, at least one recent report 
suggests the use of alternative fee arrangements may be declining, rather than 
increasing.433 It appears that the billable hour is still viable and is still a major 
part of legal billing practices.434 This may change in the future—not because of 
another recession, but because of the Digital Generation’s love of trying to do 
multiple things at once. 
As noted above, the Digital Generation love to multitask and they do so 
frequently.435 Given this, it seems unlikely that they will foreswear multitasking 
when they become practicing attorneys. But multitasking at work—texting Cli-
ent X and taking calls from Client Y while trying to draft a shareholders’ 
agreement for Client Z—will make it even harder for Digital Generation law-
yers to keep accurate track of billable time and to make sure that their billed 
hours account for every shift of attention between tasks and all the associated 
time costs. Digital Generation clients (likely heavy multitaskers themselves) 
                                                        
431  Has the News of the Death of the Billable Hour Been Greatly Exaggerated?, A.B.A. 
SECTION OF LITIGATION: A.B.A. ANNUAL MEETING 1 (Aug. 8–12, 2013), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/aba-annual-
2013/written_materials/1_1_has_the_news.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter Death of the Bill-
able Hour]. 
432  See id. at 1–2. 
433  Id. at 2 (citing a survey by Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P. of 275 in-house attorneys in the 
U.S., which found that 51 percent used some type of alternative billing arrangement, as 
compared to 61 percent the prior year). If alternative fee arrangement use is truly declining, 
it may be partly because lawyers are not convinced that the arrangements are profitable. Two 
recent surveys of practicing lawyers regarding alternative fee arrangement profitability found 
that fewer than 25 percent of those surveyed believe alternative fee arrangements are more 
profitable than hourly billing arrangements. Victor Li, How Profitable Are Alternative Fee 
Arrangements, in Practice?, ABA JOURNAL, http://www.abajournal.com/lawscribbler/article 
/how_profitable_are_alternative_fee_arrangements_in_practice (Oct. 1, 2014, 10:38 AM 
CDT). Others have a more optimistic view of alternative billing arrangements’ viability. See 
Death of the Billable Hour, supra note 431, at 2 (citing a report indicating that the use of al-
ternative fee arrangements is rising and is expected to increase in popularity in the coming 
years). Regarding alternative fee arrangements, president of BTI Consulting Group Michael 
Rynowecer has this to say: “[Alternative fee arrangements] are here, partners are making 
money off of them, and they’re likely to stay. . . . Clients like alternative fees. That’s not go-
ing away.” Li, supra (quoting Michael Rynowecer). 
434  Death of the Billable Hour, supra note 431, at 1, 7. Hence the title of this ABA Annual 
Meeting program, a clear reference to Mark Twain’s famous cable from London that said, 
“The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated.” MARK TWAIN, THE WIT AND WISDOM OF 
MARK TWAIN: A BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 46 (Paul Negri ed., 1999). 
435  See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
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will presumably recognize their generation’s tendency to multitask, and might 
surmise that their lawyers are frequently multitasking while billing by the hour. 
This may provide additional motivation for the clients to demand an alternative 
billing arrangement to ensure that they are getting the benefit of all the work 
they are paying for. It may also give the lawyers a reason to want an alternative 
fee arrangement, as they might find they are doing little bits and pieces of work 
for various clients and not getting paid for all of it when they charge in six-
minute increments. Assuming the arrangements adequately capture the value of 
the work being performed, this change could be advantageous for both attor-
neys and clients. 
2. Why Talk When We Can Text? 
Lawyers practicing today communicate extensively with clients via email; 
by some accounts, they are more likely to have regular interaction with clients 
through email than by phone or in person.436 This development is in some ways 
problematic, both from a perspective of security and confidentiality437 as well 
as with regards to the effectiveness of email communication as compared to 
telephone or in-person communication.438 These problems will likely be magni-
fied with Digital Generation lawyers and their clients. 
As discussed above, the Digital Generation’s younger members use email 
only infrequently, if at all.439 They currently prefer texting to any other form of 
communication with people in their lives.440 It is foreseeable that Digital Gen-
eration clients will bring their texting habits—or whatever replaces texting in 
the coming years—to their communications with their attorneys. And, likewise, 
their attorneys will text them back. The existing concerns for security and con-
fidentiality with email communication will be exacerbated, as the security pro-
                                                        
436  See 4 AM. BAR ASS’N, 2013 LEGAL TECHNOLOGY SURVEY REPORT, WEB AND 
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY 62 (Joshua Poje ed., 2013). This 2013 survey of 823 ABA 
lawyer members in private practice found that, of the lawyers surveyed, 92.4 percent com-
municate with clients via email “regularly,” while 91.5 percent regularly communicate via 
telephone or voicemail, and 52 percent regularly communicate face-to-face (plus or minus a 
3.5 percent margin of error). Id. at ii, 62. 
437  For example, of the lawyers surveyed by the ABA, 58.2 percent report sending confiden-
tial or privileged communications or documents to clients via email one or more times per 
day, and an additional 19.7 percent report doing so between one and four times per week. Id. 
at 58. Yet in terms of the safety precautions taken when sending these documents, 76.3 per-
cent relied on the confidentiality statement in the message body, only 31.8 percent used en-
cryption, and only 12.2 percent password protected the documents. Id. at 59. 
438  See, e.g., Noam Ebner et al., You’ve Got Agreement: Negoti@ting via Email, 31 
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 427, 434–43 (2010) (noting that email negotiation is likely to 
involve increased contentiousness, diminished interparty cooperation, reduction in integra-
tive outcomes, diminished interparty trust, and increased tendency toward sinister attribution 
as compared to face-to-face negotiation). 
439  See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
440  See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
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tocols will surely lag behind the technologies,441 and the professional guide-
lines for ethical communication practices will likely struggle to keep pace with 
the dizzying array of available communication methodologies.442  
Even if the legal profession develops effective security and confidentiality 
protocols for communication via new technologies, the use of text messaging 
and other rapid communication technology in legal practice is troubling from a 
client counseling perspective. Quite simply, the practice of law does not neatly 
fit into 160 characters.443 Trying to communicate clearly via email is hard 
enough—doing it via text only increases the risk of miscommunication. No 
amount of emoticons can replace the nuances of speech. No degree of chat 
shorthand444 can make a flurry of texts a suitable substitute for considered 
counsel delivered through a medium that permits explanation and elaboration. 
The very nature of texting—its rapidity, the instantaneousness expected in re-
sponding—is part of what makes texting inimical to the provision of sound le-
gal advice. Attorneys would be well advised to pause, reflect, and consider the 
implications of their responses before firing them off. While texting may not 
prevent them from doing so, it certainly encourages them not to. Surely the le-
gal profession will adapt to growing use of text messages and other forms of 
instant messaging, as it has adapted to the rise of email over the last few dec-
ades. And yet, much as the use of email in legal practice has proved problemat-
                                                        
441  See Roland L. Trope & Sarah Jane Hughes, Red Skies in the Morning—Professional Eth-
ics at the Dawn of Cloud Computing, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 111, 124–25 (2011) (“[T]he 
external threats have evolved much faster than the safeguards against them, due to the rapid 
evolution of communications technology.”). 
442  For a contrary viewpoint, see id. at 136 (“It is our belief that the development and adop-
tion of new communications technologies will seldom require significant changes to the 
long-standing professional ethical rules, however surprising, rapid, and disruptive the tech-
nologies prove to be upon their emergence.”). 
443  Standard text messages are restricted to 160 characters. See Mark Milian, Texting Pio-
neer Was a Man of Letters, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 2009, at B1 (explaining the history of the 
160-character maximum). 
444  The NetLingo website provides a list of hundreds of acronyms and shorthand commonly 
used in text messaging and various forms of instant messaging and Internet chat. Using the 
terms on this list, an attorney might write to her client, with respect to a settlement offer she 
believes to be illusory, IAC, IBIWISI. Her client may understand this to mean In any case, 
I’ll believe it when I see it, thereby expressing her doubts and a “wait and see” attitude. Then 
again, he could also construe it as If anyone cares, I’ll believe it when I see it and think she is 
annoyed and feels unappreciated. Or, alternatively, it could mean I am confused; I’ll believe 
it when I see it, which would suggest either that the offer is unclear or that she is over-
whelmed by the situation. In turn, the client’s response TTT could be understood by the at-
torney to mean Thought that, too, indicating he agrees with his lawyer’s assessment of the 
offer’s illusory nature, or To the top, perhaps suggesting he wants her to push for a bigger 
settlement figure, or, more cryptically, That’s the ticket. See NetLingo List of Chat Acronyms 
& Text Shorthand, NETLINGO, http://www.netlingo.com/acronyms.php (last visited Mar. 9, 
2015). To be fair, nothing would prevent either the attorney or the client from using full 
words for clarity. Yet this somewhat facetious example demonstrates some of the challenges 
of relying upon a medium that was never intended to be used for the nuanced communica-
tion demands of legal practice. 
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ic, the rising importance of text messaging is certain to create its own challeng-
es.  
3. Are We Done Yet? 
The practice of law in its current form features many occasions that de-
mand hours-long interactions—for instance, presenting a case in court, meeting 
with clients and opposing counsel to hammer out the terms of a new joint ven-
ture, and preparing clients for depositions. Practicing lawyers can probably re-
call any number of times in their experience when the talks were intense, the 
breaks were few, and the food was ordered in, if eaten at all.  
Let us assume that the Digital Generation adopt as children the suggestion 
of taking a technology break every fifteen minutes in order to improve their 
concentration. Starting in elementary school and continuing all the way through 
law school, their teachers have encouraged it in an attempt to get them to focus. 
This is the way they sit through every class and the way all their studying gets 
done. It is a predictable consequence of forming this habit that the Digital Gen-
eration will continue to take frequent technology breaks when they enter legal 
practice. Digital Generation clients will likely do the same in their careers. 
Consequently, it seems likely that day-long, sustained meetings with breaks on-
ly to use the restroom will be passé, and that shorter interactions with more in-
terruptions will be the norm.  
This predicted development is not inherently bad. Two benefits are readily 
apparent: First, concentrated periods of interaction with frequent breaks may 
lead to greater efficiency in the time between breaks. Second, if technology 
breaks become a social norm and everyone takes a break at the same time, this 
reduces the number of occasions in which either attorney or client (or both) is 
staring down at his lap while trying to check messages surreptitiously on the 
phone underneath the table. Two drawbacks are just as apparent: First, taking 
frequent breaks interrupts the flow of a meeting and risks cutting off discussion 
that might otherwise result in hatching an idea or a reaching a deal. Second, 
lawyers and clients who habitually rely upon breaks may struggle to engage for 
longer than fifteen minutes at a time even in situations that demand it, such as a 
lengthy examination of a witness on the stand or an appellate argument before a 
tribunal.  
C. Changes in Court  
If law schools and client relations must adapt to the world ICTs are creat-
ing, surely courts will not be immune. This Section sets forth three predictions 
for how courtrooms and litigation will change in the future based on the influ-
ences of ICTs and the Digital Generation, including the following: (1) wide-
spread use of ICTs in courthouses and courtrooms; (2) reliance on ICTs for 
presentations to judges and juries; and (3) potential changes to the length of 
court filings. 
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1. ICTs Permitted—and Problematic 
ICT use is already prevalent in courtrooms today. A 2013 survey of attor-
neys conducted by the ABA regarding technology use in the legal profession 
found that 47.9 percent of respondents who practice in a courtroom report using 
their laptops in the courtroom for various tasks, while 77.4 percent report using 
their smartphones and 34 percent report using a tablet.445 They use their devices 
particularly for accessing the Internet, checking for new email, sending email, 
conducting online research, and calendaring.446 Generally speaking, these fig-
ures reflect an increase in ICT usage by courtroom attorneys over the last few 
years.447 
It is foreseeable that the percentage of attorneys utilizing ICTs in the court-
room—for these purposes and others—will continue to increase because courts 
will increasingly permit ICTs to be brought into and used in the courthouse. 
These changes will not happen overnight, but will instead likely take a decade 
or more to be fully implemented. In fact, some courts, such as the criminal 
courts in Cook County, Illinois,448 will probably go in the opposite direction 
initially and will institute ICT bans before ultimately permitting ICTs in the 
courtroom. The initial hesitance is understandable in light of significant con-
cerns about ICTs in the courtroom, but it seems likely that courts will ultimate-
ly accept ICTs in recognition of their ubiquity in daily life and our growing re-
liance upon them. 
The concerns raised about ICTs in the courtroom generally fall in two ma-
jor categories: security problems and potential impacts on court proceedings.449 
Security concerns stem largely from ICTs’ camera functions. Many ICTs are 
capable of taking both still pictures and videos, and there have been instances 
                                                        
445  3 AM. BAR ASS’N, 2013 LEGAL TECHNOLOGY SURVEY REPORT, LITIGATION AND 
COURTROOM TECHNOLOGY iii, 19–23 (Joshua Poje ed., 2013) [hereinafter AM. BAR ASS’N, 
TECHNOLOGY III]. These results are based on a survey of 822 ABA lawyer members in pri-
vate practice, with a plus or minus 3.4 percent margin of error. Id. at iii. 
446  Id. at 20, 22. Thirty and one-tenth percent of lawyers who practice in a courtroom report 
accessing the Internet in court, while 29.1 percent check for new email, 28.2 percent send 
email, and 26.5 percent conduct online research. Id. at 20. Seventy-one and nine-tenths per-
cent percent report using a smartphone for checking email, while 67.2 percent use one to 
send email, 53.5 percent use the phone for calendaring, and 46.7 percent use it to access the 
Internet. Id. at 22. Similarly, 27.4 percent check for new email on a tablet, 26.9 percent use a 
tablet to send email, 23.7 percent access the Internet on a tablet, and 21.1 percent use a tablet 
for calendaring. Id. at 24. 
447  Id. at x–xi. 
448  See Press Release, State of Ill. Circuit Court of Cook Cnty., Electronic Communica-
tions/Internet Devices Ban Goes into Effect April 15 at 26th and California (Apr. 11, 2013), 
available at http://www.cookcountycourt.org/MEDIA/ViewPressRelease/tabid/338/ArticleId 
/2199/Electronic-communications-Internet-devices-ban-goes-into-effect-April-15-at-26th-and 
-California.aspx. 
449  See Nora Sydow, “Can You Hear Me Now?” Issues and Policy Considerations for Cell 
Phones and Other Electronic Devices in the Courts, CT. MANAGER, Summer 2010, at 45, 45 
(2010). 
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of witness and juror intimidation when someone in a courtroom has taken a pic-
ture of jurors or witnesses, including some who are undercover agents.450 In 
addition, guns, Tasers, and stun guns can be modified to masquerade as cell 
phones; these weapons-come-cell-phones present an obvious security risk in 
court.451 The second major concern with ICTs in the courtroom regards the ex-
tent to which ICT use “could adversely impact court proceedings—and ulti-
mately, the fair and effective administration of justice.”452 One substantial part 
of this has to do with jurors. There is reason to worry about jurors’ use of ICTs 
to discuss ongoing jury trials, whether by posting on social media or otherwise, 
and about the possibility that jurors will use ICTs to conduct their own trial-
related research.453 Another substantial part has to do with journalists. Journal-
ists’ use of ICTs to provide real-time reports of trial proceedings through Twit-
ter or blogging or other forms of real-time communication may have a negative 
impact on justice in the courtroom.454 Finally, there is some concern that audi-
ble disruptions from cell phone ringers (even when set to “vibrate”) and typing 
on keyboards may undermine the solemnity of court proceedings.455 In light of 
all these concerns, a policy prohibiting ICTs from being brought into the court-
house is understandable. 
Such a policy is also likely to be short-lived. In all likelihood, the pendu-
lum will swing definitively back to the side of permitting ICT use in the court-
room in the coming years—both in recognition of the importance of ICTs in 
our daily lives and business practices,456 and because prohibiting ICT use is 
                                                        
450  Id. at 46. For instance, in February 2010, Judge Nancy Russo of Ohio’s Cuyahoga Coun-
ty Common Pleas Court declared a mistrial after jurors noticed that two spectators in the 
courtroom were videotaping the jury and the prosecutors with their cell phones. 
CHRISTOPHER J. DAVEY ET AL., CONFERENCE OF COURT PUB. INFO. OFFICERS, NEW MEDIA 
AND THE COURTS: THE CURRENT STATUS AND A LOOK AT THE FUTURE 43 (2010), available at 
http://ccpio.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/2010-ccpio-report.pdf. Judge Russo cited the 
spectators for “intimidating and frightening the jurors.” Id. 
451  Sydow, supra note 449, at 46. 
452  Id. 
453  See id. In one instance of juror misuse of ICTs, a juror in a child kidnapping and sexual 
assault case in Lancastershire, England was dismissed from the jury after she posted details 
of the case on her Facebook page and indicated an intent to poll her online friends for advice 
in deciding the case. DAVEY ET AL., supra note 450, at 24. In another, a Maryland appeals 
court overturned a first-degree murder conviction because a juror consulted Wikipedia one 
night after deliberations to look up the definition of “lividity.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
454  Sydow, supra note 449, at 46; see also DAVEY ET AL., supra note 450, at 38 (“Headlines 
from across the nation reflect the difficulties microblogging attorneys, jurors, journalists and 
judges have created for courts. When abused or improperly managed, the technology has the 
potential to taint witnesses, disseminate inappropriate or potentially threatening photos, pro-
duce appellate issues, or provide an inappropriate communication thread for jurors, parties 
and observers.”). 
455  Sydow, supra note 449, at 47. 
456  See id. (“[M]obile devices are increasingly essential to our personal and professional 
lives, and mobile communication technologies are being incorporated into a wide variety of 
business processes. . . . Mobile devices are essential to many attorneys’ practice. . . . For 
court patrons, coming to court is often an extremely time-consuming and unpleasant experi-
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costly, time-consuming, and ultimately impractical.457 Courts also have an in-
terest in being “transparent and open to the citizens they serve.”458 Permitting 
technology in the courtroom can serve this end, despite the many courtroom 
management issues it creates.459 Permitting ICTs in the courtroom will require 
a significant investment in developing appropriate policies to manage the com-
peting interests at stake,460 and there will certainly be growing pains—
potentially severe ones. Yet in the end, permitting ICT use in the courtroom is 
inevitable. 
2. A Multimedia Extravaganza 
Laptops have uses in the courtroom beyond accessing the Internet and 
checking email. According to the ABA courtroom technology survey, 23.5 per-
cent of attorneys who practice in a courtroom currently deliver presentations 
using their laptops.461 In addition, close to half use a projection screen, more 
than a third use a digital projector, more than a quarter use a DVD player, and 
over 12 percent use a television.462 A significant percentage of attorneys pre-
sent evidence using their laptops, evidence cameras, and digital cameras, 
among other digital technologies.463 A day in court is becoming a multimedia 
extravaganza. 
This trend is likely to accelerate when the Digital Generation comprise the 
majority of practicing attorneys, for at least two distinct reasons. The first is 
that Digital Generation lawyers will want to incorporate ICTs into their court-
room presentations. The Digital Generation love technology; two of the hall-
marks of their generation are their enthusiasm for digital media and their ability 
to use digital technology to create content.464 From the time they were in grade 
school, they have been incorporating various media into their projects and 
presentations.465 If the Digital Generation have grown comfortable presenting 
                                                                                                                                
ence. Allowing court patrons the use of mobile devices inside the court complex would al-
low them to conduct other business while they wait.”). 
457  See id. (noting the likely delays that would be caused by a policy that prohibits bringing 
ICTs into the court facilities). As Sydow writes, “[b]anning [ICTs] from the courts is grow-
ing increasingly difficult and impractical.” Id. 
458  DAVEY ET AL., supra note 450, at 44. 
459  See id. 
460  See id. at 88–89 (setting forth recommendations for next steps in studying the potential 
benefits and risks of new technology in the courtroom). 
461  AM. BAR ASS’N, TECHNOLOGY III, supra note 445, at 20. 
462  Id. at 38 (finding that 43.3 percent use a projection screen, 35.8 percent use a digital pro-
jector, 27.9 percent use a DVD player, and 12.5 percent use a television). 
463  Id. at 39 (finding that 38.5 percent present evidence using a laptop, 14.8 percent use an 
evidence camera, 7 percent use a digital still camera, and 5 percent use a digital video cam-
era). 
464  ROSEN, REWIRED, supra note 110, at 26. 
465  See LENHART ET AL., supra note 394, at 11 (69 percent of teens reported creating audio, 
video, PowerPoint, or multimedia presentations for school within the prior year); see also 
KRISTEN PURCELL ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR.’S INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, THE IMPACT 
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their information with a multimedia backdrop, it seems likely that they will turn 
to this method of presentation in the courtroom as well. 
The second is that Digital Generation lawyers will need to turn to multime-
dia presentations in the courtroom in order to capture the audience’s atten-
tion—regardless of whether that audience is a Digital Generation judge or a 
Digital Generation jury. Researchers have noted that the Digital Generation 
seem to learn differently than their predecessor generations; they tend to have 
shorter attention spans for traditional forms of learning, particularly one-way 
lectures.466 They are used to getting information quickly, and prefer that the in-
formation come in the form of graphics, rather than text.467 Even conventional 
television can seem boring to the Digital Generation—a conservative estimate 
of one-third of them use other media (especially the Internet) while they are 
“watching” television.468 The generation’s lifelong immersion in fast-paced 
media, with rapid scene changes and dazzling colors, shapes, and forms, has 
been credited with this shift.469 As Dr. Dimitri Christakis, a pediatrician at the 
University of Washington School of Medicine, describes it, “[i]f a child’s brain 
gets habituated to that pace and to the extreme alertness needed to keep re-
sponding and winning [as when playing video games], the child ultimately may 
find the realities of the world underwhelming, understimulating.”470  
To ensure that a Digital Generation judge or a jury is paying attention to 
her case, a Digital Generation attorney essentially will be forced to incorporate 
a variety of media into her presentation.471 This raises questions with signifi-
cant implications: What impact will this reliance on multimedia presentations 
have on legal outcomes? If the judge’s or the jury’s ability to pay attention to 
                                                                                                                                
OF DIGITAL TOOLS ON STUDENT WRITING AND HOW WRITING IS TAUGHT IN SCHOOLS  
11 (2013), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-media/Files/Reports/2013 
/PIP_NWP%20Writing%20and%20Tech.pdf [hereinafter PURCELL ET AL., HOW WRITING IS 
TAUGHT] (third installment of Pew report on the impact of technology on education). Seven-
ty-seven percent of teachers reported assigning a multimedia project at some point during the 
academic year, including 84 percent of the English teachers and 82 percent of the histo-
ry/social science teachers surveyed. Id. at 14, 16. 
466  See sources cited supra note 419. 
467  Prensky, supra note 166, at 3. 
468  See SMALL & VORGAN, supra note 81, at 25 (estimating one-third of Digital Generation 
children are multitasking while watching TV). The Kaiser Family Foundation report esti-
mates as many as 68 percent of the Digital Generation are multitasking while watching tele-
vision. See supra note 178. 
469  See, e.g., ROSEN, REWIRED, supra note 110, at 85 (noting that children “are used to a fast, 
shallow pace of information presentation and get bored when trying to absorb information at 
the rates that were normal for their parents”); SMALL & VORGAN, supra note 81, at 26 (stat-
ing that neural circuitry and some parts of the brain that normally adapt to more traditional 
learning styles are becoming less developed, such that classroom learning and lecture/note-
taking seems boring). 
470  ROSEN, IDISORDER, supra note 111, at 113 (quoting Dr. Dimitri Christakis). 
471  As Rosen writes, “the key is that we can no longer assume that students can be forced to 
unitask without a loss of attention.” ROSEN, REWIRED, supra note 110, at 86. The same is 
very likely true when those students grow up and become factfinders in the courtroom. 
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information depends upon its delivery in a technologically enhanced, engross-
ing fashion, might an attorney’s failure to incorporate digital media in making 
his case result in a miscarriage of justice?  
3. Briefer Briefs? 
The Digital Generation write frequently.472 Most teens write something for 
school on almost a daily basis.473 In addition, the Digital Generation engage in 
many forms of informal “writing,” such as texting, tweeting, blogging, and mi-
croblogging on social network sites, using ICTs.474 Though frequent, the Digi-
tal Generation’s writing tends to be short. In a recent survey, 82 percent of 
teens reported that their typical school writing assignments are between one 
paragraph and one page in length.475 Although there seems to be agreement 
among business leaders,476 educators,477 parents,478 and young people479 that 
writing well is very important for one’s future success, there is some question 
whether writing at length is similarly crucial. Even teachers who continue to 
believe that formal writing assignments are critically important have raised 
doubts about the value of longer textual expression, such as term papers, in to-
day’s digital environment.480  
With this backdrop in mind, it seems relevant to question what impact the 
trend toward shorter writings may have on legal writing in the future. Will thir-
ty-page court filings remain the norm,481 or will briefs become briefer? Though 
it is tempting to extrapolate from research reporting a trend in favor of shorter 
writing in school that legal writing will soon follow suit, this prediction pre-
sumes too much. The fact that email is becoming the most common form of 
                                                        
472  See LENHART ET AL., supra note 394, at i (“Teenagers’ lives are filled with writing. All 
teens write for school, and 93 percent of teens say they write for their own pleasure. . . . Par-
ents believe that their children write more as teens than they did at that age.”). 
473  Id. at iii. Of teens who were surveyed, 50 percent reported that their school work requires 
daily writing, while 35 percent say they write several times a week, and the remaining 15 
percent write less often. Id. at iv. 
474  PURCELL ET AL., HOW WRITING IS TAUGHT, supra note 465, at 18; see also LENHART ET 
AL., supra note 394, at ii (finding that 85 percent of teens ages twelve to seventeen at least 
occasionally engage in some form of personal electronic communication). 
475  LENHART ET AL., supra note 394, at iv. 
476  See NAT’L COMM’N ON WRITING, WRITING: A TICKET TO WORK . . . OR A TICKET  
OUT: A SURVEY OF BUSINESS LEADERS 5–10, 15–16 (2004), available at 
http://www.collegeboard.com/prod_downloads/writingcom/writing-ticket-to-work.pdf (de-
scribing a 2004 survey of sixty-four members of the Business Roundtable that found that 
writing is an important skill for salaried employees and a significant consideration in both 
hiring and promotion). 
477  See, e.g., PURCELL ET AL., HOW WRITING IS TAUGHT, supra note 465, at 19–20. 
478  See, e.g., LENHART ET AL., supra note 394, at 37. 
479  See, e.g., id. at 42. 
480  PURCELL ET AL., HOW WRITING IS TAUGHT, supra note 465, at 21, 23. 
481  E.g., FED. R. APP. P. 28.1(e)(1) (requiring appellant’s principal brief not to exceed thirty 
pages). 
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business writing482 does not imply that there is not a time and place for other, 
lengthier forms of writing, or that shorter writing forms are an acceptable sub-
stitute for longer forms in all situations. Moreover, in many cases it is harder to 
be precise in short writings; condensing a complex legal argument into a short-
er span of pages may actually involve greater, not less, effort. This is one in-
stance in which the Digital Generation will likely adapt to norms of the legal 
profession, rather than the other way around.  
CONCLUSION 
Each of the foregoing predictions of the influence of ICTs and the Digital 
Generation on the legal profession is exactly that—a prediction. In many ways, 
predicting the ways that technology will shape the legal profession in the com-
ing decades is like forecasting what features our flying cars will have twenty 
years from now. It is inherently speculative. Predictions about technology tend 
also to be a bit overly optimistic or overly fearful, depending upon whether the 
predictor is the first on his block to adopt the newest gadget or the last to part 
ways with his typewriter.  
While we cannot be certain what the future will hold for the legal profes-
sion, we can be sure that ICTs (in some form or another) will be a part of it. 
Even if we could rid the world of ICTs for attention’s sake, most of us would 
opt not to—no more than we would abandon our cars or microwaves or ball-
point pens or any other invention once thought to be indicative of society’s 
general decay483 that is now a well-accepted part of everyday life. It is unrealis-
tic to think that we can return to a pre-ICT existence. Our lives are simply dif-
ferent now. Plus, the Digital Generation have never known any other way of 
life. So instead of worrying whether ICTs are “good” or “bad” for the practice 
of law as if we could get rid of them, we should accept that they are inevitable. 
To this end, legal professionals—both current and future—should pursue the 
suggestions that accept ICTs as a fact of life and that aim to help them adapt to 
technology, rather than encourage them to run from it. 
                                                        
482  See NAT’L COMM’N ON WRITING, supra note 476, at 11. 
483  See ALLAN COLLINS & RICHARD HALVERSON, RETHINKING EDUCATION IN THE AGE OF 
TECHNOLOGY: THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION AND SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 31 (2009) (observing 
that, in 1950, ballpoint pens were decried as “the ruin of education in our country”) (quota-
tion marks omitted). 
